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Abstract 
 
All human beings understand the behaviors of others as causal results of their mental 
states. Philosophers call this ability folk psychology and developmental researchers call it theory 
of mind (ToM). My dissertation concerns how this reasoning works and how it is acquired.  
First, I develop and expand a theory of how folk psychology develops in childhood. This 
is the Perceptual Access Reasoning, or PAR theory of the Fabricius lab. Contrary to the two 
views dominant in the field, I argue that ToM (belief reasoning or BR) is acquired around 6 years 
of age after undergoing two preliminary cognitive stages, reality reasoning (RR) and perceptual 
access reasoning (PAR). Neither of the first two satges of ToM development involve an 
understanding of mental representation. Evidence for the PAR hypothesis comes from the 
failure of 4- and 5-year-olds on a false belief task which includes a third, irrelevant, alternative; 
their failure on true belief tasks; and their failure on no belief tasks. Only the PAR hypothesis 
can account for all the data. Chapter 2 explains the PAR hypothesis and children’s 
understanding of believing. Chapter 3 extends the PAR theory to children’s understanding of 
perception, and demonstrates that the data (mostly tasks testing Flavell’s classic 4 levels model 
of perception understanding and his appearance/reality distinction) support the PAR 
hypothesis. 
Second, I demonstrate how this theory can be usefully applied to solve problems in 
cognitive science. In Chapter 4 I explore dual systems theories of cognition (and ToM in 
particular). In Chapter 5 I solve the Perner-Povinelli Problem—the claim that no empirical test 
can decide whether subjects are using mentalist rules to pass ToM tasks, or merely using 
  
behavioral rules which require no understanding of mental representation. In Chapter 6 I use 
the PAR hypothesis to argue that a limited theory-theory of concepts is plausible. The PAR stage 
concept of KNOWING and the adult (BR) concept of KNOWING are fundamentally different 
because the former is non-representational. Evidence for this is that children in the PAR stage 
do not distinguish between knowing and guessing correctly, nor between lying and being 
mistakenly incorrect. The PAR child’s concept of KNOWING is inextricably linked with 
perceptual access and correct behavior; in other words, with the inferential rules of the PAR 
theory. I then defend this hypothesis against Fodor’s shareability objection. 
Finally, in Chapter 7, I make some specific suggestions for continuing my folk psychology 
research program by expanding the PAR theory and applying it to other problems in philosophy. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
Introduction: Methodology and Overview 
 
1. Methodology: Speculative Psychology 
 Jerry Fodor prefaces The Language of Thought (1975) by calling it a work of speculative 
psychology. He describes this discipline as follows: 
It wasn’t quite philosophy because it was concerned with empirical theory construction. 
It wasn’t quite psychology because it wasn’t an experimental science. But it used the 
methods of both philosophy and psychology because it was dedicated to the notion that 
scientific theories should be both conceptually disciplined and empirically constrained. 
The monograph you are holding is also a work of speculative psychology, and as such I take 
Fodor 1975 and Fodor 1983 to be models of the methodology that I shall employ.  
There is a place for empirically-minded philosophers of mind to work alongside 
psychologists in ways that are mutually beneficial. Perhaps one of the lessons of the earliest 
research to come out of the recent Experimental Philosophy movement is that philosophers 
receive insufficient training in the getting-your-hands-dirty work of empirical data gathering. 
It’s safe to say that controlling for confounding variables in a thought experiment is much easier 
than doing it in a lab or on a questionnaire. Psychologists have a lot of training and experience 
in the gathering and mathematical analysis of data. On the other hand, philosophers are trained 
theorists. They spend a lot of time coming up with theories and making sure that they’re 
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consistent with other commonly held beliefs. The best philosophers are also good at making 
sure that their theories are consistent with both science and common sense. There is a process 
of reflective equilibrium in which one balances broader theories with individual findings from 
experiments. Philosophers are also good at interpreting data and constructing theories that 
don’t draw conclusions that go excessively beyond what the data suport. In this way 
philosophers and psychologists can work well together, the philosophers constraining the 
theorizing and the psychologists doing the empirical work, and both coming up with new ideas 
and designing future experiments.  
Of course, in taking empirical psychology seriously as a source for theorizing, this 
methodology continues a tradition in philosophy of mind which began in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s (as far as I can tell). I see exemplars of this tradition in the work of e.g. Thomas 
Nagel (at least in “Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness”), Ned Block, Tyler Burge, 
Robert Van Gulick, Daniel Dennett, C. L. Hardin, Eric Schwitzgebel, Georges Rey, Peter 
Carruthers, Jesse Prinz, Stephen Stich, and of course Jerry Fodor. Although the theories of these 
philosophers differ in many respects, they are all alike in taking empirical data from psychology 
experiments as both starting points and constraints when theorizing about the mind.1 
2. Philosophers and Cognitive Development of Theory of Mind 
                                                           
1 Here I am thinking of myself as belonging to the Analytic tradition in philosophy, because that’s what my training 
is in. In taking the science of psychology seriously as both a constraint and a data source for theorizing, Continental 
philosophers were probably further ahead (thinking of for instance Merleau-Ponty’s attitude toward child 
psychology). 
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All people, regardless of their culture, automatically interpret the behavior of other 
people by ascribing various mental states and personality traits to those people. It is so 
ubiquitous that it is almost unnoticeable, but I think it would be inconceivable to do otherwise, 
even if (as a few philosophers such as Stich and the Churchlands argue) this “folk theory” ends 
up being largely false. For instance, imagine you are walking down a familiar street when you 
notice that a person on a skateboard is heading straight for you. Contrast that situation with 
what you would expect if you noticed a skateboard heading straight for you with no person on 
it. Your predictions about the behavior of the skateboard are going to be drastically different in 
the distinct scenarios.2 The prediction you apply in the case of the person is going to 
incorporate what you interpret from that person’s facial expression about what she believes 
and perceives, along with attributing to her a general desire not to collide with anyone or 
anything. The other situation, by contrast, will only involve a rudimentary understanding of 
physics. 
Philosophers call the theory of human behavior utilized in the first situation “folk 
psychology,” but psychologists have been calling it “Theory of Mind” (ToM) since at least 
Premack & Woodruff (1978). The field’s inception is a paradigmatic example of psychologists 
and philosophers working together fruitfully. In the original commentaries on psychologists 
David Premack and Guy Woodruff’s chimpanzee studies (1978), a handful of philosophers 
suggested an experiment which was to become the false belief task (Bennet 1978, Dennett 
1978, Harman 1978, Pylyshyn 1978). This experiment was adapted for testing children by 
                                                           
2 This is, incidentally, one reason why I find Dennett’s Intentional Stance view so lacking—it ignores crucial 
differences between systems with minds and systems without them (unless he wants to ascribe minds to lightning 
bolts and thermostats). 
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psychologists Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner (1983). In a multitude of variations, and with 
subjects ranging from infants to adults, from chimps to dogs, crows and rats, this experiment 
has been the centerpiece of study on ToM and its development. 
For almost four decades now, many psychologists have spent their time investigating 
how this theory of mind develops. There have been a few philosophers paying attention to this 
research program, including e.g. about a third of the papers in Carruthers & Smith (1996), the 
dissertation and early work of Eric Schwitzgebel (which received very little attention from the 
rest of the discipline) and numerous references in the work of Stephen Stich and Peter 
Carruthers. Most of this attention resulted in a few philosophers weighing in on the Theory-
Theory/ Simulation Theory debate (e.g. Goldman 2006, Nichols & Stich 2003), but that formerly 
hot topic is no longer as popular, and most philosophers never went further than this rather 
narrow spectrum. However, there is whole host of philosophical puzzles and issues in the 
psychological literature which are waiting to be fruitfully addressed by philosophers using the 
Speculative Psychology method outlined above, and these have largely been ignored by 
philosophers. The present monograph is an attempt to improve that situation. 
The time is ripe for a philosophical investigation of this sort. The field of ToM in 
Developmental Psychology has itself been in disarray during the past decade, as the recent 
finding that infants are able to pass the false belief task has sent shockwaves through university 
psychology departments and created upheaval amongst researchers who were content with 
the Traditional View that children undergo a profound cognitive shift at about the age of four 
when they putatively acquire the concept of belief (e.g. Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Perner, 1988, 
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1991; Saxe, Carey, & Kanwisher, 2004; Wellman et al, 2001). On the other hand, the Nativist 
View is that ToM ability, including an understanding of belief, is innate.3 Although this view has 
been around since the 1980s (Leslie 1987, see also Fodor 1992), it has gained prominence in the 
past decade following Onishi & Baillargeon (2005)’s landmark study demonstrating that 15-
month-olds can pass a non-verbal false belief (location) task. A flurry of studies has followed 
since Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) first cracked the dam (Buttelman et al 2009, He et al 2011, 
Scott & Baillargeon 2009; Scott et al 2010, Song & Baillargeon 2008, Southgate et al 2010, 
Surian et al 2007, etc). So many studies have been done at this point in time that it would be 
implausible to deny that infants are capable of passing a non-verbal false task. This throws a 
major monkey wrench into the Traditional View, which had finally seemed to settle in as the 
status quo by the end of the second millennium. 
Although the current theory of mind debate in psychology (with a few philosophers 
recently weighing in; see e.g. Carruthers 2013) is consumed with the Traditional versus the 
Nativist views, recent findings that 4- and 5-year-olds fail the true belief task (Fabricius et al 
2010; discussed in Chapter 2) raise major problems for both sides. If children understand beliefs 
at age 4 as the Traditional View holds, then the true belief task should be passed at the same 
time as the false belief task. In fact, even though the task demands are as made as 
commensurable as possible, intuitively the true belief task ought to be easier to pass than the 
false belief task.  
                                                           
3 See Chapter 2 below for fuller explanations of the Traditional and Nativist views of ToM development. 
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The true belief findings are, if anything, even worse for the Nativist View. According to 
this hypothesis the failure of 3-year-olds on false belief tasks is not a sign that they lack 
competence in using BR, but is simply a kind of performance error (Chomsky, 1965; Fodor, 1992) 
in which something interferes with this competence to cause them to fail false belief tasks. 
Thus, according to Nativism, failure of inhibition or something similar causes 3-year-olds to fail 
a verbal false belief task, but this is not an issue with looking time measures (Baillargeon et al 
2010, Leslie 2005, Roth & Leslie 1998). In order to save the hypothesis, nativists now need an 
explanation for why 4- and 5-year-olds are making performance errors after they have 
apparently overcome the failure of inhibition in order to pass the false belief task. The 
Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR) hypothesis of Fabricius and colleagues, unlike its more 
popular rivals, is able to explain all of these disparate findings, as I will demonstrate in the 
following chapter. 
The present project continues to use the PAR hypothesis in order to deal with 
philosophical puzzles and difficulties in the development of Theory of Mind. I have already been 
involved in some fleshing out and development of this theory (Hedger & Fabricius 2011, Hedger 
2016), and that continues in this monograph with a treatment of children’s understanding of 
perception (Chapter 3) and belief (Chapter 2) from the PAR perspective. I also use the theory as 
a framework and springboard to solve problems such as the “Povinelli Problem” in Cognitive 
Science (Chapter 5), and in order to shed light on other murky topics such as concept 
acquisition (Chapter 6). 
3. The Rest of the Monograph 
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Chapter 2 explains the Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR) hypothesis, and then uses the 
resulting theory to explain young children’s conception of belief, which progresses according to 
three distinct stages of development. I demonstrate that the PAR hypothesis is able to explain 
all of the data from developmental psychology, including the prima facie puzzling findings that 
infants and four-year-olds pass the false belief task but three-year-olds fail it, and that four- and 
five-year-olds fail the true belief task while three-year-olds and six-year-olds pass it. In this way 
the PAR hypothesis is shown to be superior to the two dominant views of the field—Nativism 
(that understanding of belief is innate and in fact is evident in infancy) and the Traditional View 
(that children develop belief understanding at about four years of age). In contrast, according 
to the PAR theory, genuine understanding of belief is not acquired until around six years of age. 
I also speculate that the PAR hypothesis is equipped to explain findings in the Theory of Mind of 
chimpanzees, adults, and persons with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). 
Chapter 3 examines empirical data concerning young children’s understanding of 
perception, especially Flavell’s influential model of perception understanding and the Level 1/ 
Level 2 distinction, and the work of Flavell and others on children’s understanding of the 
appearance/ reality (A/R) distinction. If someone has the concept of belief, then they ought to 
be able to pass Level 2 and A/R tasks. However, as I argue in Chapter 3, someone using PAR 
should fail them. Initially, it appears that success rates of 4- and 5-year-olds vary widely on both 
sorts of tasks. However, some analysis and clarification demonstrates that many tasks 
commonly assumed to be tests of Level 2 understanding are actually testing only Level 1. Once 
these tasks are distinguished, we can see that 4- and 5-year-olds are seen to fail most Level 2 
tasks, with the possible exception of some very simple ones. However, these latter are 
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explained by the fact that understanding perception is a matter of degree, so that the same 
PAR subject may be able to pass very simple Level 2 tasks where the demands are not much 
higher than Level 1 tasks, but still perform poorly on slightly more complicated (and realistic) 
Level 2 tasks. I also argue that performance of 4- and 5-year-olds is consistent with what we 
would predict given their lack of understanding of mental states. Finally, I demonstrate that the 
PAR hypotheses is able to explain the findings during this transitional period of development 
that have so puzzled other researchers. 
Chapter 4 explains the PAR hypothesis in relation to dual systems theories of cognition. I 
argue against an alternative hypothesis that is proposed by Anika Fiebich in a recent Synthese 
paper (2014). According to Fiebich, PAR is not a distinct transitional stage in children's theory of 
mind development, but is a fast and frugal System 1 heuristic that fades once children become 
fluent in social reasoning. I point out a number of problems with Fiebich's proposal and argue 
for the superiority of the PAR hypothesis. I also present five reasons to be skeptical about the 
findings of Perner and Horn, which purportedly show that 4- and 5-year-olds can pass the 3-
location false belief task when the test is suitably modified. This is a further difficulty for 
Fiebich’s proposal, since she relies on these findings in her fluency theory. Finally, I sketch a 
dual systems theory of mind account based upon the PAR hypothesis which is different from 
Fiebich’s. 
Chapter 5 addresses what has become known as the “Povinelli Problem” in cognitive 
science. Psychologists worry about finding an empirical method for determining whether 
chimps and infants are passing ToM tasks by using mentalist rules, which include a conception 
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of mental representation, or whether they are passing them merely by using behavioral rules 
which require no understanding of the mind as such. Daniel Povinelli has made the argument 
that there is in fact no empirical method for deciding which of these two explanations is true, 
and Josef Perner has recently applied the argument to the case of human subjects. In this 
chapter, I demonstrate how the PAR theory can provide an answer to this challenge. In fact, we 
already have evidence that many 4- and 5-year-olds have been using rules which make no 
reference to beliefs in order to pass false belief tasks, and infants and chimps may be using 
these same behavioral rules (or some slight variation thereof). I provide an empirical test for 
determining whether or not this is indeed the case, thus solving the problem. 
Chapter 6 tackles the thorny issue of concept acquisition. Implicit in the background of the 
PAR theory is the idea that the concept BELIEF is acquired at around age six, as a constituent of 
the Theory of Mind which they also develop at this time. This places it firmly in the tradition of 
Sue Carey’s Theory-Theory of Concepts. However, while extremely popular amongst 
developmental psychologists (for reasons I make plain in this chapter), this view has been the 
victim of vehement attacks by Jerry Fodor. In this chapter I make explicit the PAR theory of 
concept acquisition which has been in the background in the previous chapters, and answer 
one of Fodor’s challenges to the Theory-Theory view. I also explain that various theories which 
have gone under the moniker of “Theory-Theory” in psychology, which most people (including 
Carey and Fodor) have assumed are completely independent hypotheses, nonetheless actually 
mutually reinforce each other and provide a unified, coherent view of the human mind. 
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Finally, in Chapter 7 I sketch some fruitful directions and projects (both philosophical and 
empirical) based upon the PAR hypothesis, as part of a plan to extend the research program in 
this monograph into the future. Some projects further develop and expand the PAR theory, 
while others are applications to different philosophical problems. Finally, I provide a detailed 
sketch for my next project, viz. an exploration of the phenomenal experience of young children 
entitled What is it like to be a 5-year-old? 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Believing: 
The Perceptual Access Reasoning hypothesis and young children’s understanding of belief 
 
1. Introduction 
The study of children’s understanding of mental states, along with the ability to use that 
information to predict the behavior of others, is called “Theory of Mind” (ToM) or 
“mindreading” in psychology. This chapter and the next will explore in detail the state of the art 
in children’s ToM, focusing on the mental states of belief (this chapter) and perception (Chapter 
3). The focus is for two main reasons: First, the study of these two has dominated the literature 
in psychology, and so the information available concerning these two types outweighs any 
others by a significant portion. Second, for what philosophers of mind call “folk psychology,” 
these two types of states are seen to be the most crucial and prolific (see e.g. Churchland 1981, 
Davidson 1963, Dennett 1981, Fodor 1987, Horgan & Woodward 1985, Lewis 1972, Ramsey, 
Stich & Garon 1990). Pick your favorite toy example of folk psychology (Bob sees that it’s 
raining and believes that an umbrella will keep him dry, so I he will go to the closet to get his 
umbrella before leaving the house) and perception and belief states are likely to appear in that 
explanation. Indeed, it’s difficult to imagine any causal explanation of human behavior which 
takes into account the agent’s mental states that could avoid including that agent’s beliefs.4 
                                                           
4 Williamson (1995, 2000) argues that knowing is the primary, more basic concept, and that belief is parasitic upon 
knowledge. On this view (which I am sympathetic to), some causal explanations of behavior might refer to knowing 
but not believing. Since this issue is tangential to the main points of this chapter, and won’t really change anything 
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When do children understand the concept of belief? A massive amount of research in 
developmental psychology over the past 30 years has been devoted to this topic. However, 
most research has been narrowly focused on various versions of the false belief task. It has 
come to be taken for granted that this single task is the litmus test for Theory of Mind (ToM) 
ability.5 However, Fabricius & Imbens-Bailey (2000) reveal a confound in the task allowing a 
child to give the correct answer either by attributing a false belief to the protagonist, or by 
attributing only ignorance to the protagonist and assuming that the protagonist will therefore 
be wrong about where to find the object. Furthermore, most researchers have assumed that 
the true belief task is too simple to be of much use in studying ToM development, but 
according to the PAR hypothesis children in an intermediate stage of mindreading ability should 
fail the true belief task, and Fabricius et al (2010) indeed confirmed that many 4- and 5-year-
olds who pass the false belief task nonetheless fail the true belief task. 
In this chapter, I focus on children’s understanding of belief in order to explain the 
Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR) hypothesis. This hypothesis is supported by numerous 
studies involving the false belief task (Section 2), the true belief task (Section 4), and the no 
belief task (Section 5). I then argue for its superiority over the two most popular views in theory 
of mind development, which I call the Traditional View and the Nativist View (Section 7). 
                                                           
of importance, I set this philosophical debate aside. See Section 3.1 of Chapter 7, below, for more about the theory 
of ToM development I argue for here and its relation to Williamson’s view about knowledge. 
5 For example, Henry Wellman, one of the pioneers of the ToM field, and his colleagues recently write, “Our 
measure of theory of mind is a battery of false belief tasks. Explicit false-belief understanding is a milestone, 
universal theory-of-mind achievement of the preschool years (Wellman et al., 2001), and is the most commonly 
used measure in research examining individual differences in theory of mind during the preschool years...” 
(Wellman et al, 2011). 
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2. The false belief task 
False belief tasks have been used as the core test of children’s ability to attribute 
representational mental states and use them to understand behavior since the first study of 
theory of mind in children (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In one such task, the unexpected transfer 
task (or false location task), children are presented with the following scenario, normally 
accompanied by dolls to represent the characters in the story, and props to represent the 
locations: Maxi comes into the kitchen with a piece of chocolate. He wants to put it somewhere 
so he can find it when he comes back from playing outside. He puts it into the red cupboard, 
and then goes outside to play. Later, Maxi’s mother comes into the kitchen to clean. She moves 
the chocolate from the red cupboard to the green cupboard while she is cleaning. Then, Maxi 
comes inside from playing. He is hungry and wants his chocolate. Subjects are then asked the 
test question: “Where will Maxi look for his chocolate?” The correct answer is, of course, the 
red cupboard, since Maxi ought to believe (falsely) that this is where his chocolate is located. 
Philosopher Daniel Dennett (1978) first sketched the logic and rationale for false belief 
tasks.6 Dennett was commenting on studies of theory of mind in chimpanzees (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978), in which chimps would often predict that an agent who gave cues to his 
mental state (e.g., reaching for bananas hung from the ceiling) would subsequently engage in 
the correct behavior (i.e., get a box to stand on). Chimpanzees appeared to attribute mental 
                                                           
6 Jonathon Bennet (1978), Gilbert Harman (1978), and Zenon Pylyshyn (1978) made similar suggestions in regards 
to studying chimpanzee theory of mind, and other philosophers had previously stressed the importance of 
understanding false belief in order to count as having the concept BELIEF. Donald Davidson (1975), e.g. argues that 
“Someone cannot have a belief unless he understands the possibility of being mistaken, and this requires grasping 
the contrast between truth and error—true belief and false belief” (p. 170). 
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states, but they might have simply associated familiar behaviors and outcomes. Dennett argued 
that an unambiguous test of mental state attribution required the chimpanzee to predict that 
the agent would engage in an incorrect behavior, which could be accomplished by giving the 
agent a false belief that the incorrect behavior would accomplish the goal. Wimmer and Perner 
(1983) adopted Dennett’s logic to design the unexpected transfer task, which was the first false 
belief task for children. Thus the field began with a confidence that low-level mechanisms, such 
as might be used by chimpanzees, had been controlled for by using false belief tasks. 
The unexpected contents task (or Smarties task) is a second false belief task (Hogrefe, 
Wimmer, & Perner, 1986). The child is shown a familiar candy container, such as an M&M bag, 
and asked what he thinks is inside. After the child says “M&M’s,” it is revealed that something 
unexpected is inside, such as a pencil. After the pencil is placed back inside the bag, the subject 
is informed that a friend of the experimenter’s (named “Elmo” e.g.) is waiting outside. The test 
question is: “If he just looks at it, what will Elmo think is inside the bag?” The correct answer is 
to attribute to Elmo a false belief that M&M’s are inside the bag. 
Children under the age of 4 tend to fail verbal false belief tasks. In the examples above, 
they tend to choose the green cupboard, because that is where the chocolate currently is, 
despite the fact that Maxi was outside and could not have known that the chocolate was 
moved. They also say that Elmo will think that there is a pencil in the bag, because that is what 
the bag actually contains, even though Elmo has no reason to think that. Hedger & Fabricius 
(2011) refer to this as Reality Reasoning (RR). A meta-analysis of 178 false belief studies by 
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Wellman, Cross, and Watson (2001) revealed that the age at which 50% of children pass false 
belief tasks is 3 years, 8 months. 
 Importantly, the meta-analysis also revealed that none of the various ways researchers 
have used to try to make the tasks more understandable or motivating for younger children 
reliably eliminated RR and allowed younger children to pass at rates comparable to older 
children. Six variables were found to affect the age at which children passed false belief tasks, 
but no variation was able to improve the performance of 3 year, 5 month old subjects to 
chance or greater. Thus, Wellman et al (2001) argued that the consistent failure of younger 
children was due to a lack of conceptual understanding. Most psychologists and neuroscientists 
(e.g. Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Perner, 1988, 1991; Saxe, Carey, & Kanwisher, 2004) have long 
agreed that at around 4 years of age children acquire the concept of representational mental 
states and transition from RR to what Fabricius & Hedger (2011) dub Belief Reasoning (BR). BR 
signals a full-fledged theory of mind in which understanding and predicting the behavior of 
others is accomplished by attributing to them mental states, including false beliefs.  
3. The PAR hypothesis 
Dennett (1978) felt that true belief tasks would be too easy to pass and would not 
demonstrate anything of theoretical importance. That is true as long as there are only two ways 
that children could think about mental states – to not think about them at all (RR), or to 
correctly understand their representational nature (BR) – both of which predict success on true 
belief tasks.  But when Fabricius and Imbens-Bailey (2000) proposed that children might be 
using what they called Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR) instead of BR when they passed false 
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belief tasks, it introduced an intermediate level of understanding and entailed the 
counterintuitive prediction that children should fail true belief tasks. 
  According to the PAR hypothesis (Fabricius & Imbens-Bailey 2000, Fabricius & Khalil 
2003, Fabricius et al 2010, Hedger & Fabricius 2011, Hedger 2016), false belief tasks are 
confounded in a way that allows children to pass without truly understanding false beliefs. In 
the unexpected transfer task, for example, children might only reason that when Maxi returns 
he will not see his chocolate in the new location and will therefore not know it is there, and 
that as a consequence of his ignorance he will “get it wrong” and look in the empty location. 
But it just so happens that the one “wrong” location is also the location where children who 
attribute a false belief to Maxi should say he will look. Thus children can pass the task by 
attributing only ignorance, predicting unsuccessful behavior, and using a process of elimination. 
This line of reasoning does not involve attributing false belief. Likewise, children can pass the 
unexpected contents task by using PAR. They can reason that Elmo cannot see the pencil inside, 
so he will not know it is a pencil inside, so when given the forced choice (of a pencil or M&M’s) 
he will “get it wrong” and say that M&M’s are inside instead. PAR is thus composed of two 
rules:  
Rule 1:  Seeing → Knowing (and Not Seeing → Not Knowing)  
Rule 2:  Knowing → Ge@ng it Right (and Not Knowing → Getting it Wrong) 
Importantly, these two rules contain no reference to false beliefs (as such). In the first 
test of the PAR hypothesis, Fabricius and Kahlil (2003) modified all the various false belief tasks 
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(versions of unexpected transfer, unexpected contents, and appearance-realty tasks)7 by 
including a third, irrelevant alternative.  Children using PAR should have no reason to choose 
the false belief alternative over the irrelevant alternative, but children using BR should.  In 
three studies of over 150 5- and 6-year-olds, Fabricius and Kahlil (2003) found that, consistent 
with the PAR hypothesis, many children passed the standard tasks and failed the modified 
versions by choosing the irrelevant alternatives.8  
The two PAR rules also contain no reference to true beliefs. The rules predict correct 
behavior on the basis of the child’s decision that the other knows, but this does not presume 
that the child uses an adult conception of knowing as true, justified belief; namely, as a 
representational mental state that the person maintains over time and throughout changes in 
external reality.9 Instead, knowing in PAR is caused by what the person has perceptual access to 
in the immediate situation, and both perceptual access and hence knowing change as the 
                                                           
7 The unexpected transfer and unexpected contents tasks are described above. See Chapter 3, below, for the 
appearance-reality task. 
8 Of course, “many subjects passed the standard version but failed the modified version” is a quick gloss, because 
the paper involves 10 tasks and 3 studies. As a more specific example, in Study 1, an average of 70% of the 84 5-
year-olds passed the standard false belief task, but an average of only 44% passed the modified 3-choice versions. 
See Fabricius and Khalil (2003) for further details. 
Perner and Horn (2003) tested the PAR hypothesis using a variation of the three-alternative false belief procedure 
designed to be simpler than that used by Fabricius and Khalil, and they concluded that their findings refuted the 
hypothesis. However, Hedger (2016) provides a number of reasons to doubt these findings. Additionally, Gonzales 
et al (2013) failed to replicate Perner and Horn’s findings against the hypothesis. See section 3.1 of Chapter 4 
below for more details. 
9 Of course, 2600 years of Western Philosophy has failed to come up with an adequate analysis of knowledge, and 
the last thing I want to do is to attempt to define knowing here. The main point is that the PAR child’s concept 
KNOW is non-representational. More on this in the chapters which follow, especially Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
Hence, even for philosophers who disagree with Williamson’s view that knowledge is more basic than belief (1995, 
2000), since a belief is a mental representation, but the PAR child’s concept KNOW is non-representational, then 
there is no mention of “belief” (explicit or otherwise) in the PAR rules. 
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situation changes.10 Thus PAR entails the prediction that children will judge that a protagonist 
will get it wrong regardless of whether the protagonist has a false belief or a true belief, as long 
as the situations in both cases result in comparable lack of perceptual access. To see this 
consider the various true belief versions of the false belief tasks (unexpected contents, 
unexpected transfer, and appearance-reality) used in Fabricius et al (2010).  
4. The true belief task 
The true belief version of the contents task begins like the false belief version. The child 
is shown an M&M bag and asked what he thinks is inside, and is then shown that the bag 
contains a pencil.  It becomes a true belief task when the child watches the experimenter 
remove the pencil and fill the bag with M&M’s before being asked the test question.  Children 
using BR should reason that seeing the familiar candy container will cause Elmo to have a true 
belief that it contains M&M’s. Children using RR should also answer M&M’s, but simply because 
that is what the bag actually contains. Children using PAR should reason that Elmo cannot see 
the M&M’s inside, so he will not know M&M’s are inside, so when given the forced choice (of a 
pencil or M&M’s) he will “get it wrong” and say that a pencil is inside. Using PAR, in other 
words, should cause children to fail the true belief version of the contents task just as it should 
cause them to pass the false belief version, because the protagonist is equally deprived of 
perceptual access to the contents in both cases. 
                                                           
10 There is independent evidence that the child’s understanding of ‘know’ undergoes much development during 
these years regarding its relation to both perceptual access and correct versus incorrect behavior (e.g., Perner 
1991). 
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Fabricius et al (2010) used two slightly different true belief versions of the transfer task. 
In the first (used in Study 1), Maxi watches his mother place the chocolate in the red cupboard 
before leaving. During his absence, she takes it out and considers moving it to the green 
cupboard, but then changes her mind and returns the chocolate to its original location. 
Therefore this true belief transfer task is similar to the false belief transfer task in that the 
chocolate is moved during Maxi’s absence, but it is not moved to a new location. In the second 
task (used in Study 2), Maxi watches his mother place his chocolate in the red cupboard, and 
then continues to watch as she changes her mind and moves it to the green cupboard. Then 
Maxi leaves and there is no subsequent movement of the chocolate. Hence, the chocolate is 
moved to a new location just as in the false belief version, but Maxi is present to witness the 
transfer. Thus, in both true belief tasks, when Maxi returns he should have a true belief that the 
chocolate is still in the green cupboard. Therefore children using BR should pass both versions 
of this task. But for children using PAR, when Maxi leaves his perceptual access to the situation 
is broken, and they do not attribute a belief to him that persists after he leaves the situation. 
When Maxi returns, children using PAR see him in a new situation, and when asked where Maxi 
will look, they should reason that since Maxi can’t see the chocolate now, he doesn’t know 
where it is, and thus he will “get it wrong” and look in the empty cupboard. 
The true belief version of the appearance-reality task that Fabricius et al (2010) used (in 
Study 3) involves no hidden objects, and uses tactile instead of visual perceptual information. 
Children are shown a fake rock and asked what they think it is. After answering “a rock,” they 
are allowed to feel that it is actually a sponge. Then the sponge is put away and the 
experimenter brings out a similar-looking real rock, saying, “Here is a real rock.” Children are 
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allowed to handle it briefly. They are then asked what another child who only looks at it will 
think it is. Children using PAR should reason that since the other child will not touch the object, 
he won’t know that it is a real rock, and will get it wrong when asked whether it is a rock or a 
sponge. Therefore children using PAR should say that when the other child looks at the rock he 
will think that it is a sponge, while those using either RR or BR should once again pass the task. 
The PAR hypothesis specifies that children only analyze the current situation to 
determine whether someone does or does not have perceptual contact with the object in 
question, and consequently whether he will be right or wrong about that object. For example, 
in the true and false belief transfer tasks, Maxi’s return prompts children to see him as being in 
a new situation, and to use PAR about this new situation (i.e., “He doesn’t see the object, so he 
doesn’t know where it is, so he’ll be wrong”) without any reference to the prior situation in 
which Maxi acquired his true or false belief. Conversely, if Maxi did not leave, but simply placed 
his chocolate in the red cupboard and stayed in the kitchen, the simple disappearance of the 
chocolate into the cupboard would not constitute a new situation. The hypothesis specifies that 
when children do not decide that the situation has changed, they default to their initial 
conclusion that the protagonist will get it right.  
While technically speaking it is true that at the moment an object disappears into a 
container, or a protagonist stops touching an object, he is out of visual or tactile perceptual 
contact with it, it would make no sense for children to re-apply PAR and conclude that he now 
doesn’t know where or what it is and that he will be wrong about it. There would be no 
ecological validity to applying PAR on such a moment-by-moment basis. Furthermore, feedback 
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from others’ behavior would quickly extinguish any tendency to do so. The PAR hypothesis does 
not specify the cues children use to decide what constitutes a new situation, and thus what 
cues “trigger” the PAR rules, nor how these cues are learned (or whether they are innate). 
These are empirical questions. 
Most importantly, the PAR hypothesis does specify that without a concept of mental 
representation there is no mental file, as it were, for children to put the information about 
what Maxi’s perceptual access in the prior situation caused him to know, just as there is no 
mental file for them to put the information about what the visual appearance of a container or 
object causes someone to know about what is inside or what it really is. Consequently, the 
hypothesis should be easy to refute since it entails the unique prediction that children who use 
PAR will fail true belief tasks.11 Specifically, it predicts a U-shaped developmental pattern of 
performance in true belief tasks: 3-year-olds should pass by using RR, 4- to 5-year-olds should 
fail by using PAR, and 6-year-olds should pass by using BR.  
Fabricius et al (2010) tested this prediction with 108 children in three studies. In Study 1 
they found the predicted pattern in the true belief transfer task and in the true belief contents 
task (see Figure 1). Note that in Figure 1 it appears as if 5½ -year-olds understand the location 
task, but not the contents task.  Fabricius et al (2010) demonstrated in Study 2 that this 
difference is only apparent.  The version of the true belief location task used in Study 1 
inadvertently had twice as many references to the correct location than the incorrect one in the 
                                                           
11 Two previous studies reported children’s failure on true belief tasks (Friedman et al 2003, Ruffman 1996), 
although both sets of researchers assumed that children’s difficulty with true belief was unique to the particular 
tasks used in their studies, and was not indicative of a general pattern of reasoning used across different tasks. See 
Fabricius et al (2010) for further discussion. 
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control questions, which apparently primed 5 ½ -year-olds (but not 4½ -year-olds) to choose the 
correct location.  The researchers used the second version of the true belief location task in 
Study 2 which avoided that problem, and compared the results against a true belief contents 
task which was identical to the one used in Study 1.  In Study 2, 5½ -year-olds scored the same 
on the two tasks (M = 65%), which falls favorably along the U-shaped function.  
Fabricius et al (2010) also constructed and tested two methods for determining whether 
subjects are using RR, PAR, or BR. The first method involved giving each child both a false belief 
and a true belief task. Passing the false belief task and failing the true belief task indicates PAR. 
Passing the true belief task and failing the false belief task indicates RR. Passing both tasks 
indicates BR. The second method involved asking children for their justifications for their 
answers only on the true belief task (e.g., “Why will Elmo think that?”). Passing the task and 
giving a correct explanation (e.g. “Because it’s an M&M bag”) indicates BR. Passing the task but 
giving an incorrect justification (e.g. “Because it has M&M’s in it”) or no justification indicates 
RR. Failing the task regardless of justification given is sufficient to indicate PAR, because that is 
the only approach that gives the incorrect answer to true belief tasks. 
The two methods yielded similar rates for each type of reasoning. For example, in Study 
3, the first method (classifying children according to their performance on false and true belief 
tasks) indicated that 13% of 5½-year-olds used RR, 25% used PAR, and 58% used BR (only 4% 
failed both tasks). The second method (classifying children according to their justifications on 
the true belief task) obtained similar results: 17% of 5½-year-olds used RR, 29% used PAR, and 
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54% used BR. The average rates of BR across all three studies from Fabricius et al (2010) were 
10% for 3½-year-olds, 29% for 4½-year-olds, 44% for 5½-year-olds, and 64% for 6 ½-year-olds.  
The PAR hypothesis provides a consistent and principled explanation for the difficulty 
children who pass the standard, confounded false belief tasks have with 3-alternative versions 
of false belief tasks (Fabricius & Khalil, 2003) and with true belief tasks (Fabricius et al., 2010). It 
is principled because it provides clear criteria for distinguishing PAR from RR and BR. It is 
consistent because it provides the same explanation across all the task variations of the extant 
belief tasks. Tests of the hypothesis to date have also produced consistent results (except for 
Perner & Horn, 2003; but see Hedger, 2016, and Chapter 4, below). In contrast to the meta-
analytic data showing that when they turn 5 years of age 75% of children pass the confounded 
false belief tasks (Wellman et al 2001), research using un-confounded tasks (Fabricius & Khalil 
2003, Fabricius et al. 2010) has consistently found that only about 35% understand belief.  
5. The no belief task  
Most recently, Chen et al (2015) have garnered more evidence for the PAR hypothesis 
based on the No Belief Task.12 This involved using cartoon pictures to tell a story to the subject. 
The teacher has brought a toy plane to class, which the students are all free to play with. She 
announces to the class that she is going to place the toy plane in one of two identical 
cupboards, but Lee (a student) has to leave to use the bathroom and misses where the teacher 
places the toy plane. When he returns, he wants to play with the toy plane. The test question is, 
                                                           
12 Incidentally, this is also the first paper in support of the PAR hypothesis to come from outside the Fabricius lab. 
Fabricius and colleagues have also tested children on two different versions of the No Belief Task, and findings 
were consistent with the PAR hypothesis, but these data are yet to be published. 
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“Which cupboard will Lee open?”13 Subjects were also asked about the likelihood that Lee 
would choose the other cupboard, and were asked for justifications for their response (as with 
Fabricius et al, 2010).  
Of course, someone who understands the concept of belief (and is therefore using BR) 
should reason that Lee is ignorant of the toy’s location, and so ought to be equally likely to 
choose either cupboard. Consistent with this, 59% of the 145 adults (across three experiments) 
chose the reality location (where the toy is currently located), which is not significantly different 
from chance. 97% of these adults said that Lee was just as likely to choose the other cupboard, 
and also gave appropriate justifications for their choice (e.g., “Perhaps toys were usually placed 
into this cupboard”). 
A subject using RR will choose the cupboard in which the toy plane is currently located, 
because that is where the toy really is. Consistent with this, of the children who failed the 
standard False Belief Task, 71% of them chose the reality location (where the toy is currently 
located). In contrast, a child using PAR should reason that Lee can’t see the toy, so he doesn’t 
know where it is, and consequently Lee will choose the incorrect location (i.e. the cupboard 
where the toy is not currently located). 80% of the 79 4-year-olds (across three experiments) 
did just this, and gave justifications consistent with the PAR hypothesis (e.g., “He didn’t see 
where the toy was placed”). Only 25% of 4-year-olds said that Lee was likely to have chosen the 
reality cupboard instead. As the authors conclude—citing Fabricius & Khalil (2003), Fabricius et 
                                                           
13 More strictly, in Experiment 1 the experimenters asked, “Which cupboard will Lee open first?” However, in 
Experiment 3 the ‘first’ was dropped (and a simpler story was used) in order to ensure that asking this question 
didn’t confuse subjects. The results were consistent with what they found in the first experiment. 
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al (2010), and Hedger & Fabricius (2011)—“The results suggest that young children may use the 
‘perceptual access’ approach in their theory of mind” (p. 79). 
6. What we know about the false and true belief tasks (including an explication of the 
Rule A hypothesis) 
 The most plausible hypothesis concerning development of belief understanding needs 
to account for the data concerning both the True and False Belief Task in humans, summarized 
below in Table 1. (This table has been slightly over-simplified for ease of exposition. Note that 
here “False Belief Task” refers to the classic two-option versions described in Section 2 above.) 
Given that they are our closest living relatives, it would also be helpful to have a hypothesis 
which accounts for the data concerning the True and False Belief Task in chimpanzees, 
summarized on the first line of Table 1. The best theory might also help to explain some of the 
data concerning the autism spectrum disorder as well, such as that found on line 7 in Table 1. 
A “?” in the table means that there are no published studies which I was able to find. 
The largest areas of understudied belief understanding involve the non-verbal true belief task in 
infants and 3-year-olds, and all non-verbal tasks in adults and school-age children. The study of 
the Non-Verbal True Belief Task in infants is contentious, because many researchers claim to 
have included such a task in their study, but Hedger & Fabricius (2011) explain that to be a true 
test of the PAR hypothesis, any such task requires a suitable cue for situation change, because 
children will only compute the PAR rules if they deem the present scenario to be a new 
situation (see Hedger & Fabricius 2011 for a review of some typical infant ToM studies). 
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Table 1. 
 Non-Verbal 
False Belief 
Task14 
Non-Verbal 
True Belief Task 
Verbal False 
Belief Task 
Verbal True 
Belief Task 
Chimpanzees Pass15 Fail16 N/A N/A 
Infants Pass17 ? N/A N/A 
3-Year-Olds Pass18 ? Fail19 Pass20  
4- and 5-Year-
Olds 
? ? Pass21 Fail22 
6-Year-Olds ? ? Pass23 Pass24 
Neurotypical 
Adults 
Pass25 ? (Presumably) 
Pass 
(Presumably) 
Pass 
Adults with 
High-
Functioning 
Autism 
Fail26 ? Pass27 ? 
 
                                                           
14 These non-verbal versions mostly follow the Violation of Expectation (VOE) paradigm (It is known that infants 
will look significantly longer at novel or unexpected stimuli than at stimuli which are familiar or expected; thus, if 
infants expect Maxi to go to one location, then they will look longer if Maxi goes to the other location) or the 
Anticipatory Looking (AL) paradigm (3-year-olds who say the incorrect answer will first look briefly at the false 
belief location). Some more recent studies use the active helping paradigm (subjects help agents by pointing to an 
object the agent is searching for). The chimpanzee studies involve a subordinate choosing whether or not to eat a 
prize based upon a dominant’s perceptual access to the prize. 
15 Kaminski et al (2008), Hare et al (2001). 
16 Kaminski et al (2008). 
17 For reviews see Southgate (2014) and Carruthers (2013). 
18 Clements & Perner (1994), Garnham & Perner (2001), Garnham & Ruffman (2001), Ruffman et al (2001). 
19 Wellman et al (2001). 
20 Fabricius et al (2010). 
21 Wellman et al (2001). 
22 Fabricius et al (2010). 
23 Fabricius et al (2010). 
24 Fabricius et al (2010). 
25 Senju et al (2009). 
26 Senju et al (2009). 
27 Senju et al (2009). Children with autism typically fail these (Baron-Cohen et al 1985, Perner et al 1989). 
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According to the PAR hypothesis, a two-task battery (of a false and true belief task) can 
determine which type of reasoning a subject is using (Fabricius et al 2010, Hedger & Fabricius 
2011). A subject using RR will predict that an agent will look for an object where it is actually 
located, and won’t consider an agent’s mental states or perceptual access. Thus, using RR 
should cause a subject to fail the false belief task and pass the true belief task. As explained 
above, a subject using PAR should pass the two-option false belief task (since the prediction is 
that agent will be unsuccessful due to a lack of perceptual access) and fail the true belief task 
containing an appropriate cue for situation change (once again because they predict that an 
agent will be unsuccessful due to a lack of perceptual access). Only a subject using BR, and 
making use of information concerning the agent’s mental representations, will pass both tasks 
by correctly predicting the agent’s actions. 
Reality Reasoning (RR): Fail the false belief task, Pass the true belief task 
Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR): Pass the false belief task, Fail the true belief task 
Belief Reasoning (BR): Pass the false belief task, Pass the true belief task 
 Turning to the verbal tasks on Table 1, we can see that 3-year-olds are using RR, 4- and 
5-year-olds are using PAR, and 6-year-olds and neurotypical adults are using BR. These are the 
three developmental stages of the PAR hypothesis (Fabricius & Imbens-Bailey 2000, Fabricius & 
Khalil 2003, Fabricius et al 2010, Hedger & Fabricius 2011, Hedger 2016). We also need an 
explanation of the findings on non-verbal tasks, especially the now much-touted finding that 
infants pass non-verbal versions of the false belief task. Hedger and Fabricius (2011) conjecture 
that a developmental precursor of PAR, which they dub Rule A, may be at work in these infant 
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studies. The two PAR rules (see/not see → know/not know and know/not know → get it 
right/get it wrong) are bridged by the concept KNOW, which children begin to acquire and link 
with perceptual access by about 3 ½ years of age (e.g., Pillow, 1989; Pratt & Bryant, 1990).  Rule 
A is the condensed rule see/not see →  get it right/get it wrong, which Hedger & Fabricius 
(2011) hypothesize children implicitly use before they acquire the concept KNOW.  
The theory of Rule A follows directly from collapsing the two PAR rules used by 
preschoolers into a mechanism that could be used by nonverbal organisms such as chimps and 
human infants. The data summarized on the first line of Table 1 suggests that chimpanzees may 
use Rule A (see Hedger & Fabricius 2011 for more details), because Rule A (like PAR) should 
cause subjects to pass the false belief task but fail the true belief task. Hedger and Fabricius 
(2011) conjecture that Rule A may also be operative in human infants, and perhaps persists into 
adulthood.28 More research into the anticipatory looking of children and adults would help to 
disconfirm or point in favor of the Rule A conjecture, as well as a non-verbal true belief task for 
                                                           
28 In other words, Rule A may exist simultaneously in adult cognition along with BR, along the lines of a Dual 
Systems model such as Kahneman (2011). This could be tested by using the “eye gaze” methodology developed for 
children under 4 years of age (Clements & Perner, 1994; Garnham & Perner, 2001; Garnham & Ruffman, 2001; 
Ruffman, Garnham, Import, & Connelly, 2001), in which they have passed standard, confounded false belief tasks 
by showing unconscious anticipatory looking to the correct location. However, in order to know whether correct 
anticipatory looking in the false belief task indicates attribution of false beliefs or use of Rule A, the methodology 
needs to include a true belief task in which there is some interruption in the agent’s connection to the situation 
that is comparable to what occurs in the false belief task. The previous eye gaze studies have not included such 
true belief tasks. If adults were found to continue to use Rule A implicitly it could explain a puzzling feature of 
theory of mind—that at times we appear able to make judgments about the mental states of others quickly, 
automatically, and effortlessly, while at other times the process is difficult and deliberative. There is evidence that 
BR is effortful and difficult for adults (Apperly et al, 2006; Keysar et al, 2003). Lin, Keysar and Epley (2010) found 
that higher working memory capacity can have a positive impact on adult performance in theory of mind tasks, 
while cognitive load impairs this ability. Perhaps this can be explained by BR and Rule A being different 
psychological mechanisms, the former explicit and effortful and the latter implicit, automatic and modular. 
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infants which includes a cue for situation change which is comparable to that found in the false 
belief task (such as having the agent temporarily leave and then return). 
The popular mindblindness theory of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is that part of the 
explanation of this disorder is an impaired ToM module (Baron-Cohen 1995).29 The evidence for 
this includes the fact that children with ASD exhibit a lack of gaze-monitoring (Leekam et al 
1993), failure to point in order to direct the attention of others (Baron-Cohen 1989a), delay on 
the unexpected transfer (Baron-Cohen et al 1985) and unexpected contents (Perner et al 1989) 
false belief tasks, delay on the appearance/reality task (Baron-Cohen 1989b), difficulty hiding 
objects (Baron-Cohen 1992), etc., despite the fact that children with intellectual disability (ID) 
and congenital blindness are able to successfully display most of these abilities (Baron-Cohen 
1995).  
 Perhaps the innate mechanism missing in ASD is actually Rule A, as hypothesized by 
Hedger and Fabricius (2011). Higher functioning autistics may nonetheless be able to learn BR 
in order to eventually pass the False Belief Task. For instance, Senju et al (2009) found that 
adults with Asperger syndrome did not demonstrate anticipatory looking toward the correct 
location during the false belief task, although they verbally passed the task.30 It should be noted 
that this kind of pattern has been found elsewhere in studies of ASD. For instance, Russo et al 
2012 found that although multisensory processing times were not significantly different 
                                                           
29 On modularity and psychology, see Fodor (1983) and Barrett & Kurzban (2006). On the hypothesis that ToM 
ability is the result of a module, see Baron-Cohen (1995), Carruthers (2013) and Leslie (1994). The details of Baron-
Cohen’s view are unimportant for our purposes, but it should perhaps be noted that his model includes four 
separate mindreading components, some of which (e.g. the Shared Attention Mechanism) are impaired in ASD 
while others (such as the Intentionality Detector) remain intact (Baron-Cohen 1995). 
30 Neurotypical adults did demonstrate anticipatory looking toward the correct location during the false belief task 
(which they also verbally passed), but a true belief task was not used in this study. 
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between persons with ASD and neurotypical subjects, brain activity (measured using EEG) was 
significantly different. As the authors note, this suggests that while on the surface persons with 
ASD and neurotypical persons appear to respond similarly to multisensory inputs, in actuality 
the brain mechanisms involved in this processing are entirely different (Russo et al 2012). 
Anecdotal evidence, such as Temple Grandin’s well-known remark that she feels like an 
anthropologist on Mars when dealing with other people, also suggests that persons with ASD 
may compensate for certain impairments by using different methods; specifically, higher-level 
and less intuitive methods.  
7. Troubles for the two dominant views in ToM 
The current status of ToM literature in the psychology of cognitive development is 
largely a debate between two dominant views. On the one hand, the Traditional View is that 
children progress from RR directly to BR at about the age of four (e.g. Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; 
Perner, 1988, 1991; Saxe, Carey, & Kanwisher, 2004; Wellman et al, 2001). However, this theory 
faces difficulty explaining the finding that 4- and 5-year-olds fail the true belief task. If these 
children understand beliefs, then the true belief task should be passed at the same time as the 
false belief task. In fact, even though the task demands are made as commensurable as 
possible, intuitively the true belief task ought to be easier to pass than the false belief task. 
On the other hand, the Nativist View is that ToM ability (including an understanding of 
belief) is innate, and furthermore the early onset of this capacity is evident in infancy. Although 
this view has been around since the 1980s (Leslie 1987, see also Fodor 1992), it has gained 
prominence in the past decade following Onishi & Baillargeon (2005)’s landmark study 
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demonstrating that 15-month-olds can pass a non-verbal false belief (location) task. A flurry of 
studies has followed since Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) first cracked the dam (Buttelman et al 
2009, He et al 2011, Scott & Baillargeon 2009; Song & Baillargeon 2008, Scott et al 2010, Surian 
et al 2007, Southgate et al 2010, etc). So many studies have been done at this point in time that 
it would be implausible to deny that infants are capable of passing a non-verbal false task (see 
Table 1). This also makes trouble for the Standard View.31 
We have known for some time that 3-year-olds who gave the incorrect response on the 
false belief (location) task nonetheless often displayed anticipatory looking to the correct 
location (Clements & Perner 1994). According to the Nativist view the failure of 3-year-olds on 
false belief tasks is not a sign that they lack competence in using BR, but is simply a kind of 
performance error (Chomsky, 1965; Fodor, 1992) in which something interferes with this 
competence to cause them to fail false belief tasks.  Leslie (1987; Roth & Leslie, 1998) 
hypothesized that true belief is the default attribution of our innate theory of mind mechanism, 
and that an inability to inhibit this default attribution in verbal tasks is what causes 3-year-olds 
to fail; in other words, failure on false belief tasks is due to misattribution of true belief. Leslie 
(2005) and others claim that infants do not exhibit the same difficulty inhibiting true belief 
                                                           
31 See Perner & Ruffman (2005) for one attempt to salvage the Standard View in light of the infant studies; but see 
Chapter 5 below for an argument against this putative explanation. 
 
Kevan Edwards and Bernard Kobes worry that later acquisition of belief understanding is not by itself evidence that 
belief understanding is not innate. I also accept this point. Although developmental psychologists that hold the 
Traditional View do not directly address this issue, I think they are assuming that (in the tradition of Piaget) when 
child development occurs in stages, the transitions between these stages involve a cognitive learning process, and 
therefore the understanding involved in the final stage is learned rather than innate. Also, Traditionalists tend to 
subscribe to the theory-theory view of mental state attribution (e.g. Gopnik & Wellman 1992, 1994), which is prima 
facie at odds with the view that mental state attribution is innate (once again because using a theory to attribute 
mental states is a deliberate cognitive process). (Granted, in Chapter 6 I will go against this tradition and suggest 
that the theories RR, PAR and BR may be innate, although there are clear stages of ToM development.) 
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attribution because the infant studies use eye gaze as a measure of understanding instead of 
verbal reports. Baillargeon et al (2010) also hypothesize that 3-year-olds fail verbal false belief 
tasks because of inhibition and selection failures, rather than a lack of belief understanding. 
However, the true belief findings of Fabricus et al (2010) complicate this picture. Why 
would children fail true belief tasks if they have an innate theory of mind mechanism, especially 
one whose default attribution is that people have true beliefs? According to Roth and Leslie 
(1998), false belief tasks are more difficult than true belief tasks because of the need to inhibit 
the default true belief attribution, whereas this is not necessary in true belief tasks. Yet 
beginning at around age 4 children tend to pass false belief and fail true belief tasks. There is no 
obvious explanation for why 4- and 5-year-olds who are able to inhibit true beliefs in false belief 
tasks should inhibit true beliefs in true belief tasks as well. Thus the failure of inhibition 
explanation looks to be implausible, and so the finding that 4- and 5-year-olds fail the true 
belief task is a major problem for the Nativist view.  
If it could be demonstrated that infants are able to pass a non-verbal true belief task, 
then Nativism might have a foothold. However, Hedger & Fabricius (2011) review the infant 
studies and explain that none of the true belief tasks used in those studies have a cue for 
situation change (such as a departure and return of the protagonist) which is comparable to 
that found in the false belief task. Hence it is possible that infants and toddlers are using a 
simplified, implicit version of Perceptual Access Reasoning (which Hedger and Fabricius 2011 
dub “Rule A”) in order to pass the non-verbal versions of the false belief task. Hence, the PAR 
hypothesis of Fabricius and colleagues is best able to account for all of the ToM data. 
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Some may object that according to the PAR hypothesis, 3-year-olds are using Rule A 
implicitly (exhibited by their looking to the correct location on the false belief task) but using RR 
explicitly (exhibited by their incorrect verbal responses on the false belief task). Perhaps most 
surprising, that same implicit understanding will somehow rise to conscious reasoning in the 
next stage of development, as 4- and 5-year-olds begin to use PAR on verbal (false and true) 
belief tasks. This is indeed a puzzle to be explored, but its existence should not call into 
question the PAR hypothesis, because we see similar findings in other cognitive domains. Aside 
from the many dual-systems models of cognition in adults (e.g. Kahneman 2011, Kenrick & 
Griskevicius 2013), we also find infants demonstrating apparent understanding using looking 
time measures when they don’t pass reaching procedures testing the same cognitive domain as 
toddlers. 
For instance, infants pass VOE tests (see Footnote 11) of object solidity, but toddlers 
typically fail manual search versions of the exact same tasks, much like what we find with the 
false belief task. Spelke et al (1992) familiarized 4-month-olds with watching a ball hit the floor 
behind a screen. They then watched the ball being dropped behind the screen, after being 
shown that a physical barrier stood a foot above the floor. After dropping the screen, the 
infants looked significantly longer when the ball was shown on the floor compared to when the 
ball was shown on top of the physical barrier. This demonstrates that infants understand that 
solid objects cannot pass through other solid objects.  
Hood et al (2000) used the same paradigm as the Spelke et al (1992) study, but this time 
they allowed toddlers to search in one of the two locations. Two-year-olds failed the task by 
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searching for the ball on the floor instead of on top of the barrier. Susan Carey’s (2009) 
explanation for this time lag sounds very similar to what Hedger & Fabricius (2011) hypothesize 
here in the case of the false belief task. She argues that in the looking time studies infants are 
able to pass by using “within module encapsulated representations;” their modular perceptual 
system represents objects as being solid and thus the infants are surprised when this 
expectation is violated (p. 113). However, when making a prediction two-year-olds are forced 
to use “explicit representations that are output of the perceptual device that creates 
representations of object-files” (Carey 2009, p. 113). In other words, actions such as searching 
for objects or predicting where objects will be found (or where others will look) forces 2- and 3-
year-olds to use conscious reasoning processes which may rely on different representations 
than more modular, informationally encapsulated processes such as looking. At a later time (3-
years-old according to Berthier et al, 2000) children are able to pass searching measures of 
object solidity, presumably because their conscious reasoning processes now involve the same 
representations as their more modular perceptual processes have used for at least 32 months. 
The same thing is happening with belief understanding, according to the PAR hypothesis. 
To summarize, the PAR hypothesis can explain all of the findings summarized in Table 1, 
including some findings which pose difficulties for the two dominant views. The Traditional 
View, that children progress directly from RR to BR at about the age of four, is challenged by 
the finding that infants pass non-verbal 2-option false belief tasks. According to the PAR 
hypothesis, they do this by using Rule A (an implicit, modular mechanism which is a precursor 
of PAR). The Traditional View is also challenged by the finding that children ages four and five 
fail the true belief task and the 3-option false belief task. This is explained by the fact that there 
38 
 
 
 
is an intermediate stage in between RR and BR in which children use PAR. The Nativist View, 
that BR is innate and the failure of 3-year-olds on the 2-option false belief task is a kind of 
performance error due to inhibition and selection failures, is also challenged by the finding that 
4- and 5-year-olds fail the true belief task.32 
According to the PAR hypothesis, infants pass VOE versions of the 2-option false belief 
task by using Rule A, which is presumably a modular or System 1 cognitive process. 3-year-olds 
fail the verbal 2-option false belief task, because they are using the conscious, System 2 
reasoning process known as Reality Reasoning.33 When children enter the next developmental 
stage around the age of four, and begin to use Perceptual Access Reasoning consciously and 
deliberately, they again pass the (verbal) 2-option false belief task. This same pattern of 
development which is part of the PAR hypothesis is also seen in studies of object solidity. 4-
month-olds pass VOE measures of object solidity, which Carey (2009) hypothesizes is 
accomplished by using a modular cognitive-perceptual process. 2- and 3-year-olds fail searching 
versions of the same task, because they are using a different effortful and conscious process. By 
the age of four they pass the searching measures of object solidity, which Carey (2009) 
hypothesizes is because the new deliberate reasoning process now incorporates the same 
mental representations which were already being used inside the modular perception process. 
8. Conclusion 
                                                           
32 The PAR hypothesis also explains the performance of 4-year-olds on the no belief task (Chen et al 2015) as 
explained in Section 5 above, which presents yet another challenge for the Traditional and Nativists views. 
33 See Fodor 1983 for the modular/ conscious reasoning distinction, and Kahneman 2011 (and Chapter 4) for the 
System 1/ System 2 distinction. The vocabulary may vary somewhat, but I don’t think the fact that there is some 
such distinction is at all contentious in psychology; on the contrary, it looks to be the standard view. 
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The PAR hypothesis best accounts for all of the data (the false and true belief task data 
summarized in Table 1, and the no belief task data discussed in Section 5). The studies 
demonstrating that infants are capable of passing the non-verbal false task is explained by the 
hypothesis that Rule A is an innate PAR mechanism. Further support for this conjecture is that 
our closest living relatives, chimpanzees, also appear to use Rule A, since they pass the false 
belief task but fail the true belief task. Still needed is a valid test of infants on the true belief 
task, as discussed in Section 5 above and Hedger & Fabricius (2011). The Rule A hypothesis 
would predict that infants fail the non-verbal true belief task, just as chimps do. Only the PAR 
hypothesis is able to explain why 4- and 5-year-olds fail the true belief task, even though they 
are able to pass the false belief task. 
 The philosophical upshot of all of this is that children do not have the concept of belief, 
and do not understand mental representation, before the age of 6. More evidence will be 
provided in the next chapter, where I examine children’s understanding of perception. The 
point is made still more strongly in Chapter 5, when I turn to another current concern in 
cognitive science. Psychologists worry about finding an empirical method for determining 
whether chimps and infants are passing ToM tasks by using mentalist rules, which include a 
conception of mental representation, or whether they are passing them merely by using 
behavioral rules which require no understanding of the mind as such. Daniel Povinelli (2001; 
Povinelli & Vonk, 2003, 2004; Penn & Povinelli, 2007) has made the argument that there is in 
fact no empirical method for deciding which of these two explanations is true, and Josef Perner 
(2010, forthcoming) has recently applied the argument to the case of human subjects. In 
Chapter 5, I show that PAR allows us to solve this problem. The solution makes clear that 
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children under the age of six don’t understand mental representation, and therefore lack the 
adult concepts of perception and belief.  
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[Some of this chapter is a revision of material which originally appeared in Hedger & Fabricius 
(2011) and Hedger (2016). Portions of this chapter were also presented at the Midwest 
Empirical and Theoretical Association for Philosophical Research Meeting at the University of 
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, on the 26th of April, 2012. Thanks to participants who gave 
comments and criticisms; in particular Bill Fabricius, Renee Baillargeon, Denise Cummins and 
Robert Cummins. Thanks also to Bill Fabricius, Bob Van Gulick, Kevan Edwards, Bernie Kobes 
and Kim Frost for comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.]  
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Figure 1.  Children’s Performance on True Belief Tasks 
(From Fabricius, W. V., Boyer, T., Weimer, A.A., & Carroll, K. (2010). True or false: Do 
five-year-olds understand belief? Developmental Psychology, 46, 1402 – 1416, 
American Psychological Association, reprinted with permission.) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Seeing: 
The Perceptual Access Reasoning hypothesis and young children’s understanding of 
perception 
 
1. Introduction 
After examining the child’s understanding of belief through the lens of the Perceptual 
Access Reasoning (PAR) hypothesis, which I have argued best explains all of the existing data 
(Chapter 2), it becomes obvious that children do not acquire a concept of mental 
representation until around the age of six (this idea will be developed further in the chapters 
which follow). Thus we can begin our examination of the child’s understanding of perception by 
sketching what such an understanding would be like if one lacked a conception of mental 
representation, and then looking at the picture which emerges from the large amount of data 
which developmental psychologists have gathered on children’s understanding of perception 
over the last few decades and determine whether that picture is consistent with our sketch. In 
this chapter I will first present that sketch briefly here in the introduction, before examining the 
empirical evidence in the sections which follow. In particular, we will look at studies pertaining 
to John Flavell’s highly influential model of the four levels of perception understanding in 
Section 2, studies pertaining to the child’s ability to distinguish reality from the way things 
appear to be in Section 3, and finally some closing remarks in Section 4. 
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If we take away the concept of mental representation, then what kind of an idea of 
perception might we be left with? First, this notion of perception is likely to be more directly 
causal, like one pool ball smacking into another. One is reminded of Aristotle’s metaphor of an 
object making an impression on the mind like a signet ring makes an impression on a piece of 
wax (De Anima 424a 18-20). Without the representational relationship between the mind and 
the world, we are left with a much more simplistic, unmediated and direct relationship. One 
key idea tied to the adult understanding of perception that will be obviously missing here is the 
distinction between veridical and mistaken perceptions. Without representation there cannot 
be misrepresentation. Just as it doesn’t make sense to talk of the wax impression 
misrepresenting the seal which was pressed into it, neither should it make sense to the child to 
talk about a person seeing something that isn’t there or experiencing a visual illusion. Thus the 
work by Flavell and others on the Appearance/ Reality Distinction will be crucial when deciding 
the plausibility of the PAR hypothesis.  
There shouldn’t be much more to the PAR child’s conception of visual perception than 
mere visual contact. Thus Gopnik and Wellman (1994) write that “very young children seem to 
treat desire and perception as simple causal links between the mind and the world… Given that 
an object is within a viewer’s line of sight, the viewer will see it.” This seems to be corroborated 
by anecdotal evidence. I remember when my son was 4 for example and he couldn’t seem to 
understand how I could not see one of his toys when I was facing in the direction of it, even 
though it was just one item amidst a chaotic assortment of small toys piled on the floor. And 
there is the well-known phenomenon that children will “hide” things in plain view, as when my 
son used to put a penny into his right palm right in front of me and then ask me to guess which 
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hand was holding the coin. Perner (1991) relates a similar story of how Heinz Wimmer’s 3-year-
old son would “hide” in the pantry right in front of Wimmer when playing hide-and-go-seek (p. 
153). Although children understand that a viewer cannot see an object which is occluded from 
her line of sight by about 2 and ½ years of age (Flavell et al 1978), the boys in these anecdotes 
(and many similar ones) don’t appear to understand that their fathers retain a visual 
representation which persists after the environment has been altered to obstruct their line of 
sight. This reasoning can be seen as consistent with the first of the two PAR rules (see previous 
chapter)—Daddy doesn’t see the penny (in the sense that it is not in his direct view; Daddy 
lacks unmediated perceptual access to the penny) so he won’t know which hand it’s in. Or, 
Daddy doesn’t see me (again in this simplistic sense) so he won’t know I’m in the pantry.34 
Second, this simpler notion of perception is going to be much more closely tied to the 
immediate environment. With no mental file with which such subjects can carry perceptions 
which persist through new situations (see Chapter 2), perceptions should change at the exact 
same rate as the surroundings of the perceiver change for the PAR child.35 For instance, 
consider the true belief task (Chapter 2). Maxi watches Mom move his chocolate from the blue 
cupboard to the yellow cupboard before going outside outside to play. There is no subsequent 
movement of the chocolate. However, for the child using PAR, when Maxi returns he does not 
                                                           
34 For the PAR rules to be a full explanation of this type of phenomenon, however, it must be that the occluding of 
the coin and the hiding in the pantry constitute cues for situation change. Since these sorts of behaviors are more 
typical of 3-year-olds than 4- and 5-year-olds, who are more likely to be in the PAR stage of cognitive development, 
perhaps this is indicative of a transition from Reality Reasoning (RR) to PAR—more complex than RR but without 
the more sophisticated notion of a “new situation” that we see 4- and 5-year-olds use in the true belief task. (See 
Chapter 2 for more about cues for situation change in PAR.) 
35 More precisely, perceptions change whenever both the environment changes and there is a sufficient cue for 
the subject (see Note 1 above and Chapter 2). 
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perceive the chocolate. Maxi has no representation of the chocolate in the yellow cupboard 
because PAR does not involve representation. Maxi’s visual perceptions—what Maxi sees—are 
directly related to his immediate environment or situation. And in the current situation Maxi 
has no visual perception of the chocolate. He had a visual perception of the chocolate in the 
yellow cupboard, but that was connected to the old situation, and that perception vanished as 
soon as the situation changed.  
Of course, even the adult says of this scene that Maxi cannot currently see the chocolate 
because it is not in plain view; it is inside the cupboard. However, for the adult using Belief 
Reasoning (BR), Maxi just saw the chocolate a moment ago when he watched Mom put it in the 
yellow cupboard. Maxi retains the mental representation of the chocolate in the yellow 
cupboard. However, for the PAR child this “just saw the chocolate a moment ago” also vanished 
when the situation changed. Maxi of course has no beliefs about the chocolate for a subject 
using PAR, because what is a belief if not a representation? But even for the PAR child, “just 
saw the chocolate a moment ago” is relevant to their reasoning about Maxi, as long as the 
environment does not change for Maxi. If Maxi watches Mom move the chocolate from the blue 
cupboard to the yellow cupboard and does not go outside to play, then the child using PAR will 
predict that Maxi will search the yellow cupboard if he looks for his chocolate. He just saw the 
chocolate being put into the yellow cupboard.36 However, this “just saw the chocolate” 
disappears when the environment changes to a new situation.  
                                                           
36 Indeed, recall that on my view this is why most infant theory of mind studies fail to demonstrate use of Rule A (a 
precursor of PAR); their true belief conditions lack a sufficient cue for situation change (Hedger & Fabricius 2011; 
see also Chapter 2). 
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Children in the PAR stage should nonetheless be able to understand occlusion, distance 
effects, etc., and even the sort of perspective-taking involved in realizing that I can see an 
object that you cannot see—after all, I can imagine what might happen if something impacted 
my body without considering mental states at all. Consider the findings of Yaniv and Shatz 
(1988), who argue that failures of young children on perception tasks such as the ones I report 
in Sections 2 and 3 is due to “their difficulty in accessing their knowledge in particular 
circumstances. This proposal contrasts with a common view in the field [and argued in this 
chapter] that young children are incapable of making their inferences about the mental states 
of others” (p. 95). They support their proposal with a study demonstrating that 3- 4- and 5-
year-olds understand (to some degree) that certain factors can affect perceptual access. For 
example many of them answered correctly that distance between a subject and object can 
prevent the subject from smelling or touching the object but not seeing or hearing the same 
object; or that occlusion separating an otherwise nearby subject and object can prevent seeing 
and touching the object but perhaps not hearing the object. 
However, for the child in the PAR stage of theory of mind development, determining 
perceptual access is a rather straightforward process which doesn’t require information about 
the person’s mental states. Predicting that another person won’t be able to see an occluded 
object is akin to predicting that I won’t be able to toss a ball into your hands if you’re standing 
behind an object which completely covers your body. It’s a purely physical causal process in this 
sense, which only requires understanding the environment and drawing imaginary lines 
between objects and a person (or a person’s eyes in the case of sight, a person’s hands in the 
case of touch, etc.). Therefore, the findings of Yaniv and Shatz (1988), and many other 
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researchers making similar claims, is in fact quite compatible with the inability of young 
children to make inferences about mental states. 
2. Flavell’s Four Levels of Perception Understanding 
Flavell’s (1974) classic developmental model of perception understanding distinguishes 
four different levels. Level 0 involves understanding object permanence, or the expectation that 
an object can be seen again once the child moves around an occluding object. In other words, it 
is the understanding that objects persist even when they are no longer perceived. In the 
language of Piaget (1954, Piaget & Inhelder 1956), the Level 0 child has a pragmatic and 
practical sensory-motor understanding of objects in space, and at some knowledge-in-action 
level “knows” that the same object appears differently depending upon the child’s own 
perspective and distance from that object. However, the child lacks any symbolic-
representational understanding of visual perspective (and therefore can’t really think about 
them or have conscious expectations about them).37 The Level 0 child is also egocentric in 
Piaget’s sense, in that she doesn’t consider or recognize that there are visual points of view 
other than her own.  
Piaget (1954) assumed that children reach Level 0 (which he called the acquisition of the 
“object concept”) at around 12 months, since younger infants typically make the A-Not-B error. 
That is, after an object is hidden in one location (A) and repeatedly found there, the object is 
hidden in a second location (B) and the infant is allowed to search. Before about 12 months of 
                                                           
37 Perhaps we could put this into the more modern language of Carey (2009) and Fodor (1983) by explaining that 
the Level 0 child has only modular representations of visual perspective which can’t be accessed by conscious 
reasoning systems. 
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age, infants typically continue to search for the object in the first location (i.e. searching in A 
instead of in B). However, later researchers assume that these sorts of perseveration errors are 
performance failures that don’t demonstrate true lack of competence (see Chomsky 1965 for 
the performance/competence distinction). That is, they are due to lack of inhibition rather than 
genuinely not understanding that the object persists in location B. More recent studies find 
evidence of object permanence understanding as early as 3 ½ months of age (Baillargeon & 
DeVos 1991). For our purposes, we should note that something more than Level 0 
understanding is required even for PAR, since the rules take as input whether another person 
has perceptual (e.g. visual) access to a given object. Level 0 children are not capable of 
considering the visual point of view of others. 
Level 1 involves understanding that other people may or may not be able to see the 
same objects that the subject sees. However, this is still not an understanding of mental 
representation, because the Level 1 child does not consider that another person has a unique 
point of view or visual perspective which may differ from that of the child. The level 1 child does 
not understand that the same object can appear differently to different subjects, but only 
reasons about objects and whether or not they fall within a person’s line of sight. For instance, 
one task measuring Level 1 perspective taking, the Picture Task (Flavell 1974, Masangkay et al 
1974), involves seating the child at a table across from the experimenter. The child is shown a 
card which has two different pictures on each side, for instance a dog on one side and a cat on 
the other. After familiarization with the card and the pictures, the experimenter places the card 
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in between the child and himself, and asks “What do you see? What do I see?”38 Masangkay et 
al (1974) found that about 65% of 2.5 -year-olds (Experiment 1), and all 3-year-olds 
(Experiments 1 and 2) were able to pass this task.  
A similar task conducted by Flavell and colleagues (Task IIIE in Flavell et al 1968) was 
found to be more difficult. The experimenter first familiarizes the child with a card which is 
identical on both sides; it contains pictures of an airplane on top, a teddy bear in the middle, 
and a clown on the bottom. The experimenter then demonstrates how a piece of cardboard can 
be used to occlude one or more of the pictures on one side. Placing the card with the pictures 
in between the subject and the experimenter, and placing the cardboard over pictures on the 
experimenter’s side (the cardboard is larger than the picture board so that the child is able to 
infer where it is placed), the child is asked, “Can you tell me what pictures I see on my side?” 
The cardboard is then lowered and the test question is asked a second time. Only 2 of 10 3-
year-olds answered both questions correctly, but most of the 4- and 5-year-olds did, and the 6-
year-olds performed perfectly (i.e. none of them answered a test question incorrectly). 
Level 1 understanding is clearly required for PAR. For example, in the belief tasks, the 
subject must consider what Maxi sees or does not see in order to compute the first PAR rule 
(see Chapter 2). Of course, Level 1 by itself is not sufficient for PAR, since 3-year-olds who pass 
the Picture Task nonetheless fail the standard 2-location false belief task. Although necessary 
for PAR, Level 1 does not require an understanding of mental representation. In other words, 
                                                           
38 Alternately, the subject is asked, “Do you see the cat, or do you see the dog? Do I see the cat, or do I see the 
dog?” No significant differences in success have been found between this version of the test question and the 
version given in the text above. 
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Level 1 understanding is (of course) not sufficient for BR either. For example, a Level 1 subject 
may be able to tell that a given person cannot see an object because that person’s line of sight 
is obstructed. However, she also expects someone who has line of sight to an object to see that 
object, not understanding that a person can look in the direction of something but still not see 
it, for example because it is camouflaged in some way. The findings on Level 1 tasks are thus 
completely commensurable with the PAR hypothesis, and my claim that an understanding of 
mental representation is not acquired until the BR stage, or around 6 years of age (see Chapters 
2, 5 and 6). 
Level 2 involves understanding that the same object can appear differently to different 
people. Of course, the Level 1 child recognizes that the dog in the Picture task is seen by the 
subject but not by the experimenter. However the Level 2 child understands that an object 
which is visible to both the subject and an experimenter can look different because of each 
person’s different perspective. Unlike the previous two levels, this would seem to involve an 
understanding of mental representation, since the Level 2 child must understand that visual 
representations of the same object can differ across subjects. That is, Level 2 involves realizing 
that different people can see the same object in different ways at one and the same time—that 
different people can have different mental (visual) representations of the same object. 
As tests of Level 2 vary quite a bit in complexity and task demands, so do the ages when 
subjects typically pass them. Piaget used the Three Mountains task (Piaget & Inhelder 1956), 
which involved familiarizing the child with a three-dimensional scale model of three mountains 
of different size in a nonlinear arrangement. After a doll was seated so that it was facing the 
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same model from a different visual perspective (e.g. across from and facing the child), the 
subject is asked to imagine what the mountains look like from the doll’s perspective. The child 
was asked to select from among several alternatives the photograph which best reproduced the 
doll’s visual perspective. Piaget and Inhelder (1956) found that children as old as 10 had 
difficulty with this task (although some children as young as 7 were successful), and Laurendeau 
and Pinard (1970) found that only 28% of 12-year-olds passed (the oldest age group they 
tested). Flavell et al (1968) complicated the task further. In their version, a child was shown a 
three-dimensional nonlinear arrangement of three cylinders of different sizes, but the cylinders 
were also painted red on one side (i.e. for half of their circumference) and white on the other. 
The subject was then asked to reconstruct a given view of the cylinders using a duplicate set. 
Less than half of the 16-year-olds tested passed this task. 
Borke (1975) modified Piaget and Inhelder’s (1965) Three Mountains Task in a couple of 
ways in order to test 3- and 4-year-old subjects. She used a toy car with the Sesame Street 
character Grover inside, which the experimenter “drove” around one of three different three-
dimensional model displays on square tables. Display 1 was a lake with a toy sailboat, a 
miniature cow and horse, and a model house. Display 2 was Piaget and Inhelder’s Three 
Mountains model. Display 3 was a farm scene with a number of miniature animals and people, 
a barn, a windmill, and a lake with ducks in it. The experimenter would then stop when the car 
with Grover was facing a different side of the display than the child, for a total of three times 
per display for each subject. The subject had an exact duplicate of the display on a table which 
she could turn. When the car with Grover was “stopped” by the experimenter pretending to 
drive it, the child was asked to move the turntable display until she was looking at it the same 
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way Grover is. Using the Three Mountains display (Display 2), the 3-year-olds were correct 42% 
of the time and the 4-year-olds were correct 67% of the time, already an improvement over the 
success rates of Piaget and Inhelder (1956). However, using Display 3 (the farm scene with 
multiple objects), the 3-year-olds gave correct responses over 79% of the time and the 4-year-
olds were correct 93% of the time. 
The simplest Level 2 task is probably the Turtle task (Masangkay et al 1974). This test 
involves placing a picture (of a turtle in this case) flat on the table when the child and 
experimenter are seated across from each other, so that one person sees the turtle with its feet 
on the top and its shell on the bottom, while the other person sees the reverse. The test 
questions are “Do you see the turtle right side up, or upside down? Do I see the turtle right side 
up, or upside down?” Masangkay, Flavell and their colleagues (Masangkay et al 1974, 
Experiment 2) found that 25% of 3-year-olds, 50% of 3.5-year-olds, and 100% of children aged 4 
and older passed this task. This would mean that children in the PAR stage of ToM development 
should successfully pass the Turtle task. However, 3-year-olds consistently fail this task, and 
Flavell and colleagues (Flavell et al 1981) demonstrated that increased familiarization, retesting, 
and training all fail to improve their low success rates. 
Level 2 is intended to be the dividing line which requires an understanding of mental 
representation. Level 1 only involves understanding how to draw a line of sight from a person’s 
eyes to a given object, so the subject need not consider the subjective visual experience of the 
other person, or their unique visual point of view. However, when we move to Level 2, the 
subject is now putatively considering the visual perspective—the mental (in this case visual) 
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representation—of the other person. As Flavell (1974) explains, “it must be admitted that the 
main focus of [the Level 1 child’s] attention in the person-object relation is still on the object 
rather than the person. In all probability, his representations decrease in salience and 
articulatedness as they go from the more external to the more internal aspects of that relation; 
that is, from object seen, to [the other person’s] visible looking gestures (movements and 
positioning of head and eyes, ‘intent’ expression, etc.), to [the other person’s] covert visual 
experience. In contrast, Level 2 knowledge seems unquestionably to be knowledge of precisely 
these latter, purely internal and phenomenological aspects” (p. 97).  
However, for at least some of the Level 2 tasks, I think we can question whether 
understanding of mental representation is truly required. For example, in Borke’s (1975) 
experiment, the subject may be simply reasoning about which objects in the three-dimensional 
display are closest to Grover’s line of sight, considering the character’s head orientation and 
proximity but not considering how (or even that) Grover represents the scene. The subject 
could then pass the task by simply turning the table until that object which appears closest to 
Grover is then closest to the child. This could explain why children found manipulating the 
three-dimensional model of the three mountains (Borke 1975) much easier than they found 
selecting the other character’s perspective from among a group of photographs (Piaget & 
Inhelder 1956).  
In fact, as other researchers have noted (e.g. Zatchik 1990), there is an explicit similarity 
between photographs and mental representations in that photographs are representations as 
well. If subjects are indeed considering the visual representation of the other person in order to 
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pass these tasks, then it would seem to be a straightforward and simple process to match their 
simulated visual representation with the corresponding photograph. However, 4- and 5-year-
olds find this task to be very difficult. Fishbein et al (1972) also found that manipulating physical 
objects was much easier for young children than selecting photographs. They used a revolving 
tray containing toys which differed depending upon which side of them a person was viewing, 
for example a toy soldier holding a candy cane in its left arm and saluting with its right arm. In 
the Turning task, the experimenter sat directly across from the child and asked the subject to 
turn the tray so that the experimenter could see a specified view of the toy; e.g. “Show me the 
side of the soldier holding the candy cane.” In the Pointing task, the experimenter sat in one of 
four positions, so he was facing either the front, left side, back, or right side of the toy. The child 
was then asked to select from a series of 8 photographs (showing the toy from 1 of 8 different 
angles) the one which best matched what the experimenter sees. The subject was given 
corrective feedback (e.g. shown which photograph was correct) when she responded 
incorrectly, and rewarded with an M&M candy for correct responses. The 4-year-olds gave 
correct responses on the Turning task over 90% of the time, but their percentages of correct 
responses dropped to only 48% on the Pointing task, and dropped further to 34% when 3 toys 
were used instead of only 1.39 
                                                           
39 Even when the experimenters reorganized the data in order to count the selection of an adjacent angle as 
correct, so that when the experimenter views the toy from the front e.g. a child who selects the photograph 
depicting the toy straight on, or the photograph depicting the toy from a 45 degree angle, or the photograph 
depicting the toy from a 315 degree angle (so that 3 of the 8 photographs would be counted as a correct 
response), the 4-year-olds gave correct responses only 50% of the time for the 1 toy display and 39% of the time 
for the 3 toy display (Fishbein et al 1972, p. 25). 
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One way to account for this dramatic difference between success rates depending upon 
whether subjects had to turn the tray or select a photograph, is that in the Turning task a child 
is simply moving the tray so that an object is visible to either the subject or the experimenter. 
For instance, when the experimenter instructs the child to “Show me the side of the soldier 
holding the candy cane,” the child simply reasons about the experimenter’s line of sight and 
moves the tray so that the candy cane is visible to the experimenter but not the child, in much 
the same way that a subject in the Picture task (Masangkay et al 1974) might flip the card 
around so that the cat is visible to the experimenter but not the subject. In this way the Turning 
task can be seen to be nearly identical in inference demands to the Picture task, so that what is 
actually being tested is Level 1 (and not Level 2) understanding. 
In contrast, the Pointing task explicitly asks the child to imagine the visual perspective of 
the experimenter. The child must predict what the toy looks like to the other person, i.e. the 
experimenter’s mental (visual) representation, in order to pass this task. If the child could 
indeed do so, it should then be a relatively simple matter to match that simulated visual 
representation with the corresponding photograph. However, in reality the subjects found this 
to be much more challenging. Thus, the Turning task tests Level 1 understanding but the 
Pointing task tests Level 2 understanding of perception. Reinterpreting the results in this way, 
we can see that the 4-year-olds (presumably in the PAR stage of ToM development) 
demonstrated Level 1 understanding but not Level 2 understanding. Hence they do not truly 
demonstrate understanding of mental representation, when the data are interpreted correctly. 
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If all of this is correct, then the turning tasks of Borke (1975) should also be interpreted as 
testing Level 1 and not Level 2.40 
Similarly, in the Turtle task (Masangkay et al 1974), the subject may be reasoning about 
which part of the turtle (the feet or the shell) is closest to the experimenter’s direct line of 
sight, rather than considering the visual perspective of the experimenter. In their Fishes task 
(Experiment 2) meant to test Level 1 perception understanding, three “Mr. Potato Fish” toys 
are arranged on a display so that one is always closer than the other two to a stationary 
observer. Subjects were asked to select from three identical toys the one which corresponds to 
the fish that the child or the experimenter “sees best.” According to the authors, “In both the 
pilot work and the present study, [subjects] took the one they ‘see best’ to mean the one 
closest to and facing them, as we had intended they should” (p. 361). In this Level 1 task, all 
three fish are visible but subjects are asked to select which fish the experimenter sees best. In a 
similar fashion, subjects in the Turtle task may be simply considering whether the experimenter 
sees the turtle’s feet or the turtle’s shell best. Hence the task may not actually require an 
understanding of mental representation.  
Although I am confident in my evaluation of the turning tasks of Borke (1975) and 
Fishbein et al (1972) as tests of mere Level 1 understanding, and hence versions of the tasks 
asking subjects to choose from a selection of photographs to be more accurately assessing their 
understanding of mental representation, there are at least two points against our interpreting 
away the Turtle task findings (Masangkay et al 1974) in a similar fashion. First, subjects found 
                                                           
40 Of course, neither Borke (1975) nor Fishbein et al (1972) explicitly reference the developmental model of Flavell 
under consideration here, which was published two years after the latter paper. 
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the Fishes task to be easier than the Turtle task, suggesting that the two tasks are not testing 
the same cognitive process.41  
Second, their Experiment 3 contained two tasks involving toy witch heads which were 
explicitly designed to test this interpretation (see p. 364). From the front the witch’s long 
protruding nose and open mouth were clearly visible, while from the back the witch’s cone hat 
was visible but not her nose and face. In one task (called Witch-split) the toy witch was cut in 
half, and the front half containing the nose was pasted onto one side of the card and the other 
half containing the cone hat was pasted onto the other side. The test questions were, “Do you 
see the witch’s nose or the witch’s hat? Do I see the witch’s nose or the witch’s hat?”42 The 
other task (Witches) involved placing a witch between the child and the experimenter, who 
were seated across from each other, so that it faced one of them and had the back of its head 
facing the other person. The subject was then asked to choose from a display of three toy 
witches, one facing towards the child, one facing away from the child, and one with its side 
profile facing the child. The test questions were, “Which one of these witches looks exactly like 
what you see? Which one of these witches looks exactly like what I see?”  
Although prima facie similar in task demands, Witch-split explicitly asks subjects to think 
about the witch in terms of its parts, and so is reasoning about what objects a person sees (the 
nose or the hat), while Witches explicitly asks about how another person sees the same object 
as the subject (what it “looks like” to them), and so is reasoning about another’s subjective 
                                                           
41 Whereas 50% of 3.5-year-olds gave correct responses in the Turtle task, all of them passed the Fishes task. And 
whereas 25% of 3-year-olds gave correct responses in the Turtle task, two thirds of them passed the Fishes task. 
42 Note the similarity to their aforementioned Picture task utilizing the board with a picture of a dog one side and a 
picture of a cat on the other. 
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visual point of view. All of the 3.5-year-olds passed Witch-split, but none of them passed 
Witches. If children reasoned about which part or object (the nose or the hat) the experimenter 
saw best in the Witches task, then it should be as easy as the Witch-split task, but clearly it’s 
not. This is rather compelling evidence that subjects are not passing the Turtle task by 
considering whether the feet or the shell or closest to the experimenter’s line of sight. (The 
Turtle task also explicitly asks whether the experimenter sees the turtle right side up or upside 
down.) Although it’s possible that the same story we gave for the turning tasks (Borke 1975, 
Fishbein et al 1972) also applies to the Turtle task, it starts to look rather implausible in light of 
this experiment. 
However, when we consider the data on Level 2 tasks as a whole, all of it is consistent 
with the view that children in the PAR stage of ToM development (i.e. roughly 4- and 5-year- 
olds) lack an understanding of mental representation, with the sole possible exception of the 
Turtle task (Masangkay et al 1974). Furthermore, the wide variation of ages at which children 
pass the various Level 2 tasks—from age 4 for the Turtle task (Masangkay et al) to older than 7 
(Piaget & Inhelder 1956) or 12 (Laurendeau & Pinard 1970) for the Three Mountains task, to 
older than 16 for the three cylinders task (Flavell et al 1968)—suggests that Flavell’s (1974) 
initial hunch about Level 2 understanding is likely to be true: “It seems reasonable to suppose 
that, here as elsewhere in the domain of cognitive development, there are numerous 
intermediate and transitional sublevels” (p. 97). The understanding that the same thing can 
appear differently to different people, that people can and do have distinct visual 
representations of the same object, and predicting what that other person’s visual 
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representation is like, of course admits of degree. So in some ways it’s not at all surprising that 
we see such wide variation in the ages at which subjects typically pass Level 2 tasks. 
If Flavell is right that the Level 2 stage itself admits of sub-stages of development, then 
perhaps PAR children are at the beginning end of that spectrum, having not yet acquired the 
concept of mental representation but slowly developing it over the next couple of years. This 
would make sense given that PAR is a transitional stage of ToM development between RR and 
BR. Also, the PAR rules presented last chapter don’t have an obvious application to any of the 
Level 2 tasks, so that they cannot test whether children are using PAR or not in the way that our 
false belief task-true belief task battery can (see Chapter 2). Hence my conclusion is that the 
findings of Level 1 and Level 2 understanding in children is completely consistent with the PAR 
hypothesis, and the view that an understanding of mental representation—which separates BR 
children from those in the PAR stage—is not acquired until around six years of age. 
Finally, the Level 3 child not only recognizes that the same object can appear differently 
to different people, and can not only predict how an arrangement appears from another’s 
perspective, but is also able to predict features of the other person’s retinal image. For 
instance, a Level 3 subject is able to reproduce the projective (versus real) sizes of objects from 
another’s perspective, noting for example that although one object is really bigger than a 
second object, it will appear smaller to another person because it is farther away from him. 
There are few, if any, developmental studies which test this level of perception understanding. 
Since Level 3 is of little interest for present purposes, I mention it here for completeness’ sake 
but have nothing further to say about it. 
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3. PAR and the Appearance/Reality Distinction  
After working on this model of perception understanding, Flavell and his colleagues 
spent years exploring when children learn that reality can be different than it appears, which 
they dubbed the appearance/ reality distinction (Flavell et al 1983). For our purposes, the ability 
to understand that such a distinction can be made would seem to be an essential aspect of 
having the concept of mental representation. The fact that we represent the world introduces a 
key mediation between ourselves and the world. Without mental representation, there is only 
us and the world, and we have a simple relationship of either having (perceptual) access or 
lacking access to the world. It is more like a physical relationship; for instance I either have 
access to my apartment or I don’t (e.g. when it’s locked and I don’t have the key, or when I’m in 
a different location).43 Presumably, the PAR child’s understanding of perception is a similarly 
simple model. Either a person has visual access to a scene or object, or she lacks access. Just as 
with me and my apartment, as long as a person is in the vicinity and there is no obstruction 
such as her eyes being closed or her line of sight being occluded by another object, then she 
has visual access to the object in question. 
However, the adult understanding is more complex than this due to the concept of 
mental representation.44 Now there is not simply us and the world, but there is us, the world, 
                                                           
43 Of course, I’m not claiming that young children are behaviorists or lack any conception of mind whatsoever. 
Even this simple notion of seeing is not completely devoid of mental concepts. The key thing children in the PAR 
stage lack is an understanding of mental representation. 
44 It should perhaps be noted here that even most adults have a naïve understanding of perception and memory 
which greatly simplifies the role that our brain has in creating our perceptions and memories (we spend a lot of 
time talking about this in my Critical Thinking class). Understanding perception, like understanding a Platonic 
dialogue or anything else, comes in degrees. It is not a binary operation of either understanding or not 
understanding, like a light switch being either on or off. However, lacking any conception of mental representation 
is more serious than not having a full understanding of perception. This idea is so fundamental to understanding 
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and our representations of that world. With this less direct, more mediated access to the world, 
representations of the world can be accurate or inaccurate. We can correctly represent some 
aspect of the world as it really is, or we can incorrectly represent some aspect of the world. 
Now beliefs can be true or false, and perceptions can be veridical or non-veridical. Now we 
understand that things can appear different than they really are. In the words of Flavell et al 
(1983), “[W]e have acquired the metacognitive knowledge that appearance—reality differences 
are always among life’s possibilities” (p. 96). Hence examining when children acquire the 
appearance/ reality distinction, besides being interesting in its own right, is crucial to evaluating 
the plausibility of the PAR Hypothesis. More specifically, prior to looking at the empirical data, 
we would predict that children should not have a full understanding of the appearance/ reality 
distinction in the PAR stage of development (i.e. roughly ages 4 and 5). 
3.2 Appearance/ Reality Tasks 
Probably the most well-known task Flavell and his colleagues (1983) used to test 
understanding of the appearance/ reality distinction involved showing children a sponge which 
looks like a rock, and then allowing them to handle it. After the child is familiarized with the 
fake rock, it is placed on the table. Children are then asked, “When you look at this with your 
eyes right now, what does it look like?” and “What is this really, really? Is this really, really a 
rock or really, really a sponge?” (p. 102). Hereafter, I will refer to this as the Standard 
Appearance/ Reality Task. They found that before four years of age children tend to give the 
same answer for both questions (i.e. they say that it really is a sponge, but also that it looks like 
                                                           
perception that lacking it causes a difference in kind between the young child and the adult rather than a mere 
difference of degree. 
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a sponge), presumably because they don’t realize that things can be different than they appear 
to be.  
Flavell and colleagues used a number of variations of this paradigm to test children’s 
understanding of the appearance/ reality distinction, including using objects such as rubber 
pencils and candles that look like apples, or changing the appearance of ordinary objects. For 
example, they would place a white index card behind a blue plastic filter, or put a straight 
object into a clear glass container filled with water, or view objects through a magnifying glass. 
Their creativity led to a great number of variations, including e.g. the experimenter pouring 
coffee into a mug from a watering can, with a flower placed in front of the mug, so that from a 
distance it looked as though the experimenter was watering a plant but in actuality he was 
pouring coffee into a cup. Experiment 3 of Flavell et al (1983) included a total of 21 different 
Appearance/ Reality (A/R) tasks asking children about the identity of imitation objects, the size, 
color and shape of various objects, how far away objects were, objects hidden behind larger 
objects which occluded them, and actions such as the one described with coffee in a watering 
can. 
3.3 Results 
Unsurprisingly, children in what Hedger and Fabricius (2011) dub the RR stage of 
development tend to fail these tasks, and children in what they dub the BR stage tend to pass. 
As Flavell (1986) notes, “Only a few three-year-olds get them right consistently, whereas almost 
all six- to seven-year-olds do” (p. 419). Unfortunately, the performance of children in the PAR 
stage—i.e. 4- and 5-year-olds generally—is a bit more complicated. Initially, Flavell et al (1983) 
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ran three experiments. In Experiment 1, performance of 4 ½ -year-olds (mean age 4 years, 8 
months) varied from 65% to 95% giving correct answers to both the appearance and reality 
question.45 In Experiment 2 , success rates of 4-year-olds varied from 19% to 43%, and 5-year-
olds were correct 55% to 73% of the time. Finally, in Experiment 3, 4 ½ -year-olds (mean age 4 
years, 5 months) answered both questions correctly about half of the time. 
As we saw previously with the Level 2 tasks, performance on A/R tasks varies 
considerably for children ages 4-7. Thus on a more difficult variation of the standard A/R task 
(Flavell et al 1986), 6 ½-year-olds answered correctly 45% of the time, and answered correctly 
while giving appropriate verbal justifications for their answers which included reasoning about 
appearance and reality only 12% of the time (Study 5).46 Flavell et al (1986) concluded that 6 ½-
year-olds 
...seem to find it particularly difficult to talk about appearances, realities, and 
appearance –reality relations... even briefly and minimally... They also tend not to 
mention them when asked to administer the very sorts of standard AR tasks they find so 
easy, as subjects, to solve—even after the experimenter has explained and repeatedly 
demonstrated the administration procedure... [W]e believe these difficulties in verbal 
labelling and nonverbal identification at least partly reflect genuine conceptual 
difficulties. Many subjects of this age simply seem unable to think about notions of 
"looks like," "really and truly," "looks different from the way it really and truly is," and so 
on... (pp. 58-59) 
                                                           
45 5 ½ -year-olds (mean age 5 years, 10 months) were almost perfect; notice however, that these children are on 
average almost 6 years old, and so most of them are probably in the BR stage. 
46 An attempt to improve performance of 6 ½ -year-olds (in Study 6) through a pre-training procedure and by 
repeating "more clear and explicit task instructions" before every task (for a total of 23 times) was unsuccessful (p. 
45). 
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Thus we have another puzzle in the form of apparently conflicting data about the success rates 
of children ages 4-7 on A/R tasks, much as we had in the previous section with Level 2 tasks. 
However, before we turn to attempting to solve this puzzle, let's first take a look at children's 
failures on A/R tasks, and what they mean from the perspective of the PAR theory we are 
developing. 
3.4 Errors on A/R Tasks: Phenomenism and Intellectual Realism 
As mentioned previously, children who fail the standard A/R tasks tend to give the same 
answers to both the appearance and the reality questions, rather than getting both questions 
wrong. For example, 3-year-olds tend to say that the rock-sponge looks like a sponge and really 
is a sponge, that the stick viewed partially submerged in water or through a prism looks bent 
and really is bent, and so on. More specifically, Flavell et al (1983) note that when asked about 
an object's properties—such as the shape of the stick or the color of an index card or the size of 
an object viewed through a magnifying glass—3-year-olds tend to answer both questions based 
upon the current appearance of the object in question. Thus they say for example that the 
index card looks blue and really is blue when seen through a piece of blue-colored plastic. This 
is known in the literature, following the terminology of Piaget and Inhelder (1956), as 
Phenomenism. In contrast, when asked about the identity of an object, 3-year-olds tend to 
answer both questions based upon the current reality of the object in question. Thus they say 
that the rubber pencil both looks rubber and really is rubber, rather than a pencil. This is known 
in the literature, again following the terminology of Piaget and Inhelder (1956), as Intellectual 
Realism. 
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Since 3-year-olds tend to answer both the questions the same, then that means they get 
one of the test questions correct. When asked about the properties of an object, they tend to 
answer the appearance question correctly but the reality question incorrectly, and when 
questioned about the identity of an object, they tend to get the appearance question wrong 
but the reality question correct. Thus Flavell and colleagues (1983, Flavell 1986) seem to 
interpret these results as partial understanding of the appearance/ reality distinction. They are 
partially correct, after all. However, the fact that children don't give random answers to the test 
questions doesn't imply partial understanding of the distinction at all.  
If we keep in mind that what these children lack is a conception of mental 
representation, then of course there is no distinction between what something looks like and 
how it really is. These amount to the same thing. The only possible response for such a child is 
to answer both questions the same (e.g. it looks like a sponge and really is a sponge). To answer 
both questions incorrectly would mean that children can make a distinction between how 
something appears and the way it really is, but simply that they're confused about which 
representation is the appearance and which is the reality. When we think about it carefully, we 
see that in fact we should predict that a child who truly doesn't understand mental 
representation and therefore can't make the reality/ appearance distinction will give the same 
answer to both test questions. 
Flavell et al (1983) found that when asked about properties, young children who fail the 
standard A/R task tend to exhibit phenomenism and that when asked about identities the same 
children tend to give intellectual realist responses. This may make perfect sense when we 
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consider the way our brains understand the world. We seem to be hard-wired to believe that 
identities of things remain constant, but that the properties of those objects may change over 
time, and indeed usually do change (given sufficient time). Consider Descartes’s example of a 
piece of wax. Initially, Descartes observes that the piece of wax is hard and cold when he 
touches it, makes a sharp tapping sound when he raps it on the table, has a certain shape that 
he can see, and—being recently taken from the beehive—still retains an odor of the flowers 
and a faint taste of honey. However, as he starts to melt the wax by placing it near the fire, all 
of these properties change. It is now warm and soft to the touch and makes hardly any sound 
when struck. The shape and color and even the former size of the piece of wax now change, so 
that it’s visual appearance is drastically different from a moment before. What was left of the 
smell and taste also now evaporate as it melts. Descartes observes that all of the properties of 
the piece of wax have changed right before our senses, but we continue to identify it as the 
same piece of wax. The properties have changed, but the identity remains the same (Descartes 
1641/1985, pp. 20-21). 
We see myriad examples of the phenomenon in our everyday world, and young children 
also recognize that it’s the same ball even though the shape changes after it’s been deflated, 
that it’s the same maple tree whose leaves change from green in the summer to amber and 
orange in the autumn, and who sheds those same leaves in the winter, the baby becomes the 
girl becomes the woman becomes the old woman but remains the same person, and on and on. 
(Incidentally it appears to be this world where the properties of things are constantly in flux 
which so engaged the Ancient Greek philosophers, and which is the root of many metaphysical 
identity puzzles in philosophy.)  
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Hence we see that it would be perfectly natural for the child lacking a concept of mental 
representation to apply these beliefs about ever-changing properties to the Appearance/Reality 
tasks. Since there is no distinction between reality and the way our minds represent reality, 
then there is only one thing, viz. reality. And as we have already seen, subjects who fail the A/R 
tasks consistently give the same answer to the appearance and the reality question. The object 
or the property of the object looks the same as it really is, since without mental representation 
there is no difference between the thing and the way it appears.  
What’s more, as we see from our reasoning above, identity remains constant but an 
object’s properties change. Therefore it would make sense for the child to make the 
phenomenism error when asked about properties and the intellectual realism error when asked 
about identities. The stick looks bent and it really is bent (phenomenism) for the child who lacks 
a concept of mental representation. A moment ago it looked straight and really was straight. 
This is actually perfectly reasonable given the current conceptual repertoire of the child. There 
is no distinction between the property of an object and the way we represent that property, 
there is only reality. And in reality, the properties of things change. The handlebar of the bicycle 
becomes bent, the ball goes flat, the shape of the wax changes when it gets hot. The shapes of 
objects are changing all of the time. So in the A/R tasks, for the RR or PAR child the index card is 
blue when seen behind the blue filter and it is white when the filter is removed. The color of a 
sunset changes before our very eyes as we watch it; why should index cards be any different? 
The adult explanation, that the filter makes the white card look blue temporarily, is not 
available to these subjects. 
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In contrast, the identities of objects remain constant although their properties are 
continually in flux. The same piece of wax remains through its numerous property changes, and 
the same toy soldier remains after it is bent. Thus it would make sense that the same sponge 
remains regardless of its properties. Therefore the young child says that it not only really is a 
sponge but it also looks like a sponge right now (intellectual realism). Colors and shapes and 
sizes may change, but identities do not change. If the object is a sponge, then that’s reality and 
it is always a sponge. Even adults would agree with the reasoning so far. Since there is no 
distinction between the sponge and how it appears or is visually represented, then it must also 
look like a sponge. Hence the phenomenism and intellectual realism errors are perfectly 
reasonable and predictable, given that we keep in mind that the child lacks the concept of 
mental representation, and that our brains view the world as one filled with objects whose 
identities remain constant but whose properties may change. 
There is also some evidence that young children may view properties as more malleable 
than adults do, so that from their point of view properties are constantly changing from 
situation to situation. One example is Piaget’s well known conservation task (Piaget & Inhelder 
1974). This can take many different forms, but a typical task is the following. First, children are 
shown two identical glass containers, each holding an equal amount of liquid, and are asked if 
the two amounts of liquid are the same. Of course, most children successfully answer “Yes.” 
While the child observes, the experimenter takes the liquid contents of one of the glasses and 
pours it into a taller and narrower glass. Piaget, and many other researchers who successfully 
replicated his findings, found that many children aged 2 to 6 years will now say that the two 
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amounts of liquid are different, because the thin glass contains more liquid than the original 
glass contained. 
Of course adults believe that the amount of liquid in a glass can change, for instance if 
someone spills some of a glass of bourbon or takes a drink out of it.  However, an adult who 
witnessed the bourbon being poured from one glass to another would never think that the 
amount of bourbon has somehow changed simply as a result of the act of pouring it into a new 
glass, regardless of the phenomenal appearance of either glass of bourbon. Hence, children at 
this stage of development seem to think that properties of objects can change from situation to 
situation, and those different situations may be as simple as being in different containers. (This 
was further corroborated by the fact that children made similar mistakes in other cases, such as 
when a spherical ball of clay is rolled into a snake-like shape, etc.) 
Another example is that infants may believe that the steepness of a ledge changes from 
situation to situation. At about 1 year of age many infants transition from crawling to walking. 
Kretch and Adolph (2013) found that although 12-month-olds who crawl over a shallow cliff 
(e.g. 9 cm) will not attempt to crawl over a 90 cm cliff (0% attempted this), 63% of 12-month-
olds who are walking will attempt to walk over the 90 cm cliff (i.e. approximately 3 feet). Of 
course, there are many possible interpretations of this finding, but one possibility is that infants 
think the same cliff is less deep when walking than it is when crawling. Finally, it appears that 
young children may believe that the stick actually does bend when submerged in water. Given 
what they believe about the world and the mind, this conclusion actually appears to be the 
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optimally rational one. Children lacking the concept of mental representation may begin with 
false premises, but their reasoning is quite logical. 
3.5 The PAR Stage of Development and Success on A/R Property Tasks 
Now that we understand that for young children the properties of objects can change 
from situation to situation, we may have a clue how to solve our puzzle about the performance 
of 4- and 5-year-olds on A/R tasks (most of whom are using PAR). Perhaps 4- and 5-year-olds 
who pass the standard A/R tasks, by answering e.g. that the stick looks bent but is really and 
truly straight, mean by "really and truly straight" only that the stick will be straight again once it 
is lifted out of the water, but that it really is bent right now. In other words, whereas the BR 
child or the adult mean that the stick simultaneously appears bent but is actually straight, 
because they can hold two conflicting representations of the stick in their minds at one time, 
the PAR child reasons only about how the stick is in reality, but believes that it changes from 
straight to bent back to straight again when submerged and then lifted out of the water. Thus 
the conflicting representations are not concurrent but rather chronological—the stick was 
straight, now it is bent, and it will be straight again. In fact, there is a significant amount of 
evidence in favor of this latter interpretation of what 4- and 5-year-olds are saying. 
First, in many cases when 4- and 5-year-olds are asked basic questions about how things 
are, without explicit reference to appearance or reality, they often answer based upon the 
appearance of the object (i.e. phenomenism) rather than the way the objects really are. Russell 
and Haworth (1988) had two subjects witness an illusory display and then asked them 
questions about it. For instance, in one task two children were first shown an array of white 
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objects on a table, and then instructed to wear glasses with red Perspex lenses. The test 
question was, “What color are these things on the table?” 60% of the 70 5-year-olds tested 
(mean age 5 years, 2 months) responded with “red” rather than “white,” in contrast to the 70 
7-year-olds (mean age 7 years, 2 months) who only responded “red” 25% of the time.47 Thus 
when asked about the color of the objects, 60% of the 5-year-olds answered based upon 
phenomenal appearance rather than reality, whereas only 25% of the 7-year-olds did this.  
Braine and Shanks also did a number of experiments which are designed to test Piaget’s 
idea of conservation48 but are very interesting for our purposes here (1965a, 1965b). The size 
experiment is as follows. Two simple figures were cut out of colored construction paper—for 
instance a square, star, ball, or house shape. For each pair of cutouts, there would be an 
identical shape (e.g. square), but each of the shapes would be different color (e.g. one red and 
one blue) and they would also be of different sizes (roughly 1” and 1.5”). A viewing apparatus 
was constructed with two separate compartments, each with its own viewing screen in which 
either an ordinary pane of glass, or a magnifying lens which doubled the apparent size of 
objects, can be placed. (The glass pane and magnifying lens were removable so that the 
experimenter could surreptitiously switch them in order to be sure that trials were 
counterbalanced.) For each trial, the subject first viewed the two cutouts (e.g. a 1” red square 
and a 1.5” blue square) outside the viewing apparatus, and then watched as the experimenter 
                                                           
47 Attempts to use social pressure to push 5-year-olds towards giving a realist answer had no effect. In order to 
control for the hypothesis that the phenomenism may be a result of the test context, Russell & Haworth (1988) 
had experimenters ask for a single response from the two subjects, and then gave one of them glasses with red 
Perspex lenses and the other glasses with clear lenses, so that answering “clear” would be the best way to resolve 
differences of opinion. However, even on these trials 5-year-olds said “red” 60% of the time. 
48 See section 3.4, above. 
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placed both cutouts into the compartments. The experimenter always placed them so that the 
1.5” blue square was placed behind the simple pane of glass and the 1” red square was placed 
behind the magnifying lens, so that it now looked larger (specifically 2”) than the 1.5” blue 
square. Subjects were then asked, “Which looks bigger?” and, “Which is really, really bigger?” 
(emphasis in the original). (The questions were of course counterbalanced across trials.) 
The shape experiment involved first showing the subject two rods of different colors, 
one of which is bent and the other of which is straight. These were then immersed in water so 
that the refraction made the bent rod appear straight and the straight rod appear bent. 
Subjects were then asked, “Which looks bent?” or, “Which looks straight?” (counterbalanced 
across trials); and, “Which is really, really bent?” or, “Which is really, really straight?” (the 
adjective matching that of the first test question). 
Braine and Shanks found that, across a series of four experiments using these two 
paradigms (1965a, 1965b), roughly 35% of the 4-year-olds and 65% of the 5-year-olds were able 
to answer most of the test questions correctly (specifically, at least 9 out of 10 test questions).49 
However, 4- and 5-year-olds often gave answers based upon appearance rather than reality 
when asked a neutral question which didn’t include “looks” or “really.” In Experiment IV of 
Braine & Shanks 1965b, subjects were given eight trials of the size experiment, above. After 
viewing the cutouts outside of the viewing apparatus and then inside the viewing 
compartments, subjects were asked, “Which is the big one?” Following each trial, the 
experimenters used a feedback procedure in which they were told either “Yes, that’s right; this 
                                                           
49 See Figure 3 on p. 204 of Braine & Shanks 1965b. 
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is the big one…See? [taking the cutouts back out of the viewing apparatus],” or “No, that’s 
wrong; this is the big one…See?” Subjects earned two poker chips for correct answers or had 
one taken away for incorrect responses, and the poker chips could be traded in for M&M 
candies following the experiment (which subjects knew from a pre-training procedure).  
In the first trial, 100% of the 4- and 5-year-olds answered incorrectly. That is, they all 
said that the square which is smaller in reality, but looks bigger behind the magnifying lens, was 
the big one.50 After being told they were wrong in the feedback procedure following the task, 
and with the motivation of earning poker chips which they could use to “purchase” candy, 
performance increased on the second trial of the same task to about 35% correct for 4-year-
olds and 40% correct for 5-year-olds. These are the same results Russell and Haworth (1988) 
got when they asked children similar questions about the color of objects, above. Even after 
being given feedback and correction on their answers, nearly two thirds of the 4- and 5-year-
olds in Braine and Shanks’ (1965a) Study IV nonetheless continued to respond with the cutout 
which looks bigger behind the magnifying lens when asked, “Which is bigger?” One explanation 
of this finding (and the similar finding from Russell & Haworth 1988) is that the subjects believe 
that the properties of the objects (e.g. the size and color) literally do change when viewed 
through a distorting lens or colored eyeglasses.  
From the adult perspective, the cutout remains the same size but we visually represent 
the object as being larger than it actually is when viewed through a magnifying glass. However, 
                                                           
50 An interesting contrast is that 15% of the 3-year-olds answered correctly on the first trial (see Braine & Shanks 
1965a, p. 234). However, it’s not known whether this difference is statistically significant given the number of 
subjects (7 three-year-olds, 11 four-year-olds, and 12 five-year-olds). 
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to the 4- and 5-year-olds, who are using PAR and have no concept of mental representation, 
this explanation makes no sense. From their perspective, there is only the object in reality and a 
subject’s perceptual access (or lack thereof) to the object in question. For them, there is only 
the cutout which they can see, whose properties can change over time. When viewed through 
the magnifying glass, therefore, the cutout actually is bigger than it was a moment ago. There is 
no “looks bigger” from the standpoint of PAR; there is only “bigger.” So of course when asked, 
“Which is bigger?” the 4- and 5-year-olds answer that the one which appears bigger is the 
larger one. They believe it is the larger one, when it is behind the magnifying lens. When it is 
pulled back out of the viewing apparatus, then it is again the smaller object. 
Since there is no “looks bigger” for the children using PAR, but only “is bigger,” then 
how do they interpret the questions from the Standard A/R tasks, such as “Does the stick look 
bent or does it look straight [when viewed through a prism]?” For the PAR child, there is only 
reality (the “is”), and the subject’s perceptual access to that reality (or their lack of perceptual 
access to that reality). There is no mental representation, including visual, so there is no “looks 
straight” for them. Given their limited conceptual repertoire, they are forced to interpret the 
question “Does the stick look bent or does it look straight?” as meaning “Is the stick bent or is it 
straight?” For the PAR child, properties are probably situation-dependent in the way we noted 
above. Hence the stick is in reality bent when viewed through a prism or partially submerged in 
water. Thus 4- and 5-year-olds answer that the stick looks bent in the standard A/R task. This is 
the correct answer from the adult perspective, but means something completely different in 
the mind of the child using PAR. If they lack an understanding of representation and therefore 
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don’t distinguish appearance from reality, then children using PAR may interpret “looks” and 
“is” to mean the same thing. 
Similarly, as we hypothesized at the outset of this section, children using PAR may also 
interpret the standard A/R task reality question, “Is the stick really and truly bent or is it really 
and truly straight?” as a question about how the stick is at other times, i.e. how the stick was 
previously and how it will be in the future (before and after being partially submerged in 
water). The adult of course understands that “really and truly” is meant to contrast with how 
the stick appears, i.e. how it is visually represented. For the adult, the stick simultaneously is 
visually represented as bent but is straight in objective reality. For the child using PAR, there is 
no visual representation, but the stick actually is bent in reality when partially submerged.  
Thus they answer to the first question that the stick ‘looks’ (meaning ‘is’) bent. Since the 
second question is seeking a contrast, the only contrast for the child using PAR is how the stick 
is in reality in different situations. For them, properties are situation-dependent. So “really and 
truly” must mean, for the child using PAR, how the stick is in other situations, i.e. how it is when 
not partially submerged in water. Thus they answer that the stick is “really and truly straight,” 
but again they mean something different than the adult does by this locution, given that their 
conceptualizations differ.  
In fact, this is the same theory of five-year-olds put forth by Flavell and colleagues 
(1989), independently of the PAR hypothesis. In a pilot study, they showed 5-year-olds two 
different displays—one with illusory color and one with illusory shape. However, they asked 
different reality questions for each display (counterbalanced across subjects). For one display, 
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they asked the same reality question as in the standard A/R task: “Really and truly, is this stick 
really and truly bent or really and truly straight [emphasis in the original]?” However, for the 
other display, they asked, “How about right now? Right now is this stick really and truly bent or 
really and truly straight?” They found that 5-year-olds “gave approximately twice as many 
incorrect answers to the ‘right now’ reality questions as they did to the standard reality 
questions” (p. 514). Hence they seemed to interpret the standard A/R reality question in the 
way we suggested, as meaning “How is the stick in other situations?” However, when prompted 
with the locution “right now,” 5-year-olds were twice as likely to say “bent” when the stick was 
partially submerged, because for them the stick is in reality bent ‘right now’ in the present 
situation. 
 Flavell et al (1989) then tested 24 adult college students and 24 5-year-olds on the 
appearance/reality questions, measuring how often subjects spontaneously used “looks” when 
answering the appearance question and “really and truly” when answering reality question. 
They found that 65% of the adults and 61% of the children spontaneously used “really and 
truly” in answering the reality question, but that whereas 85% of the adults used “looks” when 
answering the appearance question, only 29% of the 5-year-olds did. Flavell et al (1989, pp. 
519-520) note that 
The 29% is consistent with findings from our pilot study and from previous research that 
children of this age tend not to employ “looks” or “looks like” spontaneously when 
referring to illusory displays (Flavell et al, 1986; Russell & Haworth, 1988). It is also 
consistent with our hypothesis that they tend not to think of appearances as 
appearances, but rather as present realities. Because they tend to equate “looks” and 
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“is,” they find it natural to use the more common term “is” when describing 
appearances. 
Of course, if they lack an understanding of mental representation, then these 5-year-olds may 
lack the cognitive ability to distinguish appearances from reality, and so they are forced to 
equate the two. 
 Furthermore, the locution “right now” included in the appearance question may cue the 
children to think of the present situation. Thus, they answer that the stick looks (is) bent, 
because that’s how it is in the present situation. If anything, the “looks” may simply be a 
reminder that the subjects (from their point of view) have perceptual access to the stick in the 
current situation, because they are looking directly at it. However, just as children of this same 
age appear to reason that quantities can change from situation to situation in Piagetian 
conservation tasks, they may also reason that the stick changes from straight to bent and back 
again from situation to situation. The remaining salient difference between the two questions 
(once “looks” and “is” are equated) then becomes “really and truly,” which may cue 5-year-olds 
to think of situations other than the present one—that is, past (and perhaps future) situations 
where the stick is straight. 
  Flavell et al (1989) also asked subjects another question when the stick was partially 
submerged, which is not typically found in standard A/R tasks. One of the test questions was, 
“Is the stick a different shape than it was before?” Only 20% of the college students in the study 
answered that the stick was a different shape than it was a moment ago (p. 518). Presumably 
most of the adult subjects (if not all of them) reason that although the stick appears bent right 
now, the actual shape of the stick is nonetheless still straight. However, roughly three quarters 
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of the 5-year-olds answered “Yes,” that the stick is a different shape now than it was a moment 
ago when it was not partially submerged. In fact, 70% of the 5-year-olds who passed the 
standard A/R task answered that the stick is a different shape than it was before.  
This is evidence that although they are answering the standard A/R questions correctly 
in the sense that they are giving the same answers as adults, 5-year-olds (who are typically 
using PAR) do not interpret the questions the same way that adults do. For the child using PAR, 
the stick is straight before submerged, bent while partially submerged, and straight when taken 
back out of the water. There is no mental representation, visual or otherwise, and so there is no 
distinction between the way an object appears and the way it really is. Therefore the data 
gathered from A/R tasks is perfectly consistent with the PAR hypothesis which we set out last 
chapter. What’s more, our theory can explain the findings of Flavell et al (1989), Russell and 
Haworth (1988), and Braine and Shanks (1965a, 1965b), which are problematic for the view 
that 4- and 5-year-olds understand mental representation and have acquired a theory of mind. 
The PAR hypothesis also supplies the mechanism by which 4- and 5-year-olds misinterpret 
(from the adult perspective) the standard A/R test questions in the way in which Flavell and his 
colleagues (1989) hypothesized, just as the discovery of DNA revealed the mechanism by which 
Darwin’s hypothesis of heritable traits works in reality.51 
                                                           
51 Flavell et al (1989) actually continued to think that children in this stage do understand mental representation to 
some extent. Thus they “do not believe that they [i.e. 5-year-olds] would be actually incapable of construing the 
stimulus as being simultaneously, at this moment, characterisable in two different, contradictory-seeming ways” 
(p. 513). In this way, the view presented here contrasts sharply with that of Flavell et al (1989), since without the 
concept of mental representation children in the PAR stage are literally incapable of thinking of the stick as both 
bent and straight at one and the same time. The only way adults do that is by distinguishing objective reality 
(straight stick) from visual (mis)representations (looks bent). 
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3.5 The PAR Stage of Development and Success on A/R Identity Tasks52 
Since for the PAR child properties are continually in flux and relative to the 
environmental situation, while identities remain constant, they must interpret the test 
questions in the A/R identity tasks differently than they do in the A/R property task. Recall that 
4- and 5-year-olds tend to pass these tasks as well. In the Standard A/R task which uses the fake 
rock, children tend to answer correctly by responding with “a rock” when asked, “When you 
look at this with your eyes right now, what does it look like? Does it look like a rock or look like 
a sponge?” They also give the correct response of “a sponge” when asked, “What is this really, 
really? Is this really, really a rock or really, really a sponge?” 
The correct answer to the reality question should come as no surprise to us, because as 
we saw earlier children interpret “really, really” simply as across contexts; i.e. at different times 
and in different environmental situations. So the sponge is always a sponge and remains so 
across contexts. Just as with Descartes’ piece of wax, it’s the same sponge whether the subject 
has perceptual access to it or not, and whatever its visual appearance is.  
However, how are they to interpret the appearance question? When you look at this 
with your eyes right now, what does it look like? This question likely seems to the PAR subject 
to be a question about perceptual access. The appearance question is a question about 
perception for both the adult using BR and the 4-year-old using PAR. Since there is no 
representation mediating between the person and the world for the PAR child but only access 
                                                           
52 The explanation of PAR children’s performance on A/R identity tasks from this section was inspired by 
conversations with Bill Fabricius.  
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to the world or lack of access to the world, then the PAR child must interpret this as a question 
about perceptual access. Now they can compute PAR: 
Rule 1:  Seeing → Knowing (and Not Seeing → Not Knowing)53  
Rule 2:  Knowing → Ge@ng it Right (and Not Knowing → Ge@ng it Wrong) 
A child using PAR should reason that I’m not touching the sponge right now (recall that the appearance 
test question includes the locution ‘right now’), so I don’t know it’s a sponge, and I’ll get it wrong. 
“Getting it wrong” in this case means thinking that it’s a rock when it’s really a sponge, and so the PAR 
subject should respond to the appearance question with “a rock.” As with the False Belief Task and the 
A/R Property Task, the PAR child gives the correct response but means something very different by it 
than the typical adult does.54 
4. Conclusion 
We have demonstrated that the major studies of children’s understanding of perception 
are consistent with the PAR hypothesis. First, we noted that in Flavell’s influential model of 
perception understanding (Flavell 1974), the acquisition of the concept of mental 
representation is what distinguishes Level 1 and Level 2. Level 1 involves understanding that 
the same object may be visible to one person but not to another. Hence this is a test of 
                                                           
53 Remember that ‘seeing’ in the PAR Rules simply means perceptual access and may refer to any of the five sense 
modalities. See Hedger & Fabricius 2011 and Chapter 2 for more about the PAR rules, and especially Chapter 5 for 
more about interpreting what the PAR child means by ‘see’ and ‘know’ here. 
54 One way to test this hypothesis would be to give children a modified A/R identity task with three options, similar 
to the one used by Fabricius and Khalil (2003). In their version they showed the child that a doll (Yoshi) rode on the 
rock-sponge as if it were a car. In this way we could add a third option to the appearance test question: “When you 
look at this with your eyes right now, what does it look like? Does it look like a rock, or look like a sponge, or look 
like a car?” The child using PAR should divide their answers between “a rock” and “a car” but never answer with “a 
sponge.” 
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perceptual access, which corresponds to the first rule of PAR.55 Level 1 is thus required in order 
to use PAR, so children in this stage of theory of mind development (roughly 4- and 5-year-olds) 
should have no difficulty with Level 1 tasks. As we saw in Section 2 above, they do not have 
difficulty with these tasks. 
Lacking a concept of mental representation, children in the PAR stage should fail Level 2 
tasks, since Level 2 involves understanding that the same object can appear differently to 
different people (i.e. that two subjects can have different mental representations of the same 
object). Success rates on Level 2 tasks initially appear to vary widely, but we are able to dispel 
most of the confusion once we distinguish those tasks which putatively test Level 2 but are 
actually testing Level 1 understanding from those tasks truly testing Level 2. For example, a 
subject may use simple physical cues in order to correctly move the turntable display in Borke 
(1975)’s task, without considering the mind of the other person at all (e.g. Grover’s car is close 
to the horse but far away from the house, so I’ll turn the table until the horse is directly in front 
of me and the house is far away).  
Once we are able to ignore the tasks that are actually only testing Level 1, we find that 
children in the PAR stage do fail Level 2 tasks for the most part, although they may be 
successful on some very simple Level 2 tasks, such as the Turtle task of Masangkay et al (1974). 
However, we have to remember that predicting the visual representation of another person is 
not a simple all or nothing matter, but straightforwardly admits of degree. It involves abilities 
                                                           
55 More specifically, we might say that determining perceptual access is figuring out which conditional version of 
the first rule of PAR to compute (If S has perceptual access to X, then S knows P about X; or If S does not have 
perceptual access to X, then S does not know P about X). 
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such as simulation in addition to understanding mental representation, for instance. What’s 
more, the transitional PAR stage presumably involves a gradual acquisition of the concept of 
mental representation, or at least a gradual acquisition of the knowledge and understanding 
required to have such a concept.56 
The existence of a physical model, along with only two possibilities, may assist children 
at the beginning of this spectrum in passing the Turtle task. The child need only look at the 
physical picture and determine its orientation to the experimenter’s line of sight. In this way, 
although it is most plausible to consider the Turtle task a true test of Level 2 (for reasons given 
in Section 2 above), the task demands are only slightly greater than Level 1 tasks such as the 
Picture task. They would likely fail a more sophisticated version of the Turtle task where there 
are four possible positions of the experimenter and subjects needed to choose between 
perhaps eight photographs; and indeed they do fail similar such tasks, such as the Pointing task 
of Fishbein et al (1972). Adults and older children who are using BR would presumably have 
                                                           
56 Although my hypothesis is that BR is innate in the sense that it is not learned through a rational process (See 
Chapter 6 below; cf. Fodor 1975 on this sense of innate), I nonetheless believe that BR acquisition is a gradual 
rather than a sudden process. These two aspects are prima facie consistent with each other; this is similar e.g. to 
the view many cognitive scientists have about children and language (e.g. Pinker 1994).  
 
To be clear, once a child acquires the concept of mental representation, then that child is in the BR stage. The 
understanding of mental representation is the dividing line between the PAR and BR stages of cognitive 
development. Of course, any person’s understanding about mental states comes in degrees, and it’s unlikely 
anyone has a full understanding of what it is to perceive something, for example. But someone needs to possess 
the concept PERCEIVE before they can think about it at all, and children in the PAR stage do not share the adult 
concept SEE e.g., because their idea of seeing is non-representational. They do have some concept SEE, but it is a 
different concept from the adult concept. See Chapters 5 and 6 below for more about PAR versus BR concepts. 
 
One process that needs more research is exactly how the transitions between the three ToM stages work. More 
longitudinal studies of ToM development would be useful. To be precise, it is an open empirical question exactly 
how long it takes to acquire the adult BR concepts. Although I assume it is somewhat gradual, it is of course 
relatively quick (even if it take 2-3 years) given the breadth of knowledge required to do folk psychology. In this 
sense it is much like acquiring the ability to talk. 
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high success rates on such a task, however. For instance, Fishbein et al (1974) found that 8-
year-olds chose the correct photograph (out of eight options) 74% of the time on the Pointing 
task. All things considered, the data on Level 1/ Level 2 tasks appears consistent with the PAR 
hypothesis. 
Mental states such as perceptions are of course representations. Furthermore, as 
philosophers initially suggested to psychologists (Bennett, 1978; Dennett, 1978; Harman, 1978), 
a good way to test whether someone understands mental representation is to test whether 
they are sensitive to misrepresentation, as is done in the false belief task. It would be 
implausible to say that someone can understand representation without realizing that 
representations can sometimes misrepresent reality. John Flavell and his colleagues were the 
first to investigate when children acquire the understanding that things can be different than 
they appear to us (Flavell et al, 1983), which is an important part of recognizing that sensory 
states are representational, and hence may occasionally misrepresent reality. According to the 
PAR hypothesis, children don’t understand belief until after about six years of age, and if the 
lack of understanding of mental representation is consistent across multiple tasks, then the 
appearance/ reality distinction should likewise not be acquired until this stage of theory of 
mind development. 
In Section 3 we demonstrated that once we realize how the test questions of 
appearance/ reality tasks must be interpreted by children using PAR, the findings on these tasks 
are consistent with the PAR hypothesis. Also, the PAR theory helps explain the findings of 
Flavell et al (1989), Russell and Haworth (1988), and Braine and Shanks (1965a, 1965b) which 
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have been puzzling to researchers of cognitive development. The evidence from studies of 
children’s understanding of perception can thus be added to the case for the PAR hypothesis, 
and the view that children don’t acquire the concept of mental representation until fairly late in 
their development, i.e. typically around six years of age, contrary to every other view of 
cognitive development in the literature.57 
                                                           
57 As an homage to the late, great Jerry Fodor, we could nickname this monograph A brief refutation of 
developmental psychology. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Perceptual access reasoning: 
Developmental stage or System 1 heuristic? 
 
1. Introduction 
In her paper “Mindreading with ease? Fluency and belief reasoning in 4- to 5-year-olds,” 
Anika Fiebich (2014) discusses the Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR) hypothesis (Chapter 2, 
Fabricius et al 2010, Fabricius and Imbens-Bailey 2000, Fabricius and Khalil 2003, Hedger and 
Fabricius 2011, Hedger 2016), and proposes an alternative hypothesis. The PAR hypothesis and 
some of the evidence in support of it was presented in Chapter 2. In Section 2 I briefly review 
the Fluency Hypothesis, and then point out a number of problems with Fiebich’s proposal and 
argue for the superiority of the PAR hypothesis in Section 3. In the conclusion I explain that the 
PAR hypothesis does leave room for a dual-systems theory of sorts, albeit one which is 
importantly different from Fiebich’s proposal. I close by hinting at a broader implication for 
theorizing about child psychology which falls out of the response to Fiebich. 
2. The fluency hypothesis 
Fiebich (2014) agrees that PAR explains the failure of 4- and 5-year-olds on the true 
belief task, but disagrees that children at this stage are also using PAR to pass the false belief 
task.58 She argues that children use Belief Reasoning (BR) to pass the false belief task. Her 
hypothesis is that children switch from BR on the false belief task, to PAR on the true belief task 
                                                           
58 For details about these tasks, see Chapter 2. 
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because the latter is a cognitively cheaper heuristic. Adopting Kahneman’s well-known dual 
systems theory (Kahneman 2011), she argues that fluency explains when children ages 4 and 5 
use BR or PAR. When the cognitive task feels easy (e.g. the true belief task), they default to the 
fast and frugal PAR heuristic, and when the task feels more difficult (false belief task), they use 
the more effortful and deliberative BR. 
In the third section of her article, Fiebich (2014) discusses at length the cognitive 
demands involved in each of the three strategies which, according to the PAR hypothesis, are 
used during the three distinct stages of ToM development (Chapter 2, Hedger and Fabricus 
2011). Children under the age of 4 tend to fail verbal false belief tasks. In the false location task, 
they tend to choose the green cupboard, because that is where the chocolate is in reality 
(disregarding Maxi’s mental representations), and so Hedger & Fabricus (2011) refer to this as 
Reality Reasoning (RR). Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR) is the use of the two PAR rules to 
interpret and predict behavior, and they dub a full-fledged theory of mind including an 
understanding of belief Belief Reasoning (BR). 
Fiebich (2014) argues convincingly that “Perceptual Access Reasoning is cognitively 
more demanding than Reality Reasoning but less demanding than Belief Reasoning” (p. 935). 
Kahneman (2011)’s view is that people tend to use cognitively cheaper System 1 reasoning 
processes, unless some cognitive strain (i.e. feeling of difficulty) induces them to use the more 
effortful but also more reliable System 2 reasoning processes. Adopting this theory, Fiebich 
proposes that children ages 4 and 5 use the System 1 heuristic PAR on the true belief task, but 
that the cognitive strain involved in the false belief task causes them to use System 2 BR.  
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The explanation of this cognitive strain relies on another theory from psychology, viz. 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957). Normally, cognitive dissonance in social psychology 
refers to the discomfort felt by a person who holds two or more conflicting beliefs (or values or 
emotional responses). That is, cognitive dissonance is normally experienced when one realizes 
that two of her own beliefs logically conflict with each other. In her paper, Fiebich proposes 
that the false belief task feels more difficult because of cognitive dissonance resulting from the 
child’s own true belief conflicting with the false belief attributed to Maxi (the protagonist in the 
belief task story). In her words, “4- to 5-year-old children experience cognitive dissonance in 
reasoning processes in false belief tasks in which their own belief… differs from that of the 
agent but not in true belief tasks in which there is no such difference” (p. 941). After a couple of 
years, the “repeated experience and learning” of using BR under the cognitive strain of false 
belief situations allows children to “make use of BR with ease” (p. 941), and use it in true belief 
situations. 
3. Problems for the fluency hypothesis 
 The empirical support Fiebich relies on is Perner and Horn (2003)’s apparent failure to 
replicate the findings of Fabricius and Khalil (2003) on 3-location false belief tasks.59 In the next 
subsection I present five reasons to question the findings of Perner and Horn (2003), before 
directly addressing the fluency hypothesis in the two subsections which follow. The main 
                                                           
59 Of course, according to Perner and Horn (2003) children use BR consistently at this stage, and according to 
Fabricius and colleagues children use PAR consistently at this stage, while Fiebich’s idea contains a switching back 
and forth between the two reasoning strategies, depending upon the task. I am tempted to appeal to parsimony 
here, but I’m also aware that these sorts of debates all too often become an irreconcilable conflict of intuitions, 
and so I set that worry aside for the remainder of the chapter. 
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problem with the fluency hypothesis is that it plucks PAR out of the home background theory in 
which it makes sense when considering all of the data, and thrusts it into various background 
theories taken from adult social psychology. Not only does PAR not fit at all neatly into the 
theories of Kahneman (2011) and Festinger (1957), as demonstrated in section 4.2, but 
changing PAR from a developmental stage into a temporary heuristic causes some logical 
troubles for the fluency hypothesis, which are explained in Section 4.3. 
3.1 A closer look at the findings of Perner and Horn 
 First, the Perner and Horn (2003) explanation of the Fabricius and Khalil (2003) data, 
which Fiebich (2014) agrees with (p. 933), is that children in the Fabricius and Khalil study were 
confused by a series of three yes/no questions about the agent’s (and their own) beliefs. This 
confusion, rather than using PAR, is supposed to account for the subjects’ poor performance on 
the 3-location false belief task. However, if children were genuinely confused about the 
questions, then one would expect them to switch their answers to the series of questions 
across tasks. Fabricius and Khalil (2003) reported that the reality responses were consistent 
across tasks, which casts serious doubt on the confusion explanation.  
 Second, the percentages of children passing the control questions in Perner and Horn 
(2003) are alarmingly low—less than 75% in each of the two studies. In Wellman et al (2001)’s 
meta-analysis of false belief studies, the findings of Perner and Horn wouldn’t have been 
included in their “primary conditions,” because they required that more than 80% of children 
pass the control questions. In contrast, Fabricius and Khalil (2003) reported that in 3-option 
tasks 5- and 6-year-olds were almost always well in excess of 90% correct on control questions. 
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Third, although Perner and Horn (2003)’s findings on the 3-option location and neutral 
box false belief tasks were contrary to the PAR hypothesis, their findings on the 3-option 
contents false belief task (which they call the “typical box” task) actually confirm the PAR 
hypothesis, which predicts that 4-year-olds should choose randomly between the false belief 
and irrelevant options. In Study 2, six subjects chose the false belief option, but three chose the 
irrelevant option, with distribution not significantly different than chance.60  
 Fourth, a meta-analysis (Wellman et al 2001) found that across 178 false belief studies, 
rates for passing the two option location task are highly consistent with those for passing the 
typical contents task. Perner and Horn (2003, Study 2) failed to replicate this most basic finding 
in the false belief literature, and found instead that their location tasks were much easier; 
children passed them at a rate of 75%, as contrasted with only 38% on the contents tasks.61 
These anomalous findings suggest that there is a problem with the procedures used by Perner 
and Horn (2003)62. 
 Fifth, Fabricius and Khalil (2003) argue that differences across tasks in the relative 
salience of the three options may account for not only the PAR-contrary findings but also the 
                                                           
60 The “typical box” task of Perner and Horn (2003) followed the Unexpected Contents or “Smarties” false belief 
task described in Chapter 2, except that in the 3-option version the protagonist removes the pencil and exchanges 
it with a pebble before asking the test question. This was similar to the 3-option contents task used by Fabricius 
and Khalil (2003), and in both studies some subjects chose the irrelevant option (a pencil in this particular case), 
which is consistent with what the PAR hypothesis would predict. (You will recall that a child using PAR should 
reason that Elmo doesn’t see what’s inside the container, and therefore won’t know what’s in the container and 
will “get it wrong.” Thus, given a forced choice she should choose randomly between the false belief contents and 
the irrelevant contents, since both options are incorrect.) In the neutral box task of Perner and Horn (2003), a plain 
box with no markings or color was used in place of the familiar candy container. 
61 Out of 21 subjects, 14 passed the two option location task and 8 passed each of the two versions of the two 
option contents tasks (for a total of 16 out of 42). Subjects also found the three option location task to be much 
easier than the three option contents tasks. 
62 Perner and Horn (2003) admit that they don’t have an explanation for this anomaly (p. 269). 
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anomalous finding noted above. In order to focus the child on each option in turn and thus 
minimize the effects of salience differences, Fabricius and Khalil (2003) asked a forced choice 
test questions for each alternative (e.g., “Will Maxi think it is in the [reality location]?” “Will he 
think it is in the [irrelevant location}?” “Will he think it is in the [false belief location]?”). Perner 
and Horn (2003) asked one open-ended test question (e.g., “Where will he think it is?”), 
requiring the child to consider all the alternatives at once and thus exposing a child using PAR 
to the influence of salience differences. In location tasks all the options are present, but in both 
contents tasks only the one box is present and it has the reality object inside, so without the 
questions reminding the child of the other options they could easily forget them, which would 
explain the anomalous finding that there were more choices of the reality option in the 
contents tasks. In addition, in the  location and neutral box tasks, but not in the typical box task, 
the fact that the protagonist chose and thereby expressed a preference for the false belief 
option could have given that option extra salience, which would explain why Perner and Horn 
found significantly fewer choices of the irrelevant options in only those tasks.  
 In sum, the putative explanation that confusion on the part of the subjects is the reason 
for their poor performance on 3-location tasks in Fabricius & Khalil (2003) looks to be 
implausible since the children gave consistent answers to all of the questions across tasks, 
suggesting that they were not confused. Furthermore, the findings of Perner & Horn (2003) 
ought to be met with skepticism on independent grounds—viz. subjects’ poor performance on 
the control questions, and an anomalous discrepancy between their performance on location 
and contents tasks—which suggest that there may be problems with the tests they used. Also, 
Perner and Horn’s (2003) results on the 3-option contents false belief task are consistent with 
101 
 
 
 
the predictions of the PAR hypothesis. Finally, Fabricius & Khalil’s (2003) hypothesis that the 
one open-ended question in Perner and Horn’s (2003) procedures (which fails to remind 
subjects of all three locations or objects) resulted in salience differences across tasks, is able to 
explain the results which appear to contradict the PAR hypothesis as well as the anomalous 
inconsistency between location and contents task results. 
  Thus there is one criticism of the Fabricus and Khalil (2003) procedure (viz. that three 
yes/ no questions may have been confusing to subjects), which is endorsed by both Perner and 
Horn (2003) and Fiebich (2014). Here I have presented evidence against that criticism, as well as 
four other inter-related reasons for doubting the Perner and Horn (2003) findings. 
3.2 PAR doesn’t fit neatly into Kahneman’s background theory 
Even if we disregard the issues with Perner and Horn (2003), however, there are serious 
concerns for Fiebich’s proposed explanation of ToM findings. First, it is not at all obvious that 
the false belief task is more difficult or causes more cognitive strain than the true belief task, in 
the relevant sense of placing further task demands on the subject. Fabricius et al (2010) argue 
that the task demands of the true belief tasks are as similar as possible to the original false 
belief tasks on which they are based, and Fiebich provides no reason to think otherwise. The 
cognitive dissonance explanation is a non-starter. There is no evidence that holding a belief 
which conflicts with a belief attributed to someone else causes cognitive dissonance in adults, 
despite the vast literature on this subject. For one thing, this seems to be an all-too-common 
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occurrence.63 Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that cognitive dissonance plausibly 
creates the kind of cognitive strain which typically cause subjects to use System 2 reasoning. In 
addition to these difficulties, we would also need some evidence that cognitive dissonance of 
any kind exists in children, and that it is similar to that of adults. We know very little about how 
these sorts of mechanisms develop. 
In general, characterizing PAR as part of Kahneman (2011)’s System 1 seems to be a 
poor fit. Kahneman (2011) says that System 1 processes “operate automatically and quickly, 
with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control” (p. 20). For Kahneman, System 1 
processes are automatic and underneath the level of conscious control. He offers several 
examples, including recognizing anger in a facial expression (19), orienting to sudden loud 
sounds (22), and seeing one line as longer than the other in the Müller-Lyer illusion (26-27). 
However, PAR doesn’t seem to be like these sorts of processes. For instance, it appears to be 
under conscious control since children using the PAR rules mention them in their verbal 
justifications for choices made on false and true belief tasks (Fabricius et al 2010), and no belief 
tasks (Chen et al 2015). It also seems to be an effortful process, since it takes some time to 
develop (Chapter 2, Fabricius et al 2010, Hedger & Fabricius 2011), and the verbal reports of 
subjects suggest that they undergo a kind of step-by-step deliberate reasoning process. This is 
in contrast to quick and automatic System 1 processes such as recognizing facial expressions or 
                                                           
63 It has long been pointed out by anti-realists that we find widespread disagreement amongst professional 
philosophers, and yet we seem to find no discomfort or attempt to reconcile beliefs in Western philosophy’s 2700 
year history. The same is true in the political sphere, or at any time when people are aware of disagreeing with 
someone else. 
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perceiving lines as of different lengths, where subjects are unable to report about how they do 
those things or what process they used.64 
Kahneman (2011) does say that “other mental activities become fast and automatic 
through prolonged practice… [for example] learned skills such as reading and understanding 
nuances of social situations” (22).65 However, as Fiebich agrees, 3-year-olds typically use RR, 
and it’s not until ages 4 and 5 that children typically use PAR (Fabricus et al 2010, Fabricus & 
Khalil 2003). Thus, they presumably haven’t used it long enough for it to become fast and 
automatic. 
3.3 Logical and developmental inconsistencies in the fluency hypothesis 
Even more troubling, however, is that the cognitive dissonance story reverses the order 
of explanation. According to Fiebich, the cognitive dissonance caused by holding a belief which 
is inconsistent with that attributed to the protagonist in the false belief task causes 4- and 5-
year-olds to use BR (p. 13).66 However, the subject must use BR to attribute the dissonant belief 
to the protagonist in the first place.  When we think this through developmentally we see 
                                                           
64 An anonymous reviewer of Hedger (2016) points out this evidence is only suggestive and not decisive. However, 
I do not find the reviewer’s examples convincing. For instance, it is suggested that agents can be conscious of a 
process which is not under conscious control, such as a knee-jerk reflex. The issue though is that although subjects 
can be aware of the outputs of these processes, they are not aware of the processing itself. For example, people 
are aware that they recognize faces and judge language strings as ungrammatical. However, subjects are unable to 
report about how they do it. In contrast, subjects in Fabricius et al (2010) are not only aware of the predictions 
about where Maxi will look (and the judgments about what Maxi knows)—i.e. the outputs of PAR reasoning—they 
are also aware of the steps of the reasoning itself, and the process by which they arrive at those predictions and 
judgments. 
65 He also says in Chapter 5 that repeated experience is a cause of cognitive ease. 
66 I strongly disagree with this manner of speaking, because I don’t think a child using RR or PAR thinks or 
attributes anything about beliefs; but I’ll reluctantly adopt it throughout the rest of this paragraph for ease of 
explanation. However, if the PAR hypothesis is correct (and children at this stage aren’t reasoning about beliefs), 
then this provides another reason to reject the dissonance story. 
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additional problems. For instance, when a 3 –year-old uses RR on the false belief task, she 
attributes to the protagonist a belief about where the chocolate is which is exactly the same as 
her own, since it’s just the reality location; hence, no cognitive strain.  Therefore Fiebich needs 
some explanation of how cognitive strain ever arises on the false belief task. Notice further that 
the 4- or 5-year-old who uses PAR on the true belief task ends up attributing a belief which is 
not consistent with her own, since she predicts that the protagonist will “get it wrong” and not 
go to the reality location where the chocolate is currently located. Thus, there is cognitive strain 
on the true belief task, but according to Fiebich this task isn’t supposed to cause cognitive 
strain. That’s supposed to explain why subjects use PAR in the first place.  
All of this just leads to deeper troubles for the fluency hypothesis. Recall that although 
PAR is less effortful than BR, it is also more effortful than RR. So now Fiebich requires an 
explanation of why children should use the PAR heuristic on the true belief task when they 
already have a cognitively cheaper heuristic, viz. RR. What’s more, RR gives the correct result on 
the true belief task, contrary to PAR. If fluency were the sole reason children ages 4 and 5 revert 
to PAR on the true belief task, then why wouldn’t they instead revert to RR? It’s both cheaper 
and better than PAR on the true belief task.  
In fact, if PAR is only ever used in true belief situations, where it gives the wrong result, 
how and why would it ever be used in the first place? If 3-year-olds already use a successful 
heuristic, then why develop PAR which is both more cognitively demanding and is also 
unsuccessful when used for the sole purpose it is designed for, according to Fiebich’s 
hypothesis? She says, “Note that I have not made any claims about how RR is replaced by PAR 
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in younger children” (p. 14). However, this is needed on her story. For one thing, an explanation 
would seem to be required for how such a mechanism as Fiebich’s PAR should ever persist 
through the natural selection process, given that it always gives the wrong result. Note that on 
the PAR hypothesis, this feature is merely a spandrel piggybacking on the fact that PAR gives 
the correct result in false belief situations (Chapter 2, Hedger & Fabricius 2011). According to 
Fiebich, however, PAR isn’t used on false belief tasks. In fact, according to her story, children 
develop PAR and BR at the same time. Hence we lack an explanation of why PAR ever develops 
in the first place, given (a) that a cognitively cheaper and more successful strategy is already in 
place for true belief situations (namely RR), (b) according to the fluency hypothesis a new 
strategy (namely BR) is simultaneously available which is a successful predictor of true or false 
beliefs, and (c) PAR is never successful according to Fiebich’s account. 
4. Conclusion: Reflections and a more plausible dual systems theory 
 Although I believe that Fiebich’s particular proposal has been shown to be implausible, 
the PAR hypothesis does make room for a dual systems analysis. Recall from Chapter 2 that 
Hedger and Fabricius (2011) conjecture that a developmental precursor of PAR, which they dub 
Rule A, may be at work as an implicit theory of mind mechanism. The two PAR rules (see/not 
see → know/not know and know/not know → get it right/get it wrong) are bridged by the 
concept KNOW, which children begin to acquire and link with perceptual access by about 3 ½ 
years of age (e.g., Pillow, 1989; Pratt & Bryant, 1990).  Rule A is the condensed rule see/not see 
→  get it right/get it wrong, which Hedger & Fabricius (2011) hypothesize children implicitly 
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use before they acquire the concept KNOW.67 Rule A (like PAR) should cause subjects to pass 
the false belief task but fail the true belief task. Although they operate similarly (e.g. leading to 
the same prediction in a false belief task), PAR and Rule A are nonetheless distinct cognitive 
mechanisms. Rule A is implicit, and modular to some important degree. Thus for instance the 
output of Rule A is not available to explicit reasoning for 3-year-olds (Clements & Perner, 1994). 
PAR is an explicit, conscious reasoning process, during which children use the word “know” in 
their verbal explanations (Fabricius et al, 2010; Chen et al, 2015). 
The Rule A hypothesis could explain the data that 3-year-olds give the incorrect verbal 
response during the two-option false belief task but also show anticipatory looking to the 
correct location (Clements & Perner, 1994; Garnham & Perner, 2001; Garnham & Ruffman, 
2001; Ruffman, Garnham, Import, & Connelly, 2001). It is also consistent with the studies of 
infant and chimpanzee theory of mind that they are using Rule A (see Hedger & Fabricius 2011 
for more details). Hedger and Fabricius (2011) conjecture that Rule A may also persist into 
adulthood.  In other words, Rule A may exist simultaneously in adult cognition along with BR, 
along the lines of a Dual Systems model such as Kahneman (2011). This could be tested by using 
the “eye gaze” methodology developed for children under 4 years of age (Clements & Perner, 
1994).68 Hence the hypothesis is that Rule A is a non-verbal cognitive system used throughout 
                                                           
67 Of course, the concept used by children in the PAR stage of development is not the same concept of knowledge 
used by adults, since the former is non-representational. More on this topic in the next two chapters. 
68 However, in order to know whether correct anticipatory looking in the false belief task indicates attribution of 
false beliefs or use of Rule A, the methodology needs to include a true belief task in which there is some 
interruption in the agent’s connection to the situation that is comparable to what occurs in the false belief task 
(i.e. an appropriate cue for situation change). The previous eye gaze studies have not included such true belief 
tasks (Hedger & Fabricius, 2011). See also Chapter 7, Sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
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human development and present in chimpanzees. More research into the anticipatory looking 
of children and adults would help to disconfirm or point in favor of the Rule A conjecture. 
If adults were found to continue to use Rule A implicitly it could explain a puzzling 
feature of theory of mind—that at times we appear able to make judgments about the mental 
states of others quickly, automatically, and effortlessly, while at other times the process is 
difficult and deliberative. There is evidence that BR is effortful and difficult for adults (Apperly 
et al, 2006; Keysar et al, 2003). Lin, Keysar and Epley (2010) found that higher working memory 
capacity can have a positive impact on adult performance in theory of mind tasks, while 
cognitive load impairs this ability. Perhaps this can be explained by BR and Rule A being 
different psychological mechanisms, the former explicit and effortful and the latter implicit, 
automatic and modular69; System 2 and System 1 in Kahneman (2011)’s terminology. Thus, 
even though I argue against Fiebich’s specific account of a dual-systems theory (2014), the PAR 
hypothesis does make room for a dual-systems account in which an efficient but limited and 
rigid cognitive ToM mechanism (Rule A) exists alongside a more flexible but cognitively 
demanding cognitive ToM mechanism (RR, PAR or BR, depending upon the developmental 
stage of the subject).70 
                                                           
69 On modularity and psychology, see Fodor (1983) and Barrett & Kurzban (2006). 
70 Although the sketch of a dual-systems account presented here is superficially similar to the one proposed by 
Fiebich (2014), they are importantly different for at least four reasons: According to my proposal (but not Fiebich’s) 
(1) Rule A and PAR are distinct psychological mechanisms, (2) when using a conscious process in a psychological 
test such as the verbal false belief task, subjects will use the effortful, deliberative reasoning process, (3) this latter 
process is different depending upon which stage of theory of mind development a subject is in—RR, PAR, or BR, 
and (4) the features that might make a BR subject revert to Rule A would be perhaps time constraints or 
anticipatory looking procedures, but not features of a particular task. Thus, 3-year-olds fail the 2-location false 
belief task when tested using a verbal report method (by using RR), but pass using an AL measure (by using Rule A). 
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In fact, the Rule A hypothesis is compatible with other arguments for dual-systems 
accounts of belief reasoning, such as that presented by Apperly and Butterfill (2009). In this 
excellent paper, Apperly and Butterfill (2009) point out that adults face competing demands 
upon their ToM abilities—they must at some times be fast and efficient, but at other times be 
flexible and reliable (pp. 953, 956-957). Both demands could be satisfied by utilizing different 
cognitive mechanisms for different purposes. They also argue that a dual-systems account 
could explain the prima facie paradoxical findings that infants pass some false belief tasks while 
older children fail others (pp. 957-958; see also De Bruin & Newen 2014). This is explained by 
the fact that infants and toddlers are using distinct cognitive mechanisms (for more on how the 
PAR theory can explain this paradox, see Chapter 2 and Hedger & Fabricius 2011). They also 
point out that the ToM abilities of infants are quite commensurable with those of non-human 
animals such as chimpanzees, suggesting that they may be using the same lower-level 
mechanism (p. 958). As we saw in Chapter 2, Rule A may be the mechanism which both chimps 
and infants are using (see Table 1). Hence the PAR/ Rule A hypothesis may be seen as simply 
specifying the more general dual-systems account of Apperly & Butterfill (2009), and arguments 
which they present also lend support to the present hypothesis.71 
In sum, according to the PAR hypothesis, infants pass VOE versions of the 2-option false 
belief task by using Rule A, which is presumably a modular or System 1 cognitive process. 3-
year-olds fail the verbal 2-option false belief task, because they are using the conscious, System 
2 reasoning process known as Reality Reasoning. When children enter the next developmental 
                                                           
71 The PAR/ Rule A hypothesis also seems to be consistent with the general considerations raised by De Bruin and 
Newen (2014), although I am unsure about the specifics of their Association Module/ Operating System account. 
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stage around the age of four, and begin to use Perceptual Access Reasoning consciously and 
deliberately, they again pass the (verbal) 2-option false belief task. This same pattern of 
development which is part of the PAR hypothesis is also seen in studies of object solidity. 4-
month-olds pass VOE measures of object solidity, which Carey (2009) hypothesizes is 
accomplished by using a modular cognitive-perceptual process. 2- and 3-year-olds fail searching 
versions of the same task, because they are using a different effortful and conscious process. By 
the age of four they pass the searching measures of object solidity, which Carey (2009) 
hypothesizes is because the new deliberate reasoning process now incorporates the same 
mental representations which were already being used inside the modular perception process 
(see Chapter 2 for more details). 
Fiebich’s proposal has been shown to have numerous difficulties which make the 
fluency hypothesis problematic. Note that Fiebich eventually gets backed into this corner by 
accepting the findings of Perner and Horn (2003) and denying the findings of Fabricius & Khalil 
(2003). The acceptance that children use BR on false belief tasks must be reconciled with 
Fabricius et al.’s (2010) findings that children at this stage fail true belief tasks, and Fiebich 
attempts to do so by taking the position that children switch back and forth between two 
different reasoning strategies. Note that others (Friedman et al 2003, Lagattuta et al 2010, 
Ruffman 1996) have claimed that when children fail true belief tasks, and fail false belief tasks 
by choosing the irrelevant option, they are nevertheless attributing false beliefs to those 
protagonists. Fabricius et al (2010) pointed out that such a position blurs the “ordinary concept 
of belief [which] requires that it is caused by some information that justifies the believer in 
taking it as true” (p. 1407). Fiebich takes a more coherent position, but the fluency hypothesis 
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eventually comes up short because it is internally inconsistent as well as a poor fit with the 
theories of cognitive dissonance and dual systems cognition.72 
A crucial aspect of the sort of inference to the best explanation done by scientists 
(including psychologists) is a background theory which is not only consistent with, but also 
helps to explain, the data. The PAR hypothesis is grounded in a developmental theory. The 
theory is consistent with the set of general beliefs accepted in childhood developmental 
psychology. Hedger and Fabricius (2011) further demonstrate the compatibility of the PAR 
hypothesis with recent ToM findings in chimpanzees and human infants (see also Chapter 2). 
Fiebich’s position is logically possible; children could switch strategies. However, when we look 
closer we find numerous difficulties. Researchers need to take note that incorporating 
processes at work in adults, without considering how they develop or fit into background 
theories, is likely to cause more problems than it solves for explanations of childhood cognition. 
  
 
                                                           
72 As an anonymous reviewer points out, Fiebich (2014) proposes an empirical test of her Fluency hypothesis (pp. 
941-942). I believe that the reasoning in Section 4 of this paper is sufficient to show that the hypothesis is 
implausible, but even if one disagrees with that, there are other problems with the first of Fiebich’s experimental 
paradigms. First she suggests testing whether 4- and 5-year-olds experience more cognitive strain in the 2-location 
false belief task than in the true belief task of Fabricius et al (2010). The difficulty here is that, first, I’m not sure 
that there are accepted objective signals of cognitive strain in general, much less in children. Second, even if we 
did find more cognitive strain in the false belief task, that would not in any way count as evidence against the PAR 
hypothesis.  
Fiebich  also suggests adding variables that induce cognitive strain to the true belief task in order to test 
whether that allows 4- and 5-year-olds to pass. Again, even if this test confirmed her hypothesis I’m not sure that 
would count as evidence against PAR, but I do accept that it would perhaps lend support to the Fluency 
Hypothesis, if the internal inconsistencies of the theory could somehow be resolved. If we indeed found that 
making a task more difficult improved the performance of 4- and 5-year-olds, then that would seem to at least be 
evidence for a 2-systems account of some kind or other. 
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[This chapter is a revision of material which originally appeared in Hedger (2016). Thanks to Bill 
Fabricius, Bob Van Gulick and Kevan Edwards for comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. 
Thanks also to Jesse Prinz for a helpful conversation about this chapter. Portions of this chapter 
were also presented at the Social Minds conference at the University of Maryland, College Park 
(April 2015). Thanks to participants who gave comments and feedback, in particular Tad 
Zawidzki.] 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Answering the Perner-Povinelli Challenge: 
Distinguishing Mentalist from Behavioral Rules in Children’s Theory of Mind 
 
 
1. Introduction 
After three decades of research, the false belief task, pioneered by Wimmer and Perner 
(1983), remains the most popular test of theory of mind (ToM).  At this mature stage of 
research on ToM, many psychologists feel justified in taking a sanguine view of putatively well-
established facts based on putatively well-established methods. Henry Wellman, one of the 
pioneers of the ToM field, and his colleagues recently write (Wellman et al 2011)…        
The demonstration of robust, early-developing theory-of-mind achievements in children 
worldwide – in traditional and nontraditional, western and nonwestern societies (e.g. 
Wellman et al 2001) – has led to tremendous interest in the ontogenetic and 
evolutionary origins of theory of mind. … 
Our measure of theory of mind is a battery of false belief tasks. Explicit false-belief 
understanding [emphasis added] is a milestone, universal theory-of-mind achievement 
of the preschool years (Wellman et al 2001), and is the most commonly used measure in 
research examining individual differences in theory of mind during the preschool years... 
In Chapter Two I dubbed this the Traditional View of ToM development. It was the accepted 
view for the first two decades of ToM research on human children. 
However, there has been recent evidence that infants and chimpanzees might pass false 
belief tasks (see Chapter 2). This poses a serious challenge to the Traditional View. Perhaps the 
view could be saved by the hypothesis that chimps and infants are passing false belief tasks by 
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using behavioral rules instead of a concept of mind. However, this way out of the puzzle poses a 
new challenge for the Traditional View: If chimps and infants are passing false belief tasks by 
using behavioral rules, then so might preschoolers.  In some cases, the sanguine view seems to 
be preserved by a creeping nativism. Thus Josef Perner, another ToM pioneer, recently writes 
(Perner 2010): 
Behavior rules capture the causal dependence of [actions] on [situations] without saying 
anything about the mind that creates those dependencies. But – and this is important – 
what they capture reflects the working of the mind. Behavior rules provide an implicit 
theory of the mind– that is, they capture the workings of the mind without mentioning 
the mind… 
Mentalism tries to capture the same S[ituation]-A[ction] dependencies but by being 
explicit about the intervening mind. 
 
This brings me to the current status of ToM research. Most of the theory of mind 
establishment continue to argue that 4 ½ is the crucial age for understanding representational 
mental states such as belief, and most of the argument is against a resurgence of the Nativist 
View which has been prompted by recent infant studies in the wake of Onishi and Baillargeon 
(2005). In Chapter Two I demonstrated that the Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR) hypothesis 
is able to reconcile all of the existent data under one comprehensive theory of ToM 
development (see also Hedger 2016, Hedger & Fabricius 2011). What’s more, the PAR theory 
provides an explanation of recent findings which present troubles for both of the rival views 
(Traditional and Nativism), namely the data that 4 and 5-year-olds fail a true belief task 
(Fabricius et al 2010; see Chapter 2). 
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A further difficulty arises when attempting to determine which hypothesis about infant 
ToM is true. Cognitive scientists have recently been concerned with the aforementioned 
findings that chimps and infants pass versions of the false task. Psychologists worry about 
finding an empirical method for determining whether chimps and infants are passing ToM tasks 
by using mentalist rules, which include a conception of mental representation, or whether they 
are passing them merely by using behavioral rules which require no understanding of the mind 
as such. Daniel Povinelli (2001; Povinelli & Vonk, 2003, 2004; Penn & Povinelli, 2007) has made 
the argument that there is in fact no empirical method for deciding which of these two 
explanations is true, and Josef Perner (2010, forthcoming) has recently applied the argument to 
the case of human subjects.  
In this chapter, I demonstrate how the PAR theory can provide an answer to this 
challenge. In fact, we already have evidence that many 4- and 5-year-olds have been using rules 
which make no reference to beliefs in order to pass false belief tasks, and infants and chimps 
may be using these same behavioral rules (or some slight variation thereof). I provide an 
empirical test for determining whether or not this is indeed the case, thus solving the problem. 
Furthermore, exploring this issue demonstrates that children under the age of six lack a 
conception of mental representation, and therefore lack the adult concepts of perception and 
belief. 
2. The Perner-Povinelli Challenge 
 Perner (2010, forthcoming) and Povinelli (2001; Povinelli & Vonk, 2003, 2004; Penn & 
Povinelli, 2007) worry that in principle no empirical test of theory of mind can determine 
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whether a given organism is using mentalist rules which refer to the agent’s representational 
mental states, or simply using behavioral rules which merely take into account the agent’s 
behavior in the immediate situation. Given any mental rule which makes reference to mental 
states, Perner (forthcoming) argues that the rule can be replaced by a “computationally 
equivalent” behavioral rule “by simply deleting the reference to the mental states and adjusting 
the rule” (p. 6).73 The resulting behavioral rule will provide just as valid an explanation of the 
organism’s behavior as the mental rule. The worry is that no empirical test could in principle 
determine whether the organism is using the mental rule or merely the behavioral version. 
Hence, there is no way to determine whether e.g. a child is using an understanding of the 
representational mind in order to pass the false belief task, or merely using (either explicitly or 
implicitly) a behavioral rule which produces the same behavioral output as a mental rule would. 
Hence there may be no empirical method for attributing a theory of mind. 
 Perner (forthcoming) expresses the concern this way: 
 …[O]ne cannot arrive at a decisive test by demonstrating more and more appropriate 
 responses in situations where we think we apply a theory of mind. This strategy will not 
 help because the demonstrated response can, in principle, be based on a behavioral 
 rule. The other issue concerns the question of how we can demonstrate the use of a 
 theory of mind at all. In Fact: How do we know that we are using one? The existing 
 literature has focused on plausibility arguments, in particular about parsimony. … 
 Unfortunately, depending on how one counts assumptions both camps claimed to have 
 parsimony on  their side. (p. 6) 
                                                           
73 A note on terminology: The behavioral rules discussed in this chapter (and by Perner and others) should not be 
confused with behaviorism. No one is claiming that the behavioral rules need to be completely devoid of 
intentionality. Rather, the key difference is that behavioral rules lack the conception of mental representation. 
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 Perner (forthcoming) gives an example of a mental rule which would allow a person to 
pass the false belief task. It is composed of a belief inference and a desire inference as two input 
rules, and then an action inference which predicts the agent’s behavior as a function of the 
mental states computed by the two input rules. The overall mentalist rule procedure for 
passing the false belief task then looks like the following according to Perner (forthcoming):74 
(Belief inference): IF a person sees an object being put inside location A and then doesn’t 
                               see it moved unexpectedly to location B THEN the person thinks the 
                               object is still in A. 
(Desire inference): IF a person shows liking for an object and is heading vaguely in the 
                               direction of the object THEN he wants to get the object. 
(Action inference): IF a person wants to get an object THEN the person will go to where he                                                                        
                                thinks the object is. (pp. 4-5) 
 
By removing all of the references to mental states which appear in italics, Perner is able to 
come up with a behavioral rule which he claims would have the same empirical results: 
(Behavior rule): IF a person sees an object being put inside location A and then doesn’t 
                            see it unexpectedly moved to location B 
                                                           
74 I would like to note the initial implausibility of the claim that humans use such a specific rule to pass the false 
belief task. First, this amount of specification would require a different rule for passing the location transfer task 
and other versions of the false belief task such as the unexpected contents task. This would mean that evolution 
had selected for a large set of very specific theory of mind rules, which in turn implies that our ancestors faced a 
sufficient number of situations very similar to the current psychological tasks. Both of these claims appear 
extremely unlikely. It would also mean that our theory of mind mechanism (whatever it turns out to be) would be 
wildly computationally inefficient, which also seems unlikely given the energy expense of such cognitive activities.  
The findings involving the true belief task (Fabricius et al 2010, Hedger & Fabricius 2011; see below) make it even 
clearer that the rules we use can’t be a large set of specific ones (whether behavioral or mental), since that would 
entail that we use a specific rule which causes us to fail the true belief task. There is simply no way that such an 
unsuccessful rule by itself would survive the natural selection process. It is much more likely that the failure on 
true belief tasks is a side-effect (spandrel) of a more general rule (viz. the one which the PAR hypothesis posits) 
which is useful in a large number of other situations (such as false belief situations). 
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                            AND the person shows liking for an object and is heading vaguely in 
                            direction of the object 
                            THEN the person will go to location A. (p. 5)75 
 
Note that Perner’s behavioral rule retains some conception of perception (“sees an 
object”) and desire (“shows liking for an object”). Developmental researchers have noted that 
before children acquire the concepts of desire and perception as mental representations, they 
use the words ‘see,’ ‘like,’ etc. to refer to what we might call behavioral conceptions of 
perception and desire (Gopnik & Wellman 1994, Perner 1991). Initially, visual perception is 
conceived of as immediate visual contact with an object of perception (Chapter 3, Flavell 1988), 
and desire is conceived of as a drive toward some object (Wellman & Woolley 1990). One way 
of distinguishing these non-representational concepts of proto-perception and proto-desire 
from their full-blown representational counterparts, and a reason for calling them “behavioral,” 
is that the former are completely transparent from the third person point of view. If a child at 
this stage of cognitive development notes that S is appropriately oriented with respect to some 
object, or (perhaps) has her eye gaze directed at some object, then S sees the object, for that’s 
all visual perception is at this stage. Similarly, if S walks across the room and picks up an object, 
then S wants that object. Desire doesn’t require anything going on in a person’s head at this 
stage. Since these non-representational conceptions don’t involve the mind or representation, 
then they might be included in a behavioral rule (see Note 73). 
 This procedure for collapsing mental rules into behavioral ones can be generalized into 
Perner (2010)’s “Recipe for posing Povinelli’s challenge:” 
                                                           
75 See Note 74 on the specificity of this rule. 
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Let the Mentalist give you a specification of the inference procedures required to get 
from what the animal observes to the ensuing mental state and from that state to the 
predicted behavior. Collapse these inference rules into one that allows inference of the 
predicted behavior directly from what the animal observes. (p. 243)76 
The challenge, then, is to devise an empirical test which could determine whether a given 
subject is using the mentalist or the behavioral inference rule(s). In the following two sections I 
present a way for developmental psychologists to answer this challenge, based on the PAR 
hypothesis, the previously reported findings of failure on the true belief task (Fabricius et al 
2010, see Chapter 2), and the different nature of representational mental states on the one 
hand and situation-specific behavioral rules on the other. 
3. The PAR Hypothesis 
 Fabricius and colleagues have presented evidence that many 4- and 5-year-olds pass the 
false belief task by using a behavioral rule which they dub Perceptual Access Reasoning or PAR 
(see Chapter Two; Fabricius & Imbens-Bailey, 2000; Fabricius & Khalil, 2003; Fabricius et al, 
2010; Hedger & Fabricius, 2011; Hedger, 2016). PAR involves two general behavioral rules 
which make reference to behavioral cues and an agent’s perceptual access to her immediate 
environment, but does not involve an understanding of beliefs (as representational mental 
states). These two rules are: 
 Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR): 
Rule 1:  Seeing → Knowing (and Not Seeing → Not Knowing)  
                                                           
76 Lurz & Krachun (2011) provide several examples of this method applied to various protocols from chimp studies. 
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Rule 2:  Knowing → Ge@ng it Right (and Not Knowing → Ge@ng it Wrong) 
Crucially, the use of these two rules cause children to pass the standard false belief task 
without understanding beliefs.  
Thus, as explained in more detail in Chapter Two, using the PAR rules would cause a 
child to pass the standard 2-location false belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). A child using 
the PAR rules will reason that since Maxi doesn’t see the chocolate, then he doesn’t know 
where it is, and hence Maxi will “get it wrong” and go to the location where the chocolate is not 
currently located. As Fabricius and Imbens-Bailey (2000) explain, the only incorrect location (in 
the sense that the chocolate is not there) is the false belief location, so that success on this task 
is ambiguous between belief attribution and ignorance attribution. Understanding belief would 
cause the subject to pass, but so would using PAR. The confound in this task can be removed by 
adding a third, irrelevant, location (Fabricus & Khalil 2003). A child who is attributing a false 
belief to Maxi should choose the false belief location, but a child using PAR has no reason to 
choose this location over the irrelevant one, because both locations are equally incorrect. A 
child using PAR should fail the 3-location false belief task about half of the time. 
Fabricius and Khalil (2003) found that, consistent with the PAR hypothesis, many 
children passed the standard tasks and failed the modified versions by choosing the irrelevant 
alternatives.77 The PAR rules are similar to Perner’s behavioral rule, then, in that they don’t 
                                                           
77 Perner and Horn (2003) tested the PAR hypothesis using a variation of the three-alternative false belief 
procedure designed to be simpler than that used by Fabricius and Khalil, and they concluded that their findings 
refuted the hypothesis. However, in Chapter Four I provide five theoretical reasons to remain skeptical about their 
findings (see also Hedger 2016).  There is also empirical evidence, since Gonzales et al (2013) failed to replicate 
Perner and Horn’s findings against the hypothesis.  
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require an understanding of beliefs or mental representation (more on this in the following 
paragraphs). However, it is different in that it is much more general, and therefore applicable to 
a variety of situations. The data show that children using PAR consistently fail three very 
different versions of the false belief task (Fabricius & Khalil, 2003; see Chapter Two), and it 
seems much more likely that children are using the general PAR rules rather than a whole series 
of very specific rules (see Note 74). 
Fabricius and colleagues use the words “see” and “know” in formulating the PAR rules 
because children use these words by 3 years of age (Bartsch & Wellman, 1996). Children using 
PAR also use this language in their own explanations of their predictions given in psychology 
experiments (Fabricius et al, 2010). However, children at this stage have not yet mastered the 
full concepts SEE and KNOW. At this stage of cognitive development, SEEINGPAR is an immediate 
visual connection to one’s environment (unobstructed line of gaze), rather than a 
representational mental state. It is a simple causal connection between objects and agents, 
rather than a more complicated representational relation between states of the mind and the 
environment (see Chapter 3; cf. Flavell 1988, Gopnik & Wellman 1994, Perner, 1991). Hence 
there is no possibility of false perceptions on this understanding. For example, the SEEPAR 
concept can’t account for the possibility that one is looking at an object but failing to notice it 
or recognize it as such (Lurz & Krachun, 2011 also make this point). 
Likewise, KNOWINGPAR is also behavioral, correlated with correct or incorrect behavior, 
but not involving mental representation.78 That this is so can be seen by the fact that children 
                                                           
78 For more on the concept of knowledge in this PAR stage of ToM development, see Chapter 6. 
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using PAR fail the true belief task (Fabricius et al, 2010). PAR entails the prediction that children 
will judge that a protagonist will get it wrong regardless of whether the protagonist has a false 
belief or a true belief, as long as the situations in both cases result in comparable lack of 
perceptual access. Thus Fabricius and colleagues (2010) make the novel prediction that children 
using PAR should fail a true belief version of any of the false belief tasks, such as the 
unexpected transfer false belief task discussed above. Since either Maxi witnesses the mother 
move the chocolate (Study 2), or she moves the chocolate back to its initial location (Study 1), 
when Maxi returns he should have a true belief about where the chocolate is. Therefore 
children using Belief Reasoning (BR) should pass both versions of this task.  
However, for children using PAR, when Maxi leaves his perceptual access to the 
situation is broken, and they do not attribute a belief to him that persists after he leaves the 
situation. When Maxi returns, children using PAR see him in a new situation, and when asked 
where Maxi will look, they should reason that since Maxi can’t see the chocolate now, he 
doesn’t know where it is, and thus he will “get it wrong” and look in the empty cupboard (for 
further details see Chapter Two; Fabricius et al, 2010; Hedger & Fabricius, 2011). In Study 2 of 
Fabricius et al (2010), to take one example, only 45% of the children (mean age 65 months) who 
passed the false belief location task passed the true belief version. Thus less than half of the 
children who passed the false belief task were able to successfully pass the true belief task.  
Thus KNOWINGPAR does not involve mental representation, but is only correlated with 
correct behavior and perceptual access, as can be seen from the PAR rules (cf. Perner, 1991, for 
independent evidence of this intermediate understanding of knowledge). Children in this stage 
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(roughly 4 and 5 years of age) have moved beyond the Reality Reasoning (RR) of 3-year-olds to 
something more sophisticated. Perhaps 3-year-olds don’t consider anything mental whatsoever 
when predicting conspecific behavior, but simply reason about how the world really is. At the 
PAR stage, 4- and 5-year-olds reason about an agent’s immediate perceptual access to objects 
in the environment in order to predict behavior. However, lacking a concept of representational 
mind, this perceptual access is necessarily linked to the current environmental situation, and 
does not reside “in a person’s head” (and therefore travel with that person in space) nor persist 
through time across different situations. (Fiebich, 2014, makes the same points when 
considering the cognitive demands of the three stages in section 5 of her paper.) 
 This last point warrants emphasizing. As adults, mentalizing, or reasoning about other 
people based upon our inferences of their mental states, has become second nature to us. 
Mental thinking has become deeply natural, intuitive, and somewhat implicit by this time. (In 
Fiebich’s terminology, we have become fluent in theory of mind; see Chapter 4, Fiebich 2014). 
On the other hand, the behavioral child’s way of thinking is completely alien, and so it is 
difficult for researchers to get into the PAR child’s head. Because it is so foreign, it is difficult for 
us to think from the perspective of someone who lacks an understanding of the 
representational mind. Developmental psychologists of the theory-theory bent (e.g. Gopnik & 
Wellman, 1992; Perner, 1988, 1991; Saxe, Carey, & Kanwisher, 2004) have noted a conceptual 
change of the sort we are discussing, but missing an awareness of this intermediate stage of 
development seems to have made them forget what a profoundly different mindset any non-
representationalism of this form really comprises. Hence most developmental psychologists 
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have assumed that children were attributing beliefs when they passed the false belief task, 
perhaps since this is how adults would presumably reason.79 
 PAR reasoning is truly behavioral, in that reasoners at this stage lack a full concept of 
representational mental states. Thus when an agent witnesses the transfer of an object but 
then leaves (as in Fabricius et al, 2010, Study 2), PAR reasoners don’t attribute a true belief of 
the object’s location to the agent which stays with the agent, but instead reason that when the 
agent returns, he won’t have visual access to the object in this new situation, and hence won’t 
know where it is, but will “get it wrong” and look for the object in the incorrect location. Even 
the “perception” involved in Perceptual Access Reasoning is not representational. Thus there is 
no distinction between seeing and looking for the PAR child.80 
4. Answering the Challenge 
 I agree with Perner that any mentalist rule can be collapsed into a behavioral rule by 
removing the reference to mental states in the mentalist rule. Indeed, in Chapter Two I argue 
that many children aged 4 and 5 pass the false belief task by using such a behavioral rule, 
namely the Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR) rules of Fabricius and colleagues (Fabricius & 
                                                           
79 Thus even other researchers who have found failure on true belief tasks (Friedman et al, 2003; Ruffman, 1996) 
assume that children are attributing beliefs but using the rule inconsistently. Hence these psychologists failed to 
recognize that their findings were indicative of a general pattern of behaviorist reasoning and not unique to 
particular tasks. (See Fabricius et al, 2010, for further discussion of this point.) 
Interestingly, we might invoke Chomsky (1965)’s distinction between competence and performance, but in order to 
avoid a mistaken inference which is the reverse of the one which worried the renowned linguist. Chomsky was 
concerned that some might infer from children’s language performance errors in some situations that they weren’t 
competent in language grammar, contra Chomsky’s nativism. In contrast, many developmental psychologists have 
mistakenly inferred that children are competent belief reasoners because of their successful performance on false 
belief tasks, failing to recognize that other factors might explain this situation. In both situations, it’s important to 
remember that competence and performance can come apart. 
80 See Chapter Three for more on perception and the PAR hypothesis, and Chapter Six for more on the concept of 
knowledge involved in the PAR hypothesis. 
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Imbens-Bailey, 2000; Fabricius & Khalil, 2003; Fabricius et al, 2010; Hedger & Fabricius, 2011; 
Hedger, 2016).81 However, there nonetheless remains a way to empirically test whether a child 
is using a mentalist or a behavioral rule. The key is that although any mentalist rule can be 
collapsed into a behavioral one, PAR is a behavioral rule which can’t be unpacked into a 
mentalist one, as the aforementioned failure on the true belief task makes clear.  
Because PAR is based upon an agent’s perceptual access in the immediate situation, 
experimental conditions can be devised which cause children using PAR to fail the true belief 
task. The PAR rule is apparently triggered by a behavioral/situational input involving a 
temporary absence of the agent and then either the agent’s return (Friedman et al, 2003) or 
some movement of the object in question (Fabricius et al, 2010). Hence the recipe for causing a 
PAR theorist to fail a true belief task, as outlined in Fabricius et al (2010) and Hedger and 
Fabricius (2011), involves some cue for situation change which causes the subject to reapply 
the PAR rules to the present situation where perceptual access is lacking. “Situation change” is 
an intentionally vague parameter, because what constitutes situation change—and hence a 
triggering mechanism for PAR—is an empirical question to be discovered, not a theoretical 
question to be answered a priori (“from the armchair” as it were). However, if a child 
understands the concept of a mental representation which persists over time regardless of a 
momentary break with the agent’s immediate environment, then it would simply make no 
sense to apply the rule again for a new situation whenever the agent returns. 
                                                           
81 Recall that the concepts SEE and KNOW utilized in the PAR rules are not identical with the fully mental concepts 
which will eventually be acquired (except perhaps in cases of autism). The words ‘see’ and ‘know’ are used by 
children as early as 3 years of age (Bartsch & Wellman, 1996), but it takes longer for children to exhibit competent 
facility with the full concepts. As explained in the above sections, SEE refers to immediate perceptual contact 
between the agent and the situation, and KNOW refers to exhibiting the correct behavior (or “getting it right”). 
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In other words, the very fact that a person fails the true belief task is evidence that the 
person is using a behavioral rule and lacks an adequate understanding of mental states. An 
understanding that beliefs and memories of perceptions are representations that persist 
through time would be sufficient to pass the true belief tasks used in Fabricius et al (2010). Any 
rule which utilized an understanding of representational mental states should allow one to pass 
the true belief task. Therefore the true belief task is a sufficient empirical test of whether a 
given subject is using a behavioral or a mentalist rule to pass the false belief task. As I have 
explained, a subject using a truly mentalist rule should not fail a true belief task, while those 
using a behavioral rule such as PAR should fail.82  
Furthermore, Fabricius et al (2010)’s studies reveal an interesting U-shaped 
developmental trajectory on the true belief task (see Fig. 1, Chapter Two). Children aged 3 ½ 
successfully passed the task (83-86% successful in Study 1), while success drops near chance 
levels for children aged 4 ½ and 5 ½. It’s not until 6 ½ years of age that children’s success 
returns to previous levels. This U-shaped development is evidence against the common 
explanation that ToM tasks might be passed by using behavioral rules which are developed 
through a process of associative learning (Perner, forthcoming; Vonk & Povinelli, 2006). Here’s 
the general idea. Perhaps rather than using a mental rule to pass the false belief task, children 
instead use past experiences to learn a contingent statistical regularity to the effect that people 
typically return to the last place they saw the object (see also the priming explanation of Perner 
& Ruffman, 2005; more on this below).  
                                                           
82 Thus, the same two-task battery recommended in Chapter Two as a test of ToM ability can also be used to 
answer the challenge posed by Povinelli and Perner. 
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However, this hypothesis is not supported by the data concerning true belief tasks. The 
situation is similar to the well-known phenomenon from linguistics involving children’s 
acquisition of irregular verb past tenses in English. Children are known to correctly use ‘went’ 
early in language production, but then go through a period of incorrectly using ‘goed’ before 
returning to previous successful past tense production (see Pinker, 1995, for an extensive 
discussion). The standard explanation for the intermediate period when children say ‘goed’ is 
that they are overgeneralizing a rule they have learned (namely, add ‘-ed’ to form the past 
tense of a verb in English). It couldn’t be explained by associative learning because the adults 
they interact with presumably don’t speak that way, so there is no statistical regularity to learn. 
Similarly, since human agents don’t normally return to an incorrect location when they 
have a true belief about where an object is, it is extremely dubious that children could learn a 
contingent statistical regularity which would cause them to fail the true belief task (especially 
considering that they tend to pass at earlier ages). Here as in the case of language acquisition, 
the most plausible explanation is that children are applying a rule (viz. the PAR behavioral rules) 
in cases where it doesn’t really apply. Thus, the findings of failure on the true belief task 
provide evidence that a valid empirical test for deciding whether a child or infant is using a 
genuine understanding of mental state representation in order to pass the false belief task is to 
include a true belief task. 
Incidentally, the true belief task would also be an empirical test for comparing our 
behavioral explanation of infant success on the false belief task (see Hedger & Fabricius, 2011 
for a review) with the one offered by Perner and Ruffman (2005). Perner & Ruffman (2005) 
argue that infants may be primed to expect constellations of a person, object, and location. For 
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example, in the false belief location task described above, infants may be primed to expect the 
constellation {Maxi, chocolate, red cupboard}, and will be surprised when Maxi later goes to 
the green cupboard (recall that the chocolate is currently out of sight). This explanation would 
predict success on the true belief task, since infants will again be primed to expect the 
constellation {Maxi, chocolate, red cupboard}, and in this case the true belief location contains 
the exact same constellation. However, if infants are using some implicit version of PAR (which 
Hedger and Fabricius call “Rule A”), then we would predict that infants fail a Violation of 
Expectation (VoE) true belief task (see Chapter Two; Hedger & Fabricius, 2011; and Hedger 
2016 for details). 
Lastly, what about Perner’s worry that we can’t know whether even we (adults) are 
using a theory of mind? Given the ubiquity of folk psychological explanations in our everyday 
lives, it’s a little difficult to take this worry seriously (cf. Fodor, 1987; Doherty, 2009). Although I 
acknowledge the problems with taking persons’ verbal reports of their mental states and 
processes at face value (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Schwitzgebel, 2011; Wilson, 2002), I also think 
that without evidence to the contrary, we shouldn’t think that every person is wildly mistaken. 
Furthermore, the fact that most people are able to explicate the belief/desire syllogism and 
apply it with such facility in everyday practice is good evidence that they are indeed using a 
theory of mind (Fodor, 1987). After all, Perner’s behavioral rules are parasitic upon mental 
rules, as he himself acknowledges. Finally, it would be very surprising if we found that adults 
did worse than 6 and 7 year olds on a verbal true belief task. 
 
5. Conclusion 
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 The challenge issued by Povinelli and Perner is to devise an empirical method for 
distinguishing subjects who pass the standard false belief task (and more generally any ToM 
test) by using mentalist rules from those who pass by using behavioral rules. We first clarified 
the difference between mentalist and behavioral rules in this context, because by “behavioral 
rules” Perner (2010, forthcoming) does not mean devoid of intentionality altogether. The main 
thing which separates mental rules from behavioral ones is that the former require an 
understanding of mental representation, and the latter lack such an understanding.  
Hedger and Fabricius (2011; see Chapter 2) advocate the two task battery of a false and 
true belief task as a test for theory of mind, and this battery is also able to answer Perner and 
Povinelli’s challenge. The combination of passing the (standard 2-location) false belief task and 
failing the true belief task indicates use of behavioral rules, since it exhibits a clear lack of 
mental representation understanding. Intuitively, the true belief task has always been thought 
to be easier to pass than the false belief task, which may be one reason why psychologists and 
philosophers have previously considered it much less important (Hedger & Fabricius 2011). 
Indeed, most 3-year-olds pass the true belief task (Fabricius et al 2010). The PAR hypothesis is 
the most plausible explanation of the pre-theoretically unexpected result that 4- and 5-year-
olds fail this task yet pass the false belief task. The PAR rules only make sense in their logic and 
application if the subject lacks an understanding of mental representation. Therefore, the 
combination of passing the false belief task and failing the true belief task is evidence that 
subjects are using behavioral rules (viz. perceptual access reasoning) and not mentalist ones. 
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On the flipside, passing both tasks is evidence that subjects are using mentalist rules and 
have some understanding of mental representation.83 Inference to the best explanation leads 
to this conclusion. I assume this conclusion won’t be contentious amongst philosophers and 
psychologists, since at the present time most of them argue that for humans belief 
understanding is either innate (e.g. Carruthers 2013, Fodor 1992, Leslie 1987, 1994, 2005, Luo 
& Baillargeon 2010, Southgate 2014) or is acquired by the age of 4 (e.g. Gopnik & Wellman 
1992, 1994, Perner 1988, 1991, Saxe et al 2004, Wellman et al, 2001). Fabricius and colleagues 
(2010) find that subjects don’t pass both tasks until around 6 years of age, and by that age I 
don’t think many cognitive scientists feel that the Perner-Povinelli issue remains a serious 
concern. Thus, as we have seen, the two task battery of a false and true belief task which 
Hedger and Fabricius (2011; Chapter Two) advocate as an empirical test for theory of mind is 
able to answer Perner and Povinelli’s challenge. 
Povinelli (2001, Vonk & Povinelli 2006) first points out the problem for studying 
chimpanzee theory of mind, and it’s interesting to note that there is some evidence that chimps 
also use Rule A, the behavioral precursor which Hedger and Fabricius (2011) hypothesize is 
used by human infants and may persist into adulthood as a System 1 cognitive mechanism. For 
example, chimps in Kaminski et al (2008, Study 2) displayed correct performance on false belief 
tasks and incorrect performance on comparable true belief tasks (all of this is laid out in more 
detail in Hedger & Fabricius 2011; see Chapter 2, Chapter 4 and Hedger 2016 for more details 
concerning the Rule A hypothesis). Therefore the two task ToM battery can also be used as a 
                                                           
83 Passing the true belief task and failing the false belief task is evidence that subjects are using reality reasoning 
(RR). See Chapter 2 and Hedger & Fabricius (2011).  
132 
 
 
 
valid ToM test for infants and chimpanzees that answers the challenge issued by Povinelli and 
Perner. Thus the PAR hypothesis is able to solve a current problem in Cognitive Science. It also 
has further implications for philosophy of mind. 
Concepts are the constituents of thoughts. According to the HOT theory of 
consciousness, in order for a mental state M to be conscious, the subject must have a higher 
order thought (HOT) about that state (Carruthers 2000, Gennaro 2004, Rosenthal 1986). Thus, 
in order to have conscious beliefs, the subject must have a thought about that belief; perhaps ‘I 
believe that M’. But in order to have such a thought, the subject must have the concept BELIEF. 
The same is true for conscious perceptions and desires. However, as we have seen, children 
lack the concept BELIEF until about the age of six. Hence a consequence of the HOT theory 
would be that children under the age of six cannot have conscious mental states.84 
This problem with HOT theory, which Van Gulick (2006, p. 13) dubs the “too fancy” 
objection, has been discussed previously (Dretske 1995, Tye 1995). However, now the objection 
can be made more precisely, and there is clear empirical evidence in favor of it. Now we can say 
exactly what it is that is too sophisticated for a young child to possess, viz. an understanding of 
mental representation. Furthermore, the objection is also considerably strengthened. 
According to the PAR hypothesis, children don’t acquire such an understanding until they reach 
the third developmental stage of Belief Reasoning (BR). This doesn’t happen until around six 
years of age. Previously, the “too fancy” objection was thought by many to apply only to 
                                                           
84 Similar reasoning could expand this line of argument to apply to animals as well, and indeed the problem is often 
posed in those terms. Although I won’t take the time to do it here, I think this argument can also be adapted fairly 
easily to apply to self-representational theories of consciousness (Kriegel 2003, 2009, Kriegel & Williford 2006). See 
also Chapter 7, Section 3.3 for more on this topic. 
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infants, and not to school age children (cf. e.g. Gennaro 2012). Although I find the idea that 
infants don’t have phenomenal experience highly implausible, there have been philosophers 
who have notoriously bitten the bullet on this point (Carruthers 2000, 2005). However, it’s even 
less plausible to deny that 5-year-olds have conscious mental states. 
 In order for an experience to be phenomenally conscious, at a minimum the subject 
must be explicitly aware of that experience. Since young children don’t understand mental 
representation, it follows from the PAR hypothesis that they can’t experience beliefs and 
perceptions as representations, even for those who don’t subscribe to HOT theory and don’t 
deny that they have conscious mental states. Hence another implication of the PAR hypothesis 
is that the phenomenal experience of young children might be importantly different from that 
of adults, at least insofar as adults (at least sometimes) are aware of e.g. our visual experiences 
as representations. This might occur when we experience visual illusions such as the Müller-
Lyre Illusion or a stick bent in water (to take two of philosophers’ favorite examples). Even 
common experiences such as mistaking things in the distance for people, or wondering whether 
what we see in our backyard in the evening is an animal or something else, would seem to 
involve understanding that visual perceptions are representations and can therefore sometimes 
misrepresent. Thus it would seem these kinds of experiences would be unavailable to children 
younger than six.85 
 
 
                                                           
85 This line of thought is further developed in Chapter 7, Section 4. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Explaining Cognitive Development as a Change in Conceptual Repertoire: 
Defending a Limited Theory-Theory of Concepts against Fodor’s Shareability Concern 
 
“Acceptance of some form of intentional explanation appears to be a cultural universal. There is, 
so far as I know, no human group that doesn’t explain behavior by imputing beliefs and desires 
to the behavior. (And if an anthropologist claimed to have found such a group, I wouldn’t 
believe him.)” –Jerry Fodor86 
“Experiments like this are important because they show us that even though children use the 
same words we use, they may not mean the same things by them.” –Janet Wilde Astington87 
1. Introduction 
 There is a move which has become quite familiar in developmental psychology, which 
arguably goes back to Piaget and the very beginnings of the field. Children of various ages are 
given certain experimental tasks, and researchers find that a significant number of those 
children frequently give answers which are not only wrong, but are—at least from a normal 
adult point of view—downright bizarre. This is seen by researchers to be best explained by the 
fact that the child’s thinking about the world must be deeply and fundamentally different from 
that of the adult. From this, many researchers conclude that some children must either lack 
concepts that most adults share, or else have only an incomplete or partial concept which the 
                                                           
86 Fodor (1987), p. 132. 
87 Astington (1993), p. 130. 
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adult grasps fully.88 Very often, as with the case of Piaget, development is then seen to progress 
through certain stages, which can be defined by the concepts and understandings that children 
have at different times during their cognitive development.  
 Take as an initial example Piaget’s well known conservation task. This can take many 
different forms, but a typical task is the following. First, children are shown two identical glass 
containers, each holding an equal amount of liquid, and are asked if the two amounts of liquid 
are the same. Of course, most children successfully answer “Yes.” While the child observes, the 
psychologist takes the liquid contents of one of the glasses and pours it into a taller and 
narrower glass. Piaget and other researchers found that many children aged 2 to 6 years will 
now say that the two amounts of liquid are different, because the thin glass contains more 
liquid than the original glass contained.89 
For the normal adult, this sort of mistake is quite surprising. Of course an adult who 
witnessed the same amount of bourbon in 2 different types of glasses, served at a tavern for 
instance, might mistakenly think that her friend has received a larger portion of bourbon than 
she herself has. However, an adult who witnessed the bourbon being poured from one glass to 
another would never think that the amount of bourbon has somehow changed simply as a 
result of the act of pouring it into a new glass, regardless of the phenomenal appearance of 
either glass of bourbon. Hence, children at this stage of development (which Piaget dubbed 
                                                           
88 Part of the reason for thinking children have different concepts is that they (1) use the same words that adults 
do, but at times seem to mean something very different by them; and (2) this difference in meaning is not easily 
explained by a simple misapplication of the word to a different, shared concept (as is the case in the well-known 
phenomenon of overextension when a child acquiring English may use the word ‘cat’ to mean all animals e.g.). 
89 See Piaget & Inhelder (1974) for more on these highly replicated studies. 
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“pre-operational”) must be thinking about the world in a radically different way, in order to 
even think that such a thing is possible. Specifically, children at this stage don’t seem to realize 
that there are some properties of a thing which are invariant and persist through many types of 
physical transformation. (This was further corroborated by the fact that children made similar 
mistakes in other cases, such as when a spherical ball of clay is rolled into a snake-like shape, 
etc.)90 
Although Piaget’s theory of defining stages of cognitive development in terms of 
different logical systems has been relegated to the dustbin,91 the intuitive plausibility of 
explaining the behavior of children in terms of a unique conceptualization of the world remains. 
This paper will attempt to sketch such a story for the children’s concept KNOW at an 
intermediate stage of theory of mind (ToM) development, with the assumption that a similar 
story could be generalized to a limited number of other cases. This story will draw on recent 
empirical developments in the theory of mind, and in particular the Perceptual Access 
Reasoning (PAR) hypothesis of William Fabricius and colleagues (see Chapter 2). Considering 
concerns about theory-theory as a philosophy of concepts (defended by Carey 1985, 2010; 
Gopnik, 1988; and others), a defense will be sketched to one of Jerry Fodor’s major criticisms 
                                                           
90 After writing this introduction I came across Carey’s (2010) description of the same phenomenon, which she 
labels the “Huh?” factor (pp. 357-358). 
91 That this is so is evidenced by Perner’s (1991) characterization of a large amount of the developmental 
psychology of the 1970’s and 1980’s as “Piaget Bashing” (see Doherty 2009, pp. 12-13, for a succinct discussion). 
The reasons for this are largely twofold: Empirically, there are a vast number of studies demonstrating that 
children of a given age, which are not supposed to be able to do such-and-such according to Piaget’s theory, can 
actually do such-and-such given appropriate task adjustments (see Gelman & Baillargeon 1983, and Perner 1991, 
for partial reviews). That Piaget’s theory is so general is both a virtue and a vice in this regard. Second is the more 
philosophical point that it doesn’t seem right to call most children’s errors logical errors, since in many cases 
they’re making valid inferences given their limited understanding (see e.g. Carey 1985, p. 75). (Although they 
didn’t have as much impact in the cognitive science community, one might also add Fodor 1975’s argument that 
Piaget’s logics aren’t the sort of things that can be learned.) 
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for such proposals, which Kevan Edwards (2010) calls the “Shareability Constraint.”92 First, 
however, a momentary digression on theory-theories in general which I hope will strengthen 
the case for the theory-theory of concepts, in addition to clarifying what has been construed by 
some as a confusing terminology. 
2. Digression on Theory-Theories: A Happy Marriage of Distinct Views 
 Many, including Fodor (1998, p. 112), Laurence & Margolis (1999, p. 43), and even Carey 
herself (2010, p. 484) have complained that calling the Susan Carey (1985, 2010) view the 
“theory-theory” of concepts is unfortunate, since it’s too easily confused with the “theory-
theory” of mental state attribution (see e.g. Gopnik & Wellman, 1992, 1994). In this section I 
will sketch three different versions of a theory-theory view in psychology, and show that 
although these views are logically distinct and could therefore be held in isolation from each 
other, they nonetheless form a happy tripartite union. When one holds all three views 
together, they mutually reinforce one another in a way that makes each of them more plausible 
as an inference to the best explanation for the observed psychological data. Or so I shall argue. 
In what follows, reviewing all of the relevant experimental data in support of each view would 
take a book-length treatment, so we will have to make do with one representative key finding 
for each view. To get a fuller picture, one should read the cited papers and books. 
2.1 The Theory-Theory of Mindreading 
                                                           
92 Perhaps I should flag here that I’ve changed the spelling from Edwards (2010), who attributes the terminology to 
Georges Rey. Fodor (1998 and elsewhere) calls it the “publicity constraint.” 
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 The theory-theory view of mental state attribution (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992, 1994) 
contends that children utilize folk psychological theories in order to attribute mental states 
both to themselves and others, and also to use these attributions to predict behavior. 
According to the PAR view (Chapter 2, Fabricius et al 2010, Fabricius & Imbens-Bailey 2000, 
Fabricius & Khalil 2003, and Hedger & Fabricius 2011), there are three distinct stages of 
cognitive development, each of which makes use of a different theory.93 The Reality Reasoning 
(RR) stage (roughly age 3) is associated with the theory that there is a direct (i.e. unmediated) 
causal connection from reality to behavior. Children in this stage tend to predict that agents 
always go to the correct location in the false belief task, and lack the understanding that the 
same thing can appear differently to different people, depending upon their visual perspective 
(Flavell 1974’s “Level 2” perspective taking).94 The Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR) stage 
(roughly age 4 to 5)95 applies a series of two rules which take as input a representation of an 
agent with a goal, initiate an analysis of the agent’s perceptual access to the goal (e.g. food) in 
the present situation, and output a prediction of that agent’s behavior (see Chapter 2, Fabricius 
et al 2010, Fabricius & Imbens-Bailey 2000, Fabricius & Khalil 2003, and Hedger & Fabricius 
2011 for more on the PAR stage). These first two stages do not use any representational mental 
state concepts; instead, they are purely causal/behavioral (more on this below). Finally, the 
                                                           
93 This is a modification of the Gopnik & Wellman (1992, 1994) view, which contains only two stages and a shorter 
timeline, but otherwise the theory-theory aspects of the two views remain essentially the same. 
94 For those who are unfamiliar with these experiments, see Chapter 2 or Hedger & Fabricius (2011) p. 430 for a 
description of the false belief location task, and Chapter 3 or Masangkay et al (1974) for examples of Level 1 and 
Level 2 perception tasks. 
95 PAR is used in explicit reasoning and verbal reports in children ages 4 and 5, but a version of PAR (dubbed “Rule 
A”) may be implicitly used as early as 1 year of age, and may persist into adulthood. See Chapters 2, 4 and 5 and 
Hedger 2016 for the details of this hypothesis, and Hedger & Fabricius (2011) for a review of infant and 
chimpanzee theory of mind studies from the perspective of the PAR view. 
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Belief Reasoning (BR) stage (roughly age 6 ½ to adult for psycho-typical subjects) utilizes a full-
blown theory of mind, in the sense that it makes use of a (perhaps quite complicated) folk 
psychological theory which predicts behavior based upon mental states such as beliefs and 
desires. 
 According to theory-theory, at each stage subjects apply a theory to predict behavior 
and (in the case of BR, at least) attribute mental states to themselves and others. One example 
of a finding which supports this view is that children do not give the correct answer on a task 
about someone else’s false belief until they are able to give the correct answer on a task 
concerning their own false belief. For instance, in the unexpected contents false belief task, a 
child is shown a familiar candy container, such as an M&M bag, and asked what he thinks is 
inside. After the child says “M&M’s,” it is revealed that something unexpected is inside, such as 
a pencil. After the pencil is placed back inside the bag, the subject is informed that a friend of 
the experimenter’s (named “Elmo” e.g.) is waiting outside. The experimenter then asks, “If he 
just looks at it, what will Elmo think is inside the bag?”   
Wimmer & Hartl (1991) and others found that 3 year olds (RR stage) typically incorrectly 
infer that someone else will believe that the candy bag contains a pencil. Surprisingly, 3-year-
olds also report that they initially believed a pencil was in the bag, even though they just a 
minute ago reported that they believed that the bag contained candies. Further experiments 
were done in order to rule out conflicting explanations, such as that the children didn’t 
remember or were embarrassed about giving an incorrect response. This experiment has been 
replicated several times. Interestingly, children don’t correctly attribute a false belief about 
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themselves until they are able to do so for others (Astington & Gopnik 1988, Gopnik & 
Astington 1988, Wimmer & Hartl 1991). This is exactly what would be expected if subjects were 
applying a theory in both the first-person and third-person cases, and is contrary to the 
common sense Cartesian view of mind that we have a privileged epistemic access to our own 
mental states which we do not have when it comes to the mental states of others.96 According 
to the latter sort of view, first-person attribution should be decidedly easier than third-person 
attribution. However, that doesn’t appear to be the case. 
2.2 The Nisbett and Wilson View 
There is also a view about our introspective access to our own mental states from social 
psychology which might aptly be called theory-theory (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson, 2002). 
These researchers found that subjects consistently give reports of their own mental states 
which are demonstrably incorrect, or may behave as though they are self-attributing a mental 
state which they probably don’t have (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson, 2002). For instance, in 
one study which is typical, a female experimenter (herself blind to the experimental hypothesis) 
stopped men and asked them to fill out a questionnaire (Dutton & Aron 1974). She then gave 
the subjects her phone number and invited the men to call if they were interested in obtaining 
the survey results. There were two conditions: in one she stopped them on a safe bridge (10 ft. 
high) and in the other she stopped them while crossing a more precarious feeling suspension 
bridge 230 ft. high.  
                                                           
96 The Cartesian or privileged access view is defended in some form or other by philosophers such as Andre Gallois 
(1996), Brie Gertler (2011), Alvin Goldman (2006), and Sydney Shoemaker (1988). 
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Men were much more likely to call if they had been stopped on the precarious bridge, 
presumably because they attributed their physiological responses—which were actually caused 
by the fear of the bridge—to arousal caused by the presence of the experimenter.97 According 
to this theory-theory, the data which a subject has introspective access to, such as the 
physiological responses noted above, often greatly underspecify the mental state that one is in 
(think e.g. of the physiology of fear, anger, sexual arousal, and surprise, just to name a few). 
The subject then applies a folk theory about mental states, noting salient aspects of one’s 
environment which may or may not be in fact relevant to one’s occurrent state (such as the 
presence of a female), in order to self-attribute mental states, preferences, and the like (Dutton 
& Aron, 1974; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson, 2002).98 
Interestingly, the view developed by social psychologists Richard Nisbett, Timothy 
Wilson, and others is strikingly similar to a view put forth by neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga 
(1985), who arrived at the same conclusion from considerations of completely different data. 
Studying subjects who had the corpus callosum connecting the two brain hemispheres 
                                                           
97 Specifically, 61% of the experimental group members called, whereas only 23% of the control group members 
called, across two studies. In the first study, the experimental group crossed the “dangerous bridge” whereas the 
control group crossed the “safe bridge,” and in Study 2 both groups crossed the suspension bridge, but the control 
group was interviewed 10 minutes after crossing. 
The theory that environmental cues are used to determine emotion judgments during ambiguous states of arousal 
was originally put forward in Schachter & Singer (1962). 
98 Bob Van Gulick worries about this particular example, since subjects in the Dutton & Aron (1972) paradigm don’t 
explicitly give explanations of their behavior. However, subjects do give explicit explanations of their behavior in 
many other studies. For instance, in probably the best known of Nisbett & Wilson (1977)’s experiments, conducted 
in various stores under the guise of a consumer survey, passers-by were asked which pair they preferred, from a 
choice of five identical pairs of stockings. Although a bias to choose the right-most object was discovered (by 
almost four to one), subjects never reported an awareness of this bias and once again confabulated explanations 
for their preference (“It’s the softest,” “The material is thicker,” “It looks to be of higher quality,” etc.) When 
informed of the position bias effect, subjects denied it outright, giving the experimenters “worried glances.” 
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surgically severed in order to treat extreme epilepsy (so called “split brain” patients), Gazzaniga 
and others found that behaviors initiated by their right brain hemisphere were often 
unavailable for verbal report by the left hemisphere. When queried about these behaviors, the 
left brain (presumably ignorant of the true motives for the actions, which were interpretable 
based upon the experimental design) often confabulate (Gazzaniga’s term) a rational but 
completely false explanation for them. Furthermore, the subjects are completely convinced of 
the accuracy of these confabulations.  
In one well-known experiment, for example, a picture of a chicken claw is flashed to the 
right visual field (and then processed by the left brain hemisphere), and a picture of a snow 
scene is flashed to the left visual field (Gazzaniga & LeDoux 1978, p. 148). The subject was then 
asked to choose from an array of pictures presented to him. With his left hand (controlled by 
the right hemisphere) he selected a shovel and with his right hand he selected a chicken. When 
asked why he chose those items, the subject replied, “Oh, that’s simple. The chicken claw goes 
with the chicken, and you need a shovel to clean out the chicken shed.” In other words, the left 
hemisphere fabricates an explanation for the subject’s behavior which is consistent with the 
knowledge of the left hemisphere but fails to take into account the knowledge of the right 
hemisphere. Based on over 50 years of studying the brain, Gazzaniga (1985)’s hypothesis is that 
mental modules99 operating beneath the level of consciousness are responsible for our 
behavior, but that a left brain interpreter module theorizes a post hoc rationalization of that 
                                                           
99 See Fodor (1983) for more on the notion of modular mental architecture. 
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behavior. The interpreter uses a theory that says our behavior is the result of our own free will 
and is wholly rational. 
 The connection between the two theory-theory views so far discussed (mentalizing 
theory-theory and social psychology/neuroscience theory-theory) is, I hope, obvious by now. 
Both views argue that self-attribution of mental states (including the intentions behind many of 
our actions) is achieved by applying a theory and post hoc rationalization, rather than by some 
Cartesian process of introspection. The fact that data from three different fields—social 
psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive development in children—led researchers 
independently to the same theory strikes me as quite compelling, and makes a strong case for 
the truth of the view. Also, it’s obvious that the data in support of any of these theories would 
mutually support the other two, since the theories are essentially the same. 
2.3 The Theory-Theory of Concepts 
 Finally, the theory-theory of concepts (Carey 1985, 2010; Gopnik, 1988) argues that 
some concepts are (at least partially) individuated by larger theories in which they play a crucial 
role.100 Sometimes, and for a very limited number of concepts, different theories give rise to 
different, incommensurable, concepts. These concepts are incommensurable because they 
can’t be easily carried over from one theory to another. Utilizing theory 2 makes some concepts 
which were crucial in theory 1 almost incomprehensible. This happens when one theory can’t 
                                                           
100 A caveat which may be important for some is that there doesn’t seem to be (as of yet) a fully worked out 
theory-theory. Fodor, for instance, complains that “it’s [often] so hard to figure out what… the theory-theory is a 
theory of” (1998, p. 117), and Carey (2010, p. 484) concurs that “The theory-theory of conceptual development is 
not actually a theory [because] it’s way too underspecified.” The skeleton given here, then, is appropriately 
sketchy. 
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be easily translated into the language of the other without some translator’s gloss (Carey 1991, 
2010). For instance, the adult theory of mind, in which the idea of mental representation is 
central, is radically different from the BR or PAR stage theories of mind, where the idea of 
representational mental states is completely absent. Things which seem quite natural to us 
can’t even be considered by children at this age.  
Without the idea of representation, a whole host of ideas and distinctions—veridical 
versus illusory, for example—are not possible. The idea of visual illusion, where we have a 
perception which misrepresents reality, cannot be understood by someone who lacks the 
notion that mental states represent. Thus Flavell and colleagues have demonstrated that 
children in the RR stage don’t make what they dub the appearance/reality distinction (Flavell et 
al 1983). One task they used to test this involved showing children a sponge which looks like a 
rock, and then allowing them to handle it. After the child is familiarized with the fake rock, it is 
placed on the table. Children are then asked, “Is this really a rock or really a sponge?” and 
“When you look at this with your eyes right now, does it look like a rock or look like a sponge?” 
They found that before four years of age children tend to say that it looks like a sponge and that 
it really is a sponge, presumably because they don’t realize that things can be different than 
they appear to be. They don’t view perceptions as representations of what is perceived, but 
more like direct causal links with the environment. 
 The connection between the theory-theory of concepts and the previous two theory-
theories becomes clearer when we focus our attention on mental concepts. Consider the 
transition from the PAR stage to the Belief Reasoning (BR) stage of theory of mind development 
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(see Chapter 2, Chapter 4, Hedger 2016, Hedger & Fabricius 2011). PAR makes no use of the 
notion of mental representation, as is aptly demonstrated by failure on the true belief task 
during this stage of development (Chapter 2, Fabricius et al 2010). Fabricius et al (2010) found 
that although four- and five-year-olds pass the false belief task (which researchers have been 
using to study theory of mind in children for 30 years), they fail true belief versions of the task. 
In one such task, children were shown a story involving props and a puppet named Maxi. Maxi 
places his chocolate in a red cupboard, and then watches as his mother comes in and moves 
the chocolate from the red cupboard to the green cupboard. Maxi goes outside to play, and 
there is no movement of the chocolate during his absence. After his return, the child is asked, 
“Where will Maxi look for his chocolate?”101 The success rate of 5-year-olds was not 
significantly greater than chance.  
This finding is significant, because all it would take to pass this true belief task is the 
understanding that Maxi has a representation (belief) of the location of the chocolate which 
will persist through a brief departure and subsequent return. It’s initially quite surprising that 
anyone would fail such a task, and children at an earlier stage of cognitive development (RR) 
pass this task although they fail the false belief version. When combined with other findings in 
theory of mind development, this makes a compelling case that children younger than 6 years 
of age do not understand mental representation (see the rest of this monograph, especially 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 5). Also, children in the PAR stage have concepts of mental states such 
as KNOW which don’t map neatly onto the adult concept. Whereas the idea of mental 
                                                           
101 A meta-analysis of 178 false belief studies found no significant difference between asking “Where will Maxi 
look?” “Where does Maxi think it is?”, etc. (Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001). 
150 
 
 
 
representation is a crucial part of the adult concept KNOW, it is completely missing from the 
PAR concept. 
The theory-theory of mindreading commonly holds not only the thesis that subjects use 
a theory to attribute mental states to ourselves and others, but also that the mental state 
concepts of children—concepts such as WANT (desire), SEE (perception), etc.—are partially 
constituted by the theories which contain them (e.g. Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). If the theory-
theory of concepts is right that theory change may include conceptual change (Gopnik, 1985, 
2010), and the theory-theory of mindreading is right that mental states are attributed by a 
process of theory application, then it’s natural to think that the theories children use for the 
latter purpose will have different concepts of mental states (the key theoretical posits) at 
different stages of cognitive development. When theories that children use define stages of 
development, as they do in the PAR theory, then it’s a short step to thinking that the theories 
play these two cognitive roles. In this way, all three theory-theories fit naturally together and 
mutually support each other in one coherent picture. Although logically distinct, once in the 
abductive frame of mind of a scientist, seeing that the evidence for one theory also supports 
the other two in a tidy overall scheme leads one to accept them as a single package. 
3. The Child’s Concept KNOW 
According to the PAR hypothesis (Chapter 2, Fabricius et al 2010, Fabricius & Imbens-
Bailey 2000, Fabricius & Khalil 2003, Hedger 2016, Hedger & Fabricius 2011), at a certain stage 
of cognitive development, children demonstrate a complete lack of understanding of mental 
representation. This is evidenced by their failure on true belief tasks, as discussed in the 
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previous section (see Chapter 2, Chapter 5, Fabricius et al 2010, and Hedger & Fabricius 2011 
for more on this). The concept KNOW which children have at this stage of development is 
importantly different from the adult concept. One way to characterize this difference is to say 
that the adult concept is a mentalist one while the child’s concept is behavioral (see Chapter 5). 
Since children at the PAR stage lack any understanding of mental representation, their concept 
KNOW is inextricably linked to behavioral cues and cues about relations in the present 
situation.  
3.1 Knowledge and the PAR Rules 
More specifically, PAR theory hypothesizes that during this intermediate stage of theory 
of mind development, there is a mental mechanism which takes as input an agent, a goal (such 
as some object of interest), and some perceptual link between them.102 This perceptual link is 
not the adult conception that perceptions represent the physical environment, but rather a sort 
of immediate causal contact in the present situation. Hence, when Maxi leaves and returns in 
one version of the true belief task, the child considers this perceptual link to be broken. Call this 
perceptual link “seeing.” From this and similar data gathered from the various versions of the 
false belief task (see Chapter 2 and Hedger & Fabricius 2011 for the PAR interpretation of the 
false belief task results) and Pillow (1989)’s work on the early link between perception and 
                                                           
102 Of course, “agent,” “goal,” “object of interest” and the like are already intentional concepts, so even PAR is not 
pure behaviorism. (Again, the key difference separating PAR from BR is not the absence of mentalism per se but 
the idea that mental states are representations.) 
It’s not important for present purposes, but another cue to the PAR mechanism is situation change. This parameter 
is left intentionally vague in the theory, because sorting out what constitutes situation change—and hence a 
triggering mechanism for PAR—is an empirical question. See Hedger & Fabricius (2011) for discussion. 
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“knowledge”, etc., PAR theorists posit the first rule of Perceptual Access Reasoning (Fabricius & 
Khalil 2003):  
Rule 1: Seeing → Knowing (and Not Seeing → Not Knowing) 
The reason for the scare quotes around ‘knowledge’ and ‘seeing’ in the previous 
paragraph is that the PAR concepts of perception and knowledge are to be distinguished from 
the adult concepts. Just as SEEPAR (the PAR stage concept of sense perception) is a non-
representational link having to do with positions of agents and goals in the current situation, 
KNOWPAR is not a representational state either. Rather, knowledge for the PAR child is simply 
something which predisposes an agent to behave appropriately given her goals, which we 
might call “getting it right” (see Perner 1991 and below for evidence of this which is completely 
independent of the PAR theory). Hence, in the location tasks (both false and true belief 
versions), “knowing” is a label for the predisposition to go to the correct location—i.e., the 
location where the goal is actually located. In the true belief task described earlier, the PAR 
child first determines whether the protagonist can “see” the goal in the present situation. If 
Maxi can “see” the goal, then he “knows;” if he can’t “see” the goal, then he doesn’t “know.”  
This is a direct causal link which does not result in a representation in Maxi’s mind, so 
thus when Maxi leaves and returns and the PAR perceptual link is broken, the knowledge does 
not persist but also becomes a broken link.103 There is no understanding included in KNOWPAR 
                                                           
103 What is required to break this link is largely an empirical question, not a theoretical one. Hedger and Fabricius 
(2011) explain that once perceptual access is broken, the child will now deem the current state of affairs as a new 
situation, and will then re-apply the PAR rules. Discovering these cues for situation change is a job for empirical 
discovery. Because SEEPAR is a completely foreign concept from the adult point of view (after all, that’s part of the 
point of this chapter), there is no obvious a priori method for discovering these cues. We are able to specify two 
cues for situation change in the false and true belief paradigms which are evident from published studies. One is to 
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that people can get things correct by guessing, or that people occasionally make mistakes even 
if they know. Thus, since Maxi lacks the perceptual connection in the true belief task, then he 
doesn’t know. Since he doesn’t know, and there is no getting it right by accident or inference 
for the PAR child, then Maxi will definitely get it wrong, and look in the location where the 
chocolate is not currently located. The second rule of PAR is this simple connection between 
knowledge and appropriate behavior (Fabricius & Khalil 2003): 
Rule 2: Knowing → Getting It Right (and Not Knowing → Getting It Wrong) 
Hence, PAR Theory therefore provides a definition of the KNOW concept at this stage of 
development:104  
KNOWPAR df: S knows iff S demonstrates correct behavior and S has perceptual 
access.105  
                                                           
have some movement of the object being sought which is occluded from the agent (Fabricius et al 2010, Kaminski 
et al 2008), and the other is to have the agent momentarily leave the situation and return (Fabricius et al 2010, 
Friedman et al 2003). Whether there are other cues which trigger the PAR rules to be computed again, and what 
those might turn out to be, are matters for empirical investigation (see Chapter 2, Section 4 for more discussion). 
104 As with all rules of this sort, there arises the question whether the two PAR rules are represented somewhere in 
the child’s mind, or simply descriptive reconstructions of mental mechanisms posited by psychologists, which may 
or may not be explicitly represented anywhere in the child’s mind. (This is perhaps related to the Dennett/Fodor 
dispute over rules and representation, such as Dennett’s example of the chess program which is described as 
“getting its Queen out early.” See e.g. Dennett 1978; Fodor 1985, 1987.) In this case, the rules are explicitly and 
consciously followed by children at this stage, as demonstrated by the fact that many PAR subjects will cite the 
rules as explanations for their predictions given during false and true belief tasks (Fabricius et al 2010). 
105 It might be thought that rather than the actual demonstration of correct behavior, what is meant here is merely 
the disposition to behave correctly (so that ‘demonstrates,’ ‘exhibits,’ etc. in the descriptions here and below 
should be replaced with modals such as ‘would demonstrate, given appropriate circumstances,’ etc.). However, it’s 
not at all clear from the empirical data that children do think of knowledge as a mere disposition. Because it’s 
more of a direct behavioral relation (not mediated mentally), I think it’s a better description (and more in line with 
what children actually say) to refer to the actual demonstration of correct behavior. 
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This definition, providing both necessary and a sufficient conditions for knowledge, 
follows straightforwardly from the two PAR rules above.106 Knowing for the PAR child just is the 
exhibition of appropriate behavior. If S knows, then S will get it right. If S gets it right, then S 
knows. Similarly, there can be no knowledge without perceptual access.107 Thus, the simplicity 
of this concept of proto-knowledge allows us to define it in a way which is impossible for most 
ordinary, non-technical concepts (Fodor et al 1980). The other notable exceptions to this 
generalization are technical terms, such as those often employed by philosophers for 
theoretical purposes (“terms of art”). This lends further evidence to the idea that concepts such 
as KNOWPAR exhibit a special nature, best explained by the fact that they are partly constituted 
by the theories in which they play a central role. The hypothesis I wish to endorse is that all 
mental state terms are like this.  
Furthermore, it becomes obvious why the PAR concepts of perception and knowledge 
will be replaced by the superior representational concepts once those are available (after all, 
the former lead to the wrong prediction when someone has a true belief). This is perhaps the 
key to the transition from PAR stage to the BR stage. The nature of this process of concept 
                                                           
106 The first version of each rule can be interpreted as a material conditional of the form ‘If A then B.’ If the second 
version of each rule (given in parentheses above) is interpreted as the inverse of the first rule (i.e. ‘If not-A then 
not-B’), then according to classical logic we can use the contraposition of that rule (i.e. ‘If B then A’) and combine it 
with the first rule to obtain the biconditional ‘A if and only if B.’ Hence a definition with necessary and sufficient 
conditions logically follows from the description of the two knowledge rules in PAR (at least on one possible 
interpretation). 
107 This is perhaps best demonstrated by the no belief task (see Chapter 2, Section 5). In one version of this task 
(Chen et al 2015), Lee returns to class having missed in which of two cupboards the teacher placed a toy plane. 
When asked where he will look for it, children using PAR claimed that he will choose the empty cupboard, because 
he didn’t see the placement of the plane and therefore did not know where it was (and will “get it wrong” by 
looking in the incorrect cupboard). 
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acquisition (and theory change) is of course an empirical question, setting aside any a priori 
constraints (if indeed there are any). That is thus a question beyond the scope of this paper.  
3.2 Knowing, Lying, and Getting it Right 
According to Perner (1991, Chapter 7), “children’s earliest use of ‘know’ emphasizes its 
link to successful action…” (p. 147). As he says, this is also a part of the adult use of ‘know’, as in 
‘knowing how to do something’ or ‘knowing where something is.’108 This is the sense of ‘know’ 
involved in the PAR rules. However, in this stage of ToM development, it is a completely 
behavioral, non-representational term, and is devoid of other adult uses or aspects.109 Thus the 
concept KNOWPAR can be separated from the adult conception of ‘know,’ even in this sense of 
leading to successful action. For example, in the adult concept, even if I don’t know where my 
keys are, I still might accidentally choose the correct location in the first place I look. While for 
adults this would be a lucky guess of sorts, for children using PAR that means I know where they 
are. If knowing is simply “getting it right,” or correct behavior, then there is no difference 
between an uniformed yet correct guess and a justified belief as long as both processes lead to 
                                                           
108 Perner claims that this use of ‘know’ is the primary use for children until about four years of age. However, I cite 
evidence below that children don’t acquire the representational concept of ‘know’ until later than that. Children in 
the RR stage of ToM development perhaps lack the concept of knowledge altogether (Bartsch & Wellman 1995 
found that psychological uses of ‘know’—versus mere conversational ones such as ‘know what?’ to introduce a 
topic—occur very rarely before age 3, and increase markedly during the fourth year). Even if they do have one, it 
must be different from KNOWPAR. 
109 According to Perner (1991, Chapter 7)—drawing from Dretske (1981)—the other aspects of the adult concept 
KNOW are truth and “access to relevant information”; but these are unimportant for present purposes. Also, note 
that by “behavioral” I am not claiming that the child concept lacks any intentionality whatsoever; see Chapter 5 for 
more on this use of ‘behavioral.’ 
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successfully finding an object or accurately stating where an object is (or what properties the 
object has).110 
Following this line of reasoning, a crucial distinction separating knowledge and lucky 
guesses is part of the adult representational and mental concept of knowledge but is lacking in 
KNOWPAR. In (at that time ongoing) research discussed by Perner (1991, pp. 156-158), a piece of 
candy was placed in one of two differently colored boxes before subjects where asked, “Where 
is the candy?” In the know condition the candy was placed by the experimenter into one of the 
boxes while the subject watched. In the other two conditions an occluding screen was placed 
between the subject and the experimenter with the two boxes. The experimenter told the 
subject that he was placing the candy in one of the two boxes; however in the guess-correct 
condition candy was actually surreptitiously placed in both boxes and in the guess-wrong 
condition the candy was placed in neither box. Each subject saw all three conditions.  
After being asked which box contained the candy and looking inside to witness either its 
presence or absence, the subject was asked, “Did you really know the candy was in there or did 
you just guess?” Fewer than 20% of the subjects between 4 and 5 years of age, and fewer than 
40% of the subjects between 5 and 6.5 years of age, gave the correct response in all three 
conditions. Assuming that most of these children were in the PAR stage of ToM development, 
given their ages, this demonstrates that children using PAR (and the concept KNOWPAR) do not 
                                                           
110 Of course, if Williamson’s view of knowledge (2000) is correct, then KNOW is simple (and not a composite 
containing BELIEVE, JUSTIFICATION, etc. as parts) and primary (BELIEVE and the like are variations of, and 
therefore parasitic upon, the concept KNOW). I tend to favor this view of knowledge myself, although I’m not 
prepared to argue for it here. Although it is not yet the full-fledged adult conception of knowledge, the fact that 
(according to the PAR hypothesis advocated here) children acquire the concept KNOW in the second stage of 
development, before they acquire BELIEVE in the third stage, may lend some support for Williamson’s view 
(Williamson 2000, p. 33, footnote 7. See Chapter 7, Section 3.1 for discussion). 
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understand the difference between knowing something and merely guessing correctly. A child 
using PAR will say, in the guess-correct condition, that she really knew where the candy was 
because she successfully found the candy. 
In fact, even children in the BR stage of ToM development may still take some time to 
fully grasp the difference between knowledge and guessing. Pillow and colleagues (Pillow 2002, 
Pillow et al 2000) found that it wasn’t until 8 or 9 years of age that children were able to 
correctly judge another person’s deductive inference as more certain than a guess. In a total of 
5 studies, experimenters took two small toys (e.g. marbles) of different colors and placed them 
into opaque containers. The experimenter told the subject and a puppet that he was hiding e.g. 
“an orange marble and a blue marble.” In the looking condition, the puppet looked into one of 
the tins and said, “This marble is blue.” In the inference condition, the puppet looked into one 
of the tins and said, “The other marble is blue.” In the guessing condition, the puppet pointed 
to one of the cans (without looking inside either) and said, “This marble is blue.” Subjects were 
then asked to explain the puppet’s belief (e.g. “Why does Bob [the puppet] think the other 
marble is blue?”) and to rate the certainty of the puppet’s belief by pointing to a scale which 
they had already been familiarized with (“How sure is Bob that the marble is blue? Can you 
show me with the arrow? Put it here [happy face at one end] if Bob is really, really sure, and put 
it here [sad face at the opposite end] if Bob doesn’t know at all, and put it here [in the middle] if 
Bob is a little bit sure”). Most of the children (from preschool to 4th graders) did not consistently 
rate the puppet as less certain on guessing trials than on inference trials until about 8 or 9 years 
of age. For a child using PAR, the puppet only knows in the looking condition of these studies, 
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because according to the first PAR rule if the puppet doesn’t see the marble then she doesn’t 
know what color it is. 
Further evidence for this non-representational stage of ToM development comes from 
studies involving the concept of lying. Lying involves more than simply telling a falsehood. If I 
believe that my wife is at work, and thus tell my son that she’s at work when he asks, “Where’s 
Mom?”, then I haven’t lied. I haven’t lied even if I make a mistake and she’s actually on her 
lunch break at Subway. I have said something untrue, but it’s not a lie because I didn’t intend to 
deceive my son. I simply made a mistake. Lying involves knowing the truth, and intending to 
give someone a false belief about that fact. Of course, a false belief is a misrepresentation of 
reality that someone has in his mind. So if a child using PAR doesn’t understand mental 
representation, then she can’t fully understand lying. Lying for a child using PAR will be, just as 
ignorance is, a case of getting it wrong. There should be no difference between lying and 
mistakenly telling a falsehood in this stage of cognitive development, and indeed that is exactly 
what we find. 
Piaget (1932/1965) interviewed a number of children ages 6-12 and told them stories 
involving children intentionally telling lies in order to get sweets, exaggerating due to fear, or 
making honest mistakes. He then asked subjects whether or not the children in the stories told 
lies or not, and how blameworthy (“naughty”) their actions were. He found, in the first 
instance, that most young children don’t distinguish between mistaken factual errors and lies. 
For example, one of the dialogues Piaget recites is with a 6-year-old boy named Clai (p. 143): 
PIAGET: Do you know what a lie is? 
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CLAI: It’s when you say what isn’t true. 
P: Is ‘2 + 2 = 5’ a lie? 
C: Yes, it’s a lie. 
P: Why? 
C: Because it isn’t right. 
P: Did the boy who said that ‘2 + 2 = 5’ know it wasn’t right or did he make a mistake? 
C: He made a mistake. 
P: Then if he made a mistake, did he tell a lie or not? 
C: Yes, he told a lie. 
P: A naughty one? 
C: Not very. 
P: You see this gentleman [a student]? 
C: Yes 
P: How old do you think he is? 
C: Thirty. 
P: I would say 28.  
[The student then says he is 36.] 
P: Have we both told a lie? 
C: Yes, both lies. 
P: Naughty ones? 
C: Not so very naughty. 
P: Which is the naughtiest, yours or mine? 
C: Yours is the naughtiest, because the difference is biggest. 
P: Is it a lie, or did we just make a mistake? 
C: We made a mistake. 
P: Is it a lie all the same, or not? 
C: Yes, it’s a lie. 
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Cai (and other young children interviewed by Piaget) not only said that a mistaken 
falsehood is the same as a lie, but he also determined an untruth’s moral blameworthiness 
using the dimension of realism. That is, the more incorrect a statement is, the more “naughty” 
it is. The children also considered the statement that has the worst results (i.e. the one that 
leads to unsuccessful action) the more blameworthy. In one study Piaget told subjects a pair of 
stories (making sure they could recite them from memory as a control question) before asking 
them which of the boys in the story was naughtier. In both stories (p. 149) a man stops to ask a 
boy directions to a particular street near the school where the interviews took place. In the first 
story, a boy who doesn’t know the names of the streets very well tells him, “I think it is there,” 
but the street is not there and the man seeking directions gets lost. In the second story, the 
man asks a boy who knows the names of the streets very well. However, the boy wants to play 
a trick on the man and shows him the wrong street. The man eventually finds his way again and 
does not end up getting lost.  
Again, Piaget quotes dialogues with children ages 6, 7 and 8 who all claim that the first 
boy was the naughtiest because he made the man get lost. The important part of all of this for 
our purposes is that most of these young children don’t distinguish between lying and making a 
mistake, which as we noted earlier is just what we would predict if the children are using PAR.  
Thus one child interviewed by Piaget, age 8, claims that if the man in the second story had also 
gotten lost, then both boys “would have been equally naughty” (p. 161), since they both lied. 
Lying is simply not telling the truth for subjects in the PAR stage of development.  
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Even with the current “Piaget Bashing” trend in developmental psychology which was 
noted at the beginning of this chapter (see Note 5), more recent studies confirm Piaget’s 
original finding that young children deem all factually incorrect statements lies, even if the 
speaker is merely mistaken. Thus Wimmer et al (1984), who investigated children’s 
understanding of lying in a series of 6 experiments, conclude, “The results of these experiments 
confirmed Piaget’s claim that young children do not consider speaker intent in their use of the 
verb ‘lying’” (p. 4).  
In the first experiment, children watched 3 puppets—an older girl, a younger girl and a 
younger boy. In five different variations, the older girl answered the younger girl’s question, 
who in turn reported to her brother (the younger boy). The test question was, “Did the small 
girl fib?”111 Although the subjects performed excellently on control questions and in other 
situations, when the older girl sees a lion behind a wall but tells the young girl that it’s a dog, 
and the young girl then tells her brother that the animal is a dog, the children answer that the 
small girl does fib. Of the 30 subjects between 4 ½ and 6 ½, only one answers correctly that she 
did not fib, even though they all answer correctly that she thinks the animal is a dog. 
(Interestingly, when the older girl tells the small girl that the animal is a lion, but she wants to 
trick her brother and tells him that it’s a dog, but he mistakenly believes that the animal is a 
lion, subjects say that the small girl did not fib.)112 
                                                           
111 The authors explain that they chose to use the expression ‘fib’ (‘schwindeln’ in German) rather than ‘lie’ 
(‘luegen’ in German) “since the situation was to be playful” (p. 5). 
112 In this instance, it’s not entirely clear that adults wouldn’t answer in the same way as the children. Perhaps ‘to 
lie’ is a success verb in the same way ‘to con’ is. However, I can certainly bring to mind counterexamples to this 
from everyday conversation. For instance, suppose my wife asks me whether I was working late or at the bar, 
when she knows I was at the bar. Even though it’s unsuccessful when I tell her I was late at work, she might 
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Experiment 2 followed a similar paradigm except this time the experimenter enters with 
a box and tells the second character the contents of the box (either a piece of chocolate or a 
toy car), who then goes on to tell a doll. Sometimes the second character was played by a doll 
and sometimes the subject took the place of the second character. Neither the second 
character nor the doll she reports to are allowed to see inside the box until after the verbal 
report. The experimenter misinforms the second character, who in turn accurately reports to 
the doll what she was told by the experimenter. For example, the experimenter might tell the 
subject (playing the second character) that the closed box contains chocolate when it actually 
contains a toy car. The subject then reports to the doll that the box contains a piece of 
chocolate. 
Once again, all but 2 of 20 subjects ages 4 ½ – 6 ½ answered that the second character 
was lying, and it didn’t matter whether the second character was a doll or the subject herself. 
As the authors note, “One would have expected that in the Self condition subjects would have 
objected to even the slightest insinuation that they were lying (fibbing) when they themselves 
were led to a wrong belief by the experimenter. Instead, most of them even showed 
embarrassment when they saw that they had said something wrong in good faith” (p. 11). 
Experiments 3 and 4 controlled for the possibility that the first character’s lie influenced 
them to say that the second character was lying by using the false belief task paradigm 
(Wimmer & Perner 1983; see Chapter 2) instead. When Maxi returns after his mother has 
moved the chocolate from the red cupboard (where Maxi left it) to the green cupboard, Maxi 
                                                           
nonetheless complain that I’m lying. Thus I don’t think lie is a factive or success verb such as to know or to 
remember. 
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tells his sister where the chocolate is. Sometimes Maxi wants to help his sister find the 
chocolate, and so he reports his false belief that the chocolate is in the red cupboard, which 
turns out to be incorrect. Sometimes Maxi wants to trick his sister, and so he tells her that the 
chocolate is in the green cupboard (where it actually is) instead of reporting his false belief that 
the chocolate is in the red cupboard. Once again, most of the subjects ages 4 ½ – 6 ½ said that 
Maxi was lying in the first condition, when he intends to tell the truth but makes a mistake, and 
said that Maxi was not lying in the second condition, when he intends to deceive his sister but 
accidentally tells her where the chocolate is actually located.113 
To sum up this subsection, if knowing just means getting it right for the child in the PAR 
stage of ToM development (i.e. roughly ages 4 ½ to 6 ½ ), then there is no difference between 
what adults would call truly knowing and merely making a lucky guess. As research by Perner, 
Pillow, and their colleagues demonstrates, children do not make this distinction in the PAR 
stage of development.114 Additionally, the full adult concept of lying (i.e. knowing the truth but 
attempting to deceive the listener by giving her a false belief) should be unavailable to a child 
using PAR, since the concept of lying requires a concept of mental representation which 
children in this stage of development lack. Therefore, for children at this stage there should be 
                                                           
113 Experiments 5 and 6 are designed to disprove Piaget’s (1932/1965) claim that young children base their moral 
judgment on the objective result of the action in question rather than on the subjective intentions behind that 
action, which he called Moral Realism. They used the same false belief task paradigm as Experiments 3 and 4, but 
also allowed subjects to reward (with 1, 2 or 3 stars) or punish (with 1, 2 or 3 black marks) Maxi’s actions. Contra 
Piaget, 6-year-olds rewarded or punished actions based on intentions rather than the actual truth of their 
utterances. However, crucially for our purposes, even subjects who rewarded Maxi for his good intentions (trying 
to help his sister find the chocolate) nonetheless said he was lying (since his statement was not true). 
114 Children may not make this distinction until about age 8 or 9. This suggests that more than the concept of 
mental representation (which children acquire around 6 ½ years of age, as demonstrated by their ability to pass a 
two task battery of both the false and true belief tasks; see Chapter 2, Fabricius et al 2010, Hedger & Fabricius 
2011) is required to fully grasp this difference. 
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no difference between what adults would call genuine lying and making an honest mistake 
which results in a falsehood. As research by Piaget, Wimmer, Gruber and Perner demonstrates, 
children call any falsehood a lie until around age 8, regardless of the speaker’s intentions. This 
shows an important difference between the adult concept of knowledge and the concept of 
knowledge which is made use of in the PAR rules. These are ultimately two different concepts. 
Of course, I grant that one could always resist this line of reasoning and argue that 
children in the PAR stage and adults share the same concepts KNOW, SEE, etc.; but that 
children simply understand less about them than adults do. However, I think it’s a plausible 
position that adults and children in the PAR stage have distinct concepts. First, the types of 
errors that these children make are systematic. They are not due to any particular details of any 
one developmental psychology task, for instance, but occur across different contexts in a 
predictable manner. Second, the errors stem from a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
nature of mental states. Third, the sorts of mistakes these children make are quite surprising 
and stupefying from the adult point of view. Fourth, if the mistakes were due to some 
incomplete understanding, then education ought to help PAR children make fewer errors; but 
in actuality, giving them models to imitate, giving them feedback on earlier trials, etc. does not 
significantly improve their performance on these tasks. Fifth, the behavior of children and their 
performance on tasks undergoes perspicuous distinct stages of development, which suggests a 
fundamental shift rather than a completion of earlier incomplete understanding. For instance, 
children in the RR stage pass true belief tasks, children in the PAR stage fail them, and children 
in the BR stage pass them. Lastly, concepts are the constituents of thoughts (to have the 
concept CAT is to be able to think thoughts of which CAT is a part), and one way to explain the 
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failure of children in the PAR stage is that they are unable to have thoughts which include 
representational mental states (where “representational” simply means roughly something in 
the mind which stands for things in the world). For these reasons, I find it plausible to think that 
children and adults have distinct mental state concepts. I also think that a theory-theory of 
mental state concepts is not as implausible as many philosophers have contended, which I 
argue in the following section.  
3.3 The Child’s Concept of Knowledge and Theories of Concepts 
 One way to classify among theories of concepts (which will be familiar to those who 
have read Fodor) is by separating the theories which count conceptual role as constitutive from 
those that do not. In other words, are concepts partly individuated by the role they play in 
larger cognition? Should things such as inferential role and abilities to sort things which fall 
under the concept from those that do not be considered part of the content of concepts? 
Theories such as Fodor’s (1998, 2004) Concept Atomism, where what is constitutive of the basic 
concepts is completely divorced from their role in cognition or their relations to other concepts, 
or Edwards’s (2009, 2010, 2011) Concept Referentialism, where the content of a concept is 
exhausted by its referent, will answer these questions in the negative. A theory-theory of 
concepts, such as the one advocated here for the concept KNOW during the PAR stage of 
cognitive development, says that a concept is partly individuated by the role it plays in a larger 
theory, and hence this will be one of the many theories of concepts which are on the opposite 
side of the fence from Fodor. 
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 Of course, as Edwards (2010) points out, even if conceptual role is not part of the 
content of a concept, unless something goes terribly wrong conceptual role should nonetheless 
be “in sync” (as he puts it) with its content. Even if the content of CAT is simply that it refers to 
cats, normally possession of the ability to sort cats from non-cats will be a reliable indicator of 
possession of the concept CAT; those who think about cats will infer that they are animals and 
typically chase mice; and so on.115 The critical test for deciding which theory of concepts is 
correct, then, is whether content can be in principle divorced from conceptual role. Fodor 
(1998, 2004, 2008) argues that it is certainly possible that one could possess e.g. the concept 
CAT and yet fail to recognize cats, fail to be able to sort cats from non-cats, fail to infer anything 
about cats, and so on. In order to possess the concept CAT, the only ability required is the 
ability to think about cats. For the case of CAT, I’m inclined to agree with Fodor, that even 
though the hypothetical situation he presents is a practical impossibility, the content of the 
concept CAT is logically distinct from the conceptual role of CAT. 
However, I find the case of KNOW presented here (and indeed, all mental state 
concepts acquired during cognitive development) to be importantly different from the case of 
CAT. In particular, the PAR child’s concept KNOW is not separable from the inferential rules 
which she uses to recognize cases of knowledge. These rules, and thus conceptual role, are in 
fact what constitutes the concept of KNOW for 4- and 5-year-olds, as shown from our definition 
above. The fact that KNOWPAR does not involve mental representation at all, the fact that I take 
                                                           
115 Edwards’s (2010) example of “talking on the phone,” and the language of heterogeneous causal processes 
“implementing,” “realizing,” or “instantiating” the reference relation which he takes to be constitutive of concepts 
(p. 101), readily brings to mind an analogy with functionalism in the philosophy of mind. His real move is to place 
the individuation of concepts at a higher level of abstraction in a certain sense. 
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mental representation to be a crucial component of the adult concept of KNOW, and the fact 
that the two concepts are thus made incommensurable, make KNOW an example of the sort of 
conceptual change envisaged by Susan Carey (1985, 2010).116 The fact that, according to the 
present view, the conceptual role of KNOWPAR is constitutive of the concept, opens up the view 
to Fodor’s criticisms. In the next section, we shall see whether or not we can answer one of 
those criticisms, viz. the challenge of shareability.  
4. The Shareability Objection 
Shareability is the term I shall use (following Edwards, 2010; see note 5 above) for one 
of Fodor’s three constraints on a theory of concepts.117 The basic idea (see e.g. Edwards, 2010, 
p. 95; Fodor, 1998, pp. 28-34) is that in order for intentional psychological generalizations to be 
true, it is necessary that different people think the same thoughts on occasion. A fortiori, 
people must be capable in principle of thinking the same thoughts, and hence the constituents 
of those thoughts, i.e. concepts, must be capable of being tokened by different people on 
different occasions. In a word, concepts must be shared. Furthermore, surely anyone who takes 
the science of psychology at all seriously is committed to there being true generalizations about 
our intentional states. Even more basically, it would seem intuitively obvious that in order to 
communicate with each other or understand what others have written, etc. we must share a 
                                                           
116 Is ‘incommensurable’ too strong? Use of this term in the concept literature of course refers to Kuhn’s (1962) 
usage, and its use in Philosophy of Science is similarly contentious. I’d probably be willing to trade 
‘incommensurable’ for a weaker term, but it’s certainly true that children and adults do a lot of talking past each 
other, and it takes a great deal of understanding of ToM development to even begin to understand what children 
at this stage mean by “know.” I’m not sure I completely grasp it even now, keeping my definition in mind and 
maintaining extensive effort. Like Descartes at the end of the First Meditation, I find myself slipping back to my old 
opinions. For these reasons as well as the common usage of the term in this context, I’m willing to risk hyperbole in 
order to emphasize the vast differences between the child’s mental state concepts and our own. 
117 At least, 3 by Edwards’s (2010) count (p. 95); there are 5 constraints by Fodor’s (1998) count (p. 34). 
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large number of concepts. When I visit San Francisco for the first time and ask about a good 
restaurant, it must be assumed that whomever I am asking means the same thing by 
“restaurant,” “food,” etc. that I do, and that requires that we are both tokening concepts of the 
same type FOOD, RESTAURANT, and so on.118 
Of course, PAR theorists and adults do not share the concept KNOW, because this word 
maps onto different concepts for the child than it maps onto for the adult. At this point, a 
concern naturally arises: How are adults and children able to communicate? In particular, how 
are they able to communicate about knowledge? Carey (1992)’s answer to this is, I think, spot 
on. She says (p. 99; cf. Carey, 2010, p. 377 ff.): 
Incommensurability does not require complete lack of communication. After all, the 
early oxygen theorists argued with phlogiston theorists, who were often their colleagues 
or teachers. Locally incommensurable languages can share many terms that have the 
same meaning in both languages. This common ground can be used to fix referents for 
particular uses of non-shared terms, e.g. a use of “dephlogistonated air” to refer to 
oxygen enriched air. With much common knowledge the two sides can have genuine 
disagreements about the nature of dephligistonated air. Anyway, it is an empirical 
question just how well adults understand preschool children [and vice versa]. 
                                                           
118 Some argue that this shows not that the concepts we token must be of the exact same type, but only that the 
content of those types must overlap sufficiently to facilitate communication and intentional generalizations. 
Setting aside the problem of giving some analysis of whatever sufficient similarity amounts to, there remains Fodor 
(1998)’s extended argument that these solutions to the problem won’t work (pp. 30-34). I will ignore this idea for 
the remainder of this chapter, mostly because my proposed solution need not make any such appeal.  
This particular example may bring about worries for those who think propositions involving matters of taste are 
relative, since it would seem to follow from this view that different speakers might mean different things by ‘good 
food.’ Personally, I am not at all sympathetic to this (or any other) kind of relativism, although I’m not prepared to 
argue my point here. If you do have this concern, feel free to substitute the example of asking for a restaurant that 
serves seafood.  
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So how can adults teach children about the concept KNOW? Perhaps the fact that the adult and 
the child share enough other concepts, combined with the fact that they share the word 
‘know,’ allows children to use that word as a kind of placeholder and “bootstrap” the adult 
concept (Carey, 2010). However, as Carey urges above, how well adults and children 
communicate about knowledge is an empirical question. Numerous theory of mind 
experiments in the developmental literature suggest that there may be a lot more talking past 
each other than adults typically assume. What’s more, my hypothesis is that adults don’t teach 
children a darned thing about the concept KNOW. More on this below. For now, I take the 
initial worry to be answered. 
Another problem arises at this point, however. Namely, how is it that one person’s 
mental state concept is the same as another’s, even at the same stage of cognitive 
development? After all, different people know and understand different things. People must 
share concepts, but it seems obvious that people exhibit epistemological variations. After all 
(the criticism goes), people can believe almost anything, no matter how crazy. If mental state 
concepts are partly individuated by the theories in which they take part, wouldn’t it be likely 
that each person’s theory has some slight differences with each other person’s? If so, then it 
would seem to follow from the theory-theory view that each person’s concept KNOW is 
different. The familiar problems of holism begin to emerge at this point (Fodor & Lepore 1992, 
2002).119 
                                                           
119 I recently saw a talk by John Hawthorne (at the retirement event for José Benardete, Syracuse University, 13 
December 2011) in which he (implicitly) argued that these problems are not escaped by meaning atomists. If 
physicalism is true, then semantic meaning supervenes on some physical base. That physical base can change 
across dimensions such as time and space. Semantic meaning must therefore change over time and space. 
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To begin our search for a solution to this problem, we need to reconsider the history of 
science analogy that psychologists have used as a motivation for the theory-theory of concepts 
(Carey, 1985, 1992, 2010; Gopnik, 1988). Although supporters of this view have undoubtedly 
done important work, in general I am not a fan of this model, for two main reasons: First, an 
analogy is only helpful when it allows us insight into a phenomenon we don’t understand (such 
as the mind) by comparing it to something that we have a better grasp of (such as the digital 
computer). In this particular case, we don’t yet have a good enough grasp of philosophy of 
science for it to shed any light on concept acquisition. There is no consensus on an analysis of 
how theories work in science, or how transitions between dominant theories take place. It 
seems to me that we are simply trading one mystery for another when we make an analogy 
between the acquisition of concepts in childhood and the history of science.120 
Second, and more to the point for present purposes, this analogy may have caused 
developmental researchers to ignore some important differences between the progression of 
science and concept acquisition. For instance, in science there are typically leaps made by some 
genius such as Newton, Einstein, Darwin or Turing. They come up with some new, innovative, 
and important ideas, and then have the job of explaining this to the rest of the science 
                                                           
(Memory fails me, but I think that there’s a Dante quote about the language subtly changing in the villages across 
Italy, so that each person can understand someone in the nearest village, but not a person from a village further 
along the trail.) Thus, even if atomism can answer how someone else in the same room can share concepts, it 
leaves unanswered the problem of how those same concepts remain constant over time. This seems to be a 
serious concern, but one which we don’t have time to consider further here. My hunch is that Fodor had more 
credence in concept atomism (not to mention irreducibility of the sciences) than he did in physicalism (this much is 
suggested by remarks in Fodor & Lepore 2002, p. 10 e.g.). Sadly, we can no longer ask him if my hunch is correct. 
120 Alison Gopnik (1988) is sensitive to this, but for some reason which I don’t fully grasp finds it a virtue of the 
theory rather than a vice (p. 209). Fodor (1998) clearly agrees with me here; he notes (with his characteristic 
acerbic wit), that “if you find the idea that a scientific theory-change is a paradigm shift less than fully perspicuous, 
you will also be uncertain what exactly it is that the ontogenetic analogy asserts about stages of conceptual 
development” (p. 113). 
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community. The general population, if they’re fortunate, also learn about the theory in time. 
(Maybe I’m less intelligent than the average Joe, but I still have difficulty fully grasping 
Einstein’s relativity theory, even after reading a number of explanations aimed at laymen.) 
On the other hand, folk psychological theories—including the ones held at early stages 
of cognitive development—are not like this at all. They are not the product of an original insight 
of some genius, but are instead found everywhere. A theory of mind seems to be a universal 
human phenomenon (with the possible exception of some people with autism spectrum 
disorder—see e.g. Baron-Cohen 1995). Furthermore, they don’t seem to be the kind of things 
that are learned. RR and PAR theories are thought to be wildly false by adults, so there is no 
reason that they would be teaching these theories to their children. Also, a meta-analysis of 
178 theory of mind studies (Wellman, Cross, and Watson 2001) found that neither education 
nor country of origin can improve 3-year-olds’ performance on the false belief task to higher 
than chance. Thus, culture and upbringing are not relevant factors in a child’s performance on 
theory of mind tasks.  
Also, it has been widely noted that attempts to teach children at an earlier stage of 
cognitive development has absolutely no effect on their ability to pass ToM tasks. Flavell et al 
(1995) found that extensive pre-training periods concerning what it means to think about 
something did not improve the performance of 5-year-old subjects on tasks where they were 
asked to determine which of a choice of objects they were thinking about a minute ago. For 
instance, in one study (Study 11) the five-year-olds were seated at a table and asked which of 
two crayons on the table is the longer one. They then immediately moved to a chair on the 
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opposite side of the table, and were asked which objects they were thinking about while seated 
in the first chair—the two crayons, a plastic doll which was hidden from view in an envelope 
while the child was seated in the first seat, or the experimenter’s eyeglasses. Although an adult 
experimenter participated along with the subjects and modeled correct answers to the 
questions, only 19% of the 5-year-olds correctly chose the crayons and not the irrelevant 
objects (one of which was completely hidden from view until the questioning). A pre-training 
period, involving using a flashlight as a metaphor, did not significantly improve overall 
performance (Study 12), and in fact in some cases the performance was actually worse. 
Johnson & Wellman (1982) asked children ages 3 to 14 whether the brain was used in various 
mental activities, including remembering, seeing, knowing the alphabet, and many others. A 
unit on the brain included in the 5th grade science curriculum had absolutely no effect on the 
results (as reported in Carey, 1985, pp. 48-51).121 Further examples abound in the literature. 
This sort of evidence leads to the hypothesis which I wish to propose here, which would 
also serve as a solution to the shareability problem. The answer to the problem is that concepts 
are shared because these theories are innate. Innateness may be difficult to specify, but for our 
purposes we may perhaps say that a cognitive mechanism is innate just in case it is the result of 
some biological phenotype. The key point is to exclude those mechanisms which are learned 
and those which are acquired by some sort of accident (such as getting hit on the head by a 
brick).122 Innate cognitive mechanisms will ultimately have an evolutionary explanation for their 
                                                           
121 This phenomena is not limited to the understanding of mental concepts; Carey (2010, pp. 436-445) reports that 
extensive math and science education, from elementary to high school, has not helped a vast number of people 
understand math and science concepts such as decimals, fractions, weight, and mass. 
122 See Fodor (2008) pp. 131-132 for an amusing list of possible processes which might be called concept 
acquisition. A successful analysis of ‘innate’ would rule out all of these processes except for the one which Fodor 
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existence, rather than any learning process or incidental circumstances. The argument for 
nativism concerning mental state theories is that (1) these theories (RR, PAR, and BR) are 
universally found among all human beings regardless of their culture, upbringing or education, 
(2) these theories do not appear to be the result of any learning process, and (3) the sole major 
factor in the acquisition of these theories seems to be the age of the subject (e.g. Wellman et 
al, 2001). Admittedly, we currently lack any sort of model in cognitive science for understanding 
what sort of mental mechanism an innate theory would be like,123 but the empirical evidence 
points towards nativism as the best explanation of the nature and existence of these theories, 
and that also happens to provide a solution to the shareability worry. 
Interestingly, this hypothesis was initially put forward by no less than Jerry Fodor 
himself, in an overlooked but ingenious argument in the “Creation Myth” epilogue to 
Psychosemantics way back in 1987.  There he argues that what makes the higher intelligence of 
humans possible is the ability to accumulate and transmit information through language “(and 
other cultural artifacts)” (p. 130). “Ideally,” he says, “each individual should be the beneficiary 
                                                           
(1975) initially endorsed for all concepts. Importantly, however, I wish to argue only for nativism concerning 
mental state concepts such as KNOW. 
Of course, carefully distinguishing innate from acquired characteristics in psychology is notoriously difficult (see 
Griffiths, 2009, for discussion). Chomsky’s account of language has been highly influential to contemporary 
discussions of nativism in psychology and the philosophy of psychology. His “poverty of the stimulus argument” is 
roughly that the small amount of exposure and feedback available to young children concerning grammaticality of 
language strings is insufficient to explain the vast knowledge of grammar exhibited by their linguistic behavior, 
including frequent production of novel grammatical strings (Chomsky, 1959). Here the relevant contrast seems to 
be between knowledge which is innate and knowledge which is the result of a cognitive learning process (cf. Fodor, 
1975). This is admittedly a difficult issue which I can’t help much with here, but I hope my simple definition (along 
with pretheoretic intuitions) suffice to motivate the view I propose. (Personally, I am waiting for a genius to come 
along and explain it to the rest of us. In the meantime please excuse the vagueness of my proposed definition.) 
123 Core cognition (Carey 2010) and modularity (Fodor 1983) seem to come close, but will have to be modified. 
(Ultimately I think Chomsky’s 1965 theory of universal grammar comes closest; more on that below.) Also, 
although this is extremely speculative, if some theories are indeed innate, perhaps that could that be the start of 
an answer to Fodor’s (2000) dilemma about where abduction comes from. 
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of the learned adaptations of all of its conspecifics, cohorts, and predecessors alike” (p. 129). 
Since it’s not possible for this transmission of information to occur through heritable traits, then 
it’s done through language and other cultural processes—the next best thing. However, this 
process presupposes a culture, and a culture in turn “presupposes a social animal, one that is 
capable of integrating its own behavior with the behavior of others of its kind… You do not 
want to spend your life reinventing the wheel. But neither do you want to have to spend it 
learning enough about your neighbor’s psychology to permit you to exploit his expertise” (p. 
131). The ability to be social with creatures as cognitively complex as human beings requires a 
folk psychological theory of mind. I can’t meet you at your office without making some 
assumptions about your beliefs and desires and how they lead to behaviors such as going to 
such-and-such location at such-and-such time.124 
A further constraint on what we can learn is the relative brevity of the human lifespan. 
Fodor explains that this process of coming to understand “must be achieved rapidly compared 
to the length of an individual life. There is … no use designing a social organism with a long 
prematurity if most of its apprentice years have to be spent learning the commonsense 
psychology of its species” (p. 132). And another problem is that the intelligence of human 
beings makes the behaviors of which they are capable very complex and complicated, so that a 
                                                           
124 This is similar to the Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis of Tomasello and colleagues (Herrmann et al 2007, 
Tomasello 2009), that humans’ evolved social-cooperative and ToM skills, which enable transmission of knowledge 
through culture,  are the basis of cognitive skills which appear far superior to those of any other species. This 
hypothesis also has some empirical support. To take one example, an extensive study (Herrmann et al 2007) found 
that 105 2 ½ -year-olds did not perform significantly better than 106 chimpanzees on tasks testing understanding 
of space, quantity and causality (both groups performed slightly better than 32 orangutans in a total of 78 trials), 
although they performed about twice as well as chimps and orangutans on tasks testing social learning, 
communication and theory of mind. 
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simple mechanical solution (Fodor gives the example of Stickleback mating procedures, pp. 
131-132) will not work. What is needed is a fairly robust theory. Fodor concludes (bold added 
for emphasis): 
Here is what I would have done if I had been faced with this problem in designing Homo 
sapiens. I would have made knowledge of commonsense Homo sapiens psychology 
innate; that way nobody would have to spend time learning it. (p. 132) 
That is Fodor (1987)’s a priori argument that a folk psychological theory of mind is innate. 
 Fodor (1987) also gives an empirical argument to the best explanation for the nativism 
of theory of mind not unlike my own, above. He urges that, “The empirical evidence that God 
did it the way I would have isn’t, in fact, unimpressive” (p. 132), and he provides three reasons 
in support of his abduction. First is the same universality I noted above (see the epigram to this 
article for the quote). Second is the lack of a rival hypothesis (p. 133). This is perhaps akin to my 
point that these theories don’t appear to be learned. The third point must be amended 
somewhat. Fodor hypothesized that we would find demonstrations of children’s understanding 
of the mind at earlier and earlier ages once experimental techniques improved. This is certainly 
understandable given the progression of developmental psychology in 1987. As explained 
earlier, that was typically the flavor of the “Piaget bashing” experiments which were taking 
place during the 1970’s and 1980’s. However, time has not come to prove Fodor’s point in the 
case of theory of mind development. In fact, the state of the art—the PAR hypothesis of 
Fabricius and colleagues—has shown that theory of mind development is more protracted than 
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previously thought, not less so.125 Even so, given the age factor, the succession of these 
cognitive stages may simply be a result of cognitive mechanisms (and theories) “coming 
online.” That is, they may simply be due to maturity of the neurological system coupled with 
some necessary social interaction. 
Lastly, while I’m in a speculative mood, here’s another radical hypothesis which has 
always seemed plausible to me: KNOW is an innate, primitive concept that comes online along 
with the BR theory. That’s why adults have such strong intuitions about when someone knows, 
but 2500 years of philosophy hasn’t been able to come up with a good analysis of what 
knowledge is.126 There is a striking analogy here with intuitions concerning the grammaticality 
of strings of language and Chomsky’s theory of universal grammar (Chomsky 1965). Native 
speakers are very good at determining which strings are grammatical and which are not, but 
very bad at explaining what makes a given string ungrammatical. Similarly, adults are largely in 
agreement about what cases constitute knowledge and which do not, but are very poor at 
explaining why. Furthermore, these rules of grammar which Chomsky and other linguists argue 
are innate, are similar in complexity to what a theory of knowledge might be like. So perhaps 
there is a precedent for this sort of hypothesis in cognitive science after all. 
 
                                                           
125 Some infant researchers currently claim otherwise, but see Hedger and Fabricius (2011) for a critical review. 
126 The once much discussed finding that Asians don’t share Gettier intuitions about knowledge (Weinberg et al 
2001) would, of course, throw a monkey wrench into this hypothesis, if it were genuine. Luckily for me, this initial 
study doesn’t appear replicable (Nagel 2012, Seyedsayamdost 2015).  
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
Further Directions: 
The next phase of perceptual access reasoning research 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 This monograph essentially represents the first decade of an ongoing research program 
in the Philosophy of Psychology. This chapter includes an outline of projects for further 
development of the Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR) theory (Section 2) and useful ways to 
apply the theory to solve more problems in philosophy of mind (Section 3). In Section 4 I 
provide a more detailed outline for a future project exploring the phenomenal experience of 
young children who are using PAR, entitled What is it like to be a 5-year-old? 
2. PAR Theory Development 
 As I hope to have demonstrated in this monograph, the PAR hypothesis has been 
developed into an extensive theory which makes better explanations of the data on belief and 
perception than the other, currently more more popular, theories. It also makes some 
interesting predictions, many of which have been demonstrated empirically, but many more of 
which still need to be tested. Brief outlines of more specific projects in this area follow. 
2. 1 Desire and other mental states from PAR perspective 
 In Chapter 2 I gave an account of belief and how this concept develops in children, 
based upon the framework of the PAR hypothesis. In Chapter 3 I demonstrated that the data 
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gathered on children’s understanding of perception and its development, influenced by the 
Flavell lab’s four levels model and appearance/reality distinction, is consistent with the PAR 
hypothesis. Belief and perception have always been of central importance to philosophers, and 
of course are prominently featured in the two PAR rules (see Chapter 2). One issue that needs 
further work is exactly what the “knows” in the PAR rules really consists of. It cannot be full-
fledged belief, since this concept is not acquired until the BR stage. (See Chapter 5 and Section 
3.1 below for more on this topic.) The no belief task discussed in Chapter 2 could use 
replication, and there may be other tasks involving belief that could strengthen the case for the 
PAR hypothesis as well. It would also be a good future project to design one or more perception 
tasks in order to provide some clarity on children’s understanding of perception and how it 
develops as well (see also Section 2.6, below). 
Of course, mental phenomena involve much more than believing and perceiving. 
Another key mental state for Theory of Mind (ToM) development is desire. ToM as discussed by 
psychologists is basically what philosophers have called folk psychology (see e.g. Churchland 
1981, Davidson 1963, Dennett 1981, Fodor 1987, Horgan & Woodward 1985, Lewis 1972, 
Ramsey, Stich & Garon 1990). Philosophers have noted that a person’s beliefs and desires are 
central, perhaps sufficient, to explain a person’s behavior, using something like Aristotle’s 
practical syllogism (Nichomacean Ethics): Joe wants a beer (desire), thinks that there is some in 
the refrigerator (belief), and this explains why he is opening said refrigerator (action). Thus, a 
better understanding of children’s understanding of desire and its development from the point 
of view of the PAR theory is needed. There is already some evidence for an early non-
representational concept of desire, something like a simple, behavioral environmental drive 
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towards an object (Wellman & Woolley 1990). It seems likely that there will be a shift to a 
concept of representational desire around age 6 when children hit the Belief Reasoning (BR) 
stage, to accompany the acquisition of representational concepts of belief (Chapter 2) and 
Perception (Chapter 3). 
Desire presents a unique challenge when designing tasks to test between the use of a 
representational concept of desire and non-representational concept of a drive towards an 
object. Both belief and perception can fail to accurately represent the world, and these non-
veridical possibilities are exploited in the tasks testing them. For instance, in the (standard) 
false belief task the question is whether children understand that Maxi has a non-veridical 
representation of the location of the chocolate (see Chapter 2), and in the appearance/reality 
task the question is whether children understand that someone can have a non-veridical 
representation of a sponge (see Chapter 3). The key to these tasks and their variations is that 
without a concept of representational mental states, non-veridical mental states do not make 
sense.  
However, when it comes to desire, people can desire things that the world does not 
currently contain. This has to do with what Anscombe (1957) called direction of fit—whereas 
beliefs and perceptions need to be adjusted so that they align correctly with the world in order 
to be accurate, desires are satisfied when the world is altered to fit the representation. My 
desire for a Mercedes is satisfied when I am able to change the world so that my name is on the 
title of one. I suppose a non-veridical desire would be a desire that the subject does not 
genuinely have, and so desire is much more difficult to satisfactorily demonstrate 
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experimentally.127 Whereas beliefs are descriptive representations of how the world is, desires 
are prescriptive representations of how the world ought to be. 
Researchers have often thought of ToM task demands in terms of the ability to hold two 
conflicting mental states in the mind at once rather than in terms of mental representation, and 
so Repacholi and Gopnik (1997) tested whether children would offer an adult broccoli instead 
of crackers when that adult displayed a preference for them, even though the subject herself 
preferred the crackers. Although success on this task indeed demonstrates some understanding 
of desire, it does not seem to distinguish representational desire from non-representational 
desire. This is analogous to Level 1 understanding of perception in Flavell’s model discussed in 
Chapter 3. Passing this task only involves understanding that people can have desires that are 
different from one’s own (i.e. moving past egocentrism in Piagetian terms), but each of these 
desires might simply be behavioral drives for objects in the immediate environment. A new 
type of task is required to test for a PAR stage of desire.  
Perhaps one way would be to test whether a child subject understands that a desire 
persists through situation change similarly to beliefs; for example that a person who desires X 
will continue to desire X even when it is not present in the immediate environment (i.e. even 
when perceptual access is lacking), and will attempt to alter the world to make X present if it is 
within the person’s ability to do so. For instance, tell the child that Maxi desires chocolate when 
                                                           
127 Of course, this gloss of “a desire that the subject does not genuinely have” would need a lot more explication, 
and can’t be exactly right. There is a lot of literature in psychology e.g. concerning subconscious desires that 
subjects are not aware of, and so on. The main point I am trying to make here is that the veridical/ non-veridical 
distinction which belief tasks use to test subjects doesn’t map neatly onto desires. However, I don’t want to be too 
quick and say there is no such distinction for desire, since people have come up with unexpected similar 
distinctions for other sorts of non-descriptive content, such as David Kaplan has done for expressives. 
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both crackers and chocolate are present, and have Mom put the chocolate away while Maxi is 
outside playing. When Maxi returns, the chocolate is now occluded but he retains perceptual 
access to the crackers. Have Maxi walk toward the crackers, and the test question might be, 
“What does Maxi want? Does he want the chocolate? Or does he want the crackers?” At any 
rate, further work needs to be done in order to adequately test for a PAR stage of desire. 
Lastly, although desire would be the logical next mental state to study from the PAR 
perspective given its centrality in folk psychological prediction and interpretation, there are of 
course many other types of mental states—imagining, considering, wondering, understanding, 
daydreaming, boredom, confusion, irritation, obsession etc.—and some of these may be 
interesting to explore through the lens of the PAR hypothesis. 
2.2 Testing adults’ eye gaze on true and false belief tasks 
 The first major challenge to what I call the Traditional View of ToM development in 
children, viz. that children progress directly from RR to BR at about the age of four (see e.g. 
Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Perner, 1988, 1991; Saxe, Carey, & Kanwisher, 2004; Wellman et al, 
2001; see Chapter 2 above for discussion), was the finding that 3-year-olds appear to implicitly 
pass the standard, 2-location false belief task by showing unconscious anticipatory looking to 
the correct location (Clements & Perner, 1994; Garnham & Perner, 2001; Garnham & Ruffman, 
2001; Ruffman, Garnham, Import, & Connelly, 2001).  
 However, as explained in Chapter 2 above, the standard 2-location false belief task is 
unable to differentiate between the use of BR or PAR. In other words, subjects may of course 
pass by reasoning that Maxi retains a mental state of belief representing the location of where 
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he left the chocolate—which persists while he is outside regardless of what happens in the 
room during his absence and regardless of the true location of the chocolate. However, they 
may also pass by using the PAR rules, and reasoning that when Maxi returns he is in a new 
situation, and in this new situation Maxi does not have perceptual access to the chocolate. 
Hence, Maxi doesn’t see the chocolate, therefore doesn’t know where the chocolate is, and will 
get it wrong by choosing the location where the chocolate is not currently located.  
The eye gaze studies to date therefore inherit this confound from the classic false belief 
tasks on which they are based (Clements & Perner, 1994; Garnham & Perner, 2001; Garnham & 
Ruffman, 2001; Ruffman, Garnham, Import, & Connelly, 2001), and thus they cannot accurately 
determine whether subjects are using BR or PAR in order to look at the correct location. These 
studies also suggest that there are simultaneous psychological mechanisms active in 3-year-
olds, along the lines of a Dual Systems model such as Kahneman (2011). There appears to be an 
implicit modular mechanism which would explain anticipatory looking to the correct location, 
as well as the explicit use of RR which explains their verbal response of the incorrect location.  
Hedger & Fabricius (2011) conjecture that Rule A is this modular, subconscious 
mechanism. Rule A is a condensed version of, and developmental precursor of, the PAR rules: 
Rule A: 
Seeing → Ge@ng It Right (and Not Seeing → Ge@ng It Wrong) 
Rule A is the result of directly combining the two PAR rules used by preschoolers into a 
mechanism that could be used by nonverbal organisms such as chimps and human infants, and 
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removing the proto-mental concept KNOW from the two PAR rules. Hedger and Fabricius 
(2011) conjecture that Rule A is operative in human infants and chimpanzees, and perhaps 
persists into adulthood.  
More research into the anticipatory looking of children and adults would help to 
disconfirm or point in favor of the Rule A conjecture. However, the confound explained above 
first needs to be removed from the false belief task which studies to date have used. As 
discussed in Chapter 2 above, this can be done by using a two-task battery of a 2-location false 
belief task and a true belief task, as Fabricius et al (2010) demonstrated. Failing both tasks 
demonstrates use of RR, passing the false belief task but failing the true belief task 
demonstrates use of PAR, and passing both tasks demonstrates use of BR (see Chapter 2, 
Fabricius et al 2010, and Hedger & Fabricius 2011 for more details). Adults (and children) could 
be tested for Rule A by using the “eye gaze” methodology developed for children under 4 years 
of age (Clements & Perner, 1994; Garnham & Perner, 2001; Garnham & Ruffman, 2001; 
Ruffman, Garnham, Import, & Connelly, 2001) on both the true and false belief tasks. 
 Additionally, in order to know whether correct anticipatory looking in the false belief 
task indicates attribution of false beliefs or use of Rule A, the methodology needs to include a 
true belief task in which there is some interruption in the agent’s connection to the situation 
that is comparable to what occurs in the false belief task; in other words, a cue for situation 
change. This can be done by simply having the protagonist leave and then return (see Chapter 2 
and Hedger & Fabricius, 2011).  Unfortunately, the previous eye gaze studies have not included 
such true belief tasks. If adults were to show anticipatory looking to the incorrect location on a 
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true belief task despite giving the correct location verbally, then this would be a surprising 
finding that is nonetheless predicted by the Rule A hypothesis of Hedger and Fabricius (2011). 
Giving adult subjects a cognitive load or other working memory task may help prompt the use 
of a modular, implicit mechanism. New studies are therefore needed, and this is another 
project suggested by the present monograph. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 above, if adults were found to continue to use Rule A implicitly 
it could explain a puzzling feature of ToM—that at times we appear able to make judgments 
about the mental states of others quickly, automatically, and effortlessly (Fodor, 1987) while at 
other times the process is difficult and deliberative. There is evidence that BR is effortful and 
difficult for adults (Apperly et al, 2006; Keysar et al, 2003). Lin, Keysar and Epley (2010) found 
that higher working memory capacity can have a positive impact on adult performance in 
theory of mind tasks, while cognitive load impairs this ability. Perhaps this can be explained by 
BR and Rule A being different psychological mechanisms, the former explicit and effortful and 
the latter implicit, automatic and modular.128 
2.3 True belief task for infants 
At this point there is deluge of studies on the false belief task in infants arguing for the 
Nativist view of ToM development, and many of these purport to include a true belief task as a 
control. However, as explained in Chapter 2 above and in Hedger and Fabricius (2011), to date 
these tasks have lacked a suitable cue for situation change that is comparable to those found on 
                                                           
128 I address worries about the existence of both a verbal PAR mechanism (during the second stage of ToM 
development) and a modular Rule A mechanism (evident in infancy but perhaps persisting into adulthood) and 
related concerns in Chapter 2, Section 7, above. 
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false belief tasks. As Hedger and Fabricius (2011) note, the use of rules which predicted that a 
person wouldn’t be able to find an object as soon as it was occluded from view would 
presumably be unadaptive (e.g. it would lead to unsuccessful caching of food and other items 
needed for survival). One would expect such a mechanism not to survive the natural selection 
process.  
However (as discussed in Chapter 5 above), the survival of Rule A can be explained by 
the fact that it does cause successful predictions of behavior in limited situations, such as those 
similar to the 2-location false belief task. In fact, there is some evidence that Rule A (or a similar 
modular mechanism) can be found in chimpanzees (see Hedger & Fabricius, 2011). After all, 
even given an understanding of representational mental states, we can recognize that subjects 
who can’t see an object will very often “get it wrong” and look in the incorrect location, as Rule 
A predicts.129  
The reason for these successful predictions is that subjects compute the rule every time 
the protagonist is in a different situation, but if the protagonist remains in the current situation 
then subjects will not compute Rule A again. For instance, if I hide a Snickers candy bar 
underneath my Spirited Away DVD directly in front of Chantel while she reclines on our couch, 
even a baby using Rule A should not predict that Chantel will “get it wrong” and look in a 
different location, because this protagonist (Chantel in the current example) is still in the same 
                                                           
129 I was reminded of this when I misplaced my cell phone this morning. Even given familiarity with the possible 
locations of the cell phone (viz. various locations in my apartment and my car), and extreme familiarity with the 
habits of the protagonist (since said protagonist was myself), I looked in a frustratingly large number of incorrect 
locations before finally stumbling upon my phone. (I can only hope that unlike Wittgenstein, my philosophical 
method is significantly better than this: “I do philosophy now like an old woman who is always mislaying 
something and having to look for it again; now her spectacles, now her keys,” Wittgenstein, 1969, Section 532). 
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situation even after her perceptual access to the candy bar is broken (i.e. the Snickers is 
occluded from her view by the DVD case). We require an adequate cue for situation change 
(e.g. Chantel leaves the room and comes back) which will trigger the infant (or chimp or adult) 
to compute Rule A again for the current, new situation.  
This of course explains why Rule A causes failure on true belief tasks. However, none of 
the true belief tasks found in the infant studies so far have such a cue (see the review in Hedger 
& Fabricius, 2011, for detailed individual explanations). Therefore, an infant true belief study 
that does contain such a cue is needed in order to test the Rule A hypothesis. Furthermore, a 
review of more recent infant studies is needed in order to demonstrate that such a test has not 
yet been done, and that brings me to the next project. 
2.4 Further development of the argument against Nativism. 
 As we just mentioned at the end of the previous section, one project which would be 
useful is a continuation of the review of infant and chimpanzee studies from Hedger and 
Fabricius (2011) updated to include discussion of the studies done since 2011. Along with a 
review of empirical studies, with individual discussions of the true belief tasks used and (where 
appropriate) explanations of the lack of suitable cues for situation change, there have also been 
a few theoretical papers prompted by the current nativist euphoria130 in developmental 
psychology (see e.g. Carruthers 2013, Southgate 2014). Thus it may be useful to also apply the 
theoretical argument against Nativism from Chapter 2 more specifically to these papers. One 
                                                           
130 Hat tip to Nagel 1974. 
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challenging issue which needs to be addressed is getting clear about what it means for ToM or 
BR to be innate.131 
2.5 Testing the A/R explanation 
 As I explained in Chapter 3, there is also a method we could use to test the explanation I 
give there for the success of PAR subjects on Appearance/ Reality (A/R) identity tasks. In the 
Standard A/R Task, Flavell et al (1983) showed children a sponge which looks like a rock, and 
then allowed them to handle it. After the child is familiarized with the fake rock, it is placed on 
the table. Children are then asked, “When you look at this with your eyes right now, what does 
it look like?” [Appearance Question] and “What is this really, really? Is this really, really a rock 
or really, really a sponge?” [Reality Question] (p. 102). 4- and 5-year-olds tend to get these 
questions correct, by responding to the appearance question with “a rock” and the reality 
question with “a sponge.” 
 In Chapter 3 I presented the hypothesis that children using PAR interpret the 
appearance question not as “How are you visually representing the object?”, because they lack 
the concept of mental representation. Instead they interpret the appearance question as “Do 
you have perceptual access to the object?” Hence this question triggers them to compute the 
                                                           
131 Carefully distinguishing innate from acquired characteristics in psychology is notoriously difficult (see Griffiths, 
2009, for discussion). Chomsky’s account of language has been highly influential to contemporary discussions of 
nativism in psychology and the philosophy of psychology. His “poverty of the stimulus argument” is roughly that 
the small amount of exposure and feedback available to young children concerning grammaticality of language 
strings is insufficient to explain the vast knowledge of grammar exhibited by their linguistic behavior, including 
frequent production of novel grammatical strings (Chomsky, 1959). Here the relevant contrast seems to be 
between knowledge which is innate and knowledge which is the result of a cognitive learning process (cf. Fodor, 
1975).  
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PAR rules. Thus a child using PAR should reason that I’m not touching the sponge right now 
(recall that the appearance test question includes the locution ‘right now’), so I don’t know it’s 
a sponge, and I’ll get it wrong. “Getting it wrong” in this case means thinking that it’s a rock 
when it’s really a sponge, and so the PAR subject should respond to the appearance question 
with “a rock.” As with the False Belief Task and the A/R Property Task, the PAR child gives the 
correct response but means something very different by it than the typical adult does. 
 We could test this hypothesis by giving children a modified A/R identity task with three 
options, similar to the one used by Fabricius and Khalil (2003). First we familiarize the subject 
with a sponge that looks like a rock. We ask them what it looks like, then allow them to touch it, 
and so on. Then we show the child that a doll (Yoshi) rides on the rock-sponge as if it were a 
car, as Fabricius and Khalil (2003) did in their version. Now we are in a position to add a third 
option to the appearance test question: “When you look at this with your eyes right now, what 
does it look like? Does it look like a rock, or look like a sponge, or look like a car?” The present 
hypothesis predicts that 4- and 5-year-olds who pass the standard A/R task should divide their 
answers between “a rock” and “a car” but never answer with “a sponge.” 
 Using PAR, the subject should reason that she isn’t touching the object right now, so she 
doesn’t know (Rule 1), and since she doesn’t know, then she’ll get it wrong (Rule 2). Some 
preliminary testing would help evaluate whether this is a suitable paradigm for a modified A/R 
task which would be adequate for testing my hypotheses concerning children’s understanding 
of perception during the PAR stage, but at any rate this is another future project based upon 
the research program set out in this monograph. 
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3. Philosophical Problems 
 In this monograph I used the PAR hypothesis to shed light on two thorny problems in 
Cognitive Science and philosophy of psychology, viz. theories of concepts (Chapter 6) and what I 
call the Perner-Povinelli Challenge of designing an adequate empirical test for distinguishing 
between the use of reasoning involving genuine understanding of the mental and reasoning 
involving merely behavioral generalizations (Chapter 5). Of course, there are many other 
problems in the philosophy of psychology, and I believe the PAR theory can help us to find 
solutions for many of them. Following are brief descriptions of three of these issues, as well as 
suggestions for helpful applications of the PAR theory. 
3.1 The Williamson view that knowledge is prior to belief 
 The standard view in philosophy is that knowledge is a composite, composed of the 
mental state of belief and other non-mental factors—viz. the truth of the belief, the believer 
having sufficient justification for believing the proposition, and some further conditions in order 
to avoid Gettier (1963)-type counterexamples.132 There is such widespread agreement on this 
matter that few explicit arguments have been made for knowledge being a composite of which 
                                                           
132 The failure of epistemologists in specifying suitable conditions which would avoid Gettier cases is one reason 
Williamson  thinks the standard view is wrong (1995, 2000). 
 
Some may object to the idea that a mental state is partly constituted by external factors such as truth, since in 
Williamson’s view knowledge is purely a mental state (2000, pp. 21-48; see arguments to this effect in e.g.Fricker 
2009, Magnus & Cohen 2003). However, those philosophers who already accept the externalism of Burge (1979) 
and Putnam (1975) shouldn’t find this surprising or worrisome. At any rate, this issue cuts deeper than questions 
about knowledge. 
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belief is a simple part, but there seem to be at least two major reasons for the popularity of this 
account. 
 The first reason is due to the examples philosophers have used to explore the question, 
“What is knowledge?” In Plato’s Meno, for example, Socrates notes that a guide who knows the 
way to Larissa and a guide that merely has a true opinion about the way to Larissa will both be 
equally useful to the traveler, since both should be equally successful in getting her there. Yet 
knowledge is more highly prized than mere true opinion, as both Meno and Socrates note. 
Knowledge intuitively seems better and more valuable than merely correctly guessing for 
instance. The intuition is that both guides believe something true, but that something extra is 
required for someone to know something; the belief must be “tied down” like a Daedalus 
sculpture, and this tying down example suggests that to know is both to have a true belief and 
something else (which Socrates called an account or logos). 
 Another reason is that in discussions of folk psychology philosophers take belief to be 
central (see e.g. Churchland 1981, Davidson 1963, Dennett 1981, Fodor 1987, Horgan & 
Woodward 1985, Lewis 1972, Ramsey, Stich & Garon 1990). As mentioned previously, belief 
and desire are mental states that are the causes of human behavior, and typically if one knows 
what a protagonist believes and what a protagonist desires then one is able to predict and 
explain that protagonist’s behavior. For instance, if I know that Bob wants his Dretske book, and 
believes that his Dretske book is in his office, then I can predict that Bob is going to look for his 
Dretske book in his office (or explain why Bob is currently rummaging through the stacks of 
books piled about his office).  
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What’s more, I can make this same prediction whether Bob knows his book in his office, 
falsely believes his book in his office, or has a “mere” true belief that his book is in his office 
(perhaps because his colleague Kevan is attempting to trick Bob, and believes the Dretske book 
is actually in his mailbox where he moved it yesterday, but unbeknownst to Kevan the secretary 
has noticed the book and returned it to his office). In other words, the generality of belief 
makes it appear that belief is more basic, and knowledge is just a special case of belief where 
some other non-mental factors such as truth and justification are also involved. However, the 
mental state of belief is all that is required to explain human action, and it is the thing actually 
causing the behavior. 
A notable exception to this standard view is Timothy Williamson, who argues that 
knowledge is a simple mental state and is actually more basic than belief (1995, 2000). Part of 
the argument for this is that in some cases, knowing something instead of merely believing 
something can make a causal difference in human action. For instance, other things being 
equal, whether Bob knows his Dretske book is in his office or believes his Dretske in his office 
(even when the belief is true) can make a noticeable difference in how Bob behaves. Taking the 
earlier cases, when Bob knows his book is in his office he is likely to be more persistent in 
searching for it than in the case where he has a true belief because Kevan told him his book is in 
his office.133  
Therefore there is reason to distinguish knowledge from belief in folk psychological 
explanations, because the two cases make a noticeable difference in behavior. Merely 
                                                           
133 This example is of course inspired by Williamson (2000)’s case of the burglar on page 62. 
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mentioning Bob’s belief that his Dretske book is in his office fails to sufficiently explain why Bob 
spends hours diligently going through all of his bookshelves, and even carefully going through 
the stacks of books piled about on his desk and on the floor, going through boxes etc. that Bob 
does when he knows his book is somewhere in that darn office. Thus knowledge is sometimes 
the appropriate explanans in folk psychological reasoning, and according to Williamson 
knowledge is also more basic than belief. The central and more common cases are the ones 
where someone knows something and that explains their behavior; cases of false belief and 
lucky guesses are parasitic upon the concept of knowledge (Nagel, 2013; Williamson, 2000).  
Although not every belief is a case of knowledge, and hence knowledge remains a 
subset of belief on Williamsons’s view as well, knowing is constitutively prior to believing and so 
the subset determines the nature of the larger set. Understanding believing requires 
understanding knowing in the sense that BELIEF is the derivative concept. Believing falsely is a 
kind of “botched knowing” (Williamson, 2000, p. 47) where knowledge was the aim but 
something went awry, and believing truly is a “diluted version of knowing” (Nagel, 2013, p. 285) 
where one lacks the credence of ordinary knowledge.134 In folk psychological explanations, 
“believing p is, roughly, treating p as if one knew p, [so that] knowing is in that sense central to 
                                                           
134 Another example of this is that knowledge is factive, meaning that Bob cannot know that his Dretske book is in 
his office unless it is true that his Dretske book is in his office. There are other factive verbs/ mental states, such as 
e.g. forgetting, remembering, acknowledging, regretting and so on, but Williamson (2000) notes that “knowing is 
important as the most general factive stative attitude” (p. 40), since these other factive states require knowledge 
in the first place. For instance, one can’t remember X unless one knows X, etc. Here again, knowledge looks to be 
the primary, most basic concept among factives (Williamson 2000, pp. 33-41).  
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believing” (Williamson, 2000, p. 47). In all of these cases, one needs to understand knowledge 
in order to understand these variations upon that concept.135 
If this picture is correct, and in particular if Williamson is right that understanding 
knowledge is necessary for understanding belief, then one would expect that the concept 
KNOW would develop before the concept BELIEVE.136 In fact, Williamson takes this to be the 
case, and considers this another argument in favor his view: “A further ground for suspicion of 
analyses of the concept knows in terms of the concept believes is that they seem to imply that 
the latter concept is acquired before the former. Data on child development suggest, if 
anything, the reverse order (see Perner, 1991, pp. 145-203 for discussion of the relevant work)” 
(p. 33, footnote 7). Other philosophers have taken a more detailed look at the developmental 
data, but disagree on the interpretation. Nagel (2013) argues that the data do suggest that the 
concept of knowledge is acquired first, and so support Williamson’s view, but Rose (2015) 
essentially argues that the data are inconclusive because results are conflicting. The PAR 
hypothesis has a good track record for making sense of apparently conflicting data in theory of 
mind development (see Chapters 2 and 3), so the theory may also prove useful in deciding this 
issue, and that is another future project I would like to do. 
The PAR theory does in fact suggest that the concept KNOW is acquired before the 
concept BELIEVE, since the PAR stage makes use of the former but the latter is not acquired 
                                                           
135 Williamson (2000) has other arguments for the primacy of knowledge, having to do with linguistic norms and 
knowledge’s role in the speech act of assertion e.g., but I hope the foregoing discussion is sufficient for 
understanding his view. I focus on folk psychological explanations here as most relevant to theory of mind in 
developmental psychology. See McGlynn (2014) for a critical discussion of Williamson’s view. 
136 If the concepts KNOW and BELIEVE are acquired at the same time, then that would also be consistent with 
Williamson’s view as far as I can tell. 
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until the BR stage of development. However, one difficulty with this preliminary analysis is that 
although the PAR rules do reference whether a protagonist knows or doesn’t know, this is a 
sort of proto-concept which differs from the full-fledged adult concept since children do not yet 
understand mental representation in the PAR stage. As discussed in Chapter 6, knowing for 
children in the PAR stage is a direct, unmediated connection to correct or successful behavior 
(and ignorance is a similar direct cause of unsuccessful behavior). Thus there is no such thing as 
guessing correctly but not knowing for the PAR child. Both guides to Larissa know according to 
the child using PAR, since both “get it right” by arriving in the correct location.  
Although not the same conception of knowledge that adults and older children acquire 
later in the BR stage, the fact that children are using the word ‘know’ before they have acquired 
the concept BELIEF, and using (an admittedly simplified version of) the concept of knowledge in 
their reasoning during the PAR stage prior to acquiring BELIEVE, may nonetheless provide some 
support for Williamson’s view. If KNOW was a compositional concept with BELIEVE as one of its 
parts, then it wouldn’t be possible to have the concept KNOW before one had the concept 
BELIEVE, just as one couldn’t have the concept BACHELOR before one had acquired the concept 
UNMARRIED. Arguably, the view of ToM development I advocate suggests that children at least 
begin to acquire the concept KNOW prior to the concept BELIEVE. 
Williamson makes an intriguing comment when he notes that “children understand 
ignorance before they understand error” (p. 33, footnote 7), since use of the PAR rules involves 
attributing ignorance to the protagonist in the false belief task due to their lack of perceptual 
access. It might be argued that children master the concept of ignorance before they acquire 
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BELIEVE, since it doesn’t depend as much on the idea of mental representation as KNOW and 
BELIEVE. What’s more, as discussed in Chapter 6 children in the PAR stage also call a case of 
mistakenly telling a falsehood an act of lying (for instance, when accurately reporting the 
incorrect information to someone else because the protagonist was misinformed). This may 
show that children at the PAR stage already have some sensitivity to what Williamson (2000) 
calls the knowledge norm of assertion. These children seem to understand that a person should 
not assert what she does not know. At the very least, the developmental evidence is consistent 
with Williamson’s view since children clearly do not acquire the concept BELIEVE before KNOW. 
As with all of these projects, a more in depth analysis may prove useful. 
3.2 Fodor’s compositionality constraint and my Theory-Theory view of concepts 
 In Chapter 6 I argued for a type of theory-theory view for certain mental state concepts 
based on the development of ToM. I argued that as children progress through stages of ToM 
development they use different concepts of mental states, and those concepts are at least 
partly individuated by the theories of mental states which children in those stages use (more 
specifically RR, PAR and BR). Although the theory-theory view is probably the most popular 
among developmental psychologists (Astington 1993; Carey 1985, 2010; Gopnik 1988, Gopnik & 
Meltzoff 1997; Gopnik & Wellman 1992, etc.), which is not surprising given the considerations I 
discuss in chapter 6, I don’t know of any philosophers who advocate such a view. Fodor (1998) 
makes a number of important criticisms of the view (which also apply to most other theories 
about concepts, especially those held by psychologists). In Chapter 6 I addressed Fodor’s 
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shareability objection, but the other major objection which needs to be defended against is his 
compositionality objection. 
 To say that thoughts are compositional is to say that the meaning of a complex thought, 
such as e.g. the thought Joe loves David, is a product of the meaning of the parts of the thought 
and syntactical rules for the proper arrangement of those parts. Fodor believes that 
compositionality is the only way to explain three important features of thoughts.137 First, 
thoughts are productive. This means that in principle (though not of course in practice) a person 
can think an infinite number of thoughts while having only a finite number of concepts. The 
thing which explains the productivity of thought is that thoughts are recursive, and this function 
is only possible if complex thoughts contain parts which contribute the same meaning each 
time they are used. The easiest way to see this is by using concepts such as and, or, etc. which 
allow one to add on to any thought. Hence, Joe loves David can become Joe loves David and 
Chantel, Joe loves David and Chantel and he teaches philosophy, and so on indefinitely. There 
are also for instance concepts represented by affixes in language which can likewise be 
repeated indefinitely: I wonder what the world will be like for my great-grandchild, I wonder 
what the world will be like for my great-great-grandchild, I wonder what the world will be like 
for my great-great-great-grandchild, etc. 
 The second feature of thoughts explained by compositionality is that thoughts are 
systematic. Systematicity means that if one can understand a thought, then one can 
understand a different thought containing the same semantic and syntactic constituents. 
                                                           
137 In fact, it is these three features that are more important to Fodor than the claim about compositionality itself. 
See e.g. Fodor 1998, p. 94. 
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Common examples include, for instance, if a person can understand the thought Joe loves 
Chantel, then that same person can understand the thought Chantel loves Joe. That same 
person may not, however, be able to entertain the thought Joe loves David (e.g. when the 
thinker doesn’t know the individual referred to by David). Similarly, the person who can think 
Joe is taller than Chantel can also think the thought Chantel is taller than Joe (but not 
necessarily the thought Joe is taller than David), etc. This is explained by the fact that both (1) 
although Joe loves Chantel and Chantel loves Joe are different thoughts, they both contain the 
same syntactic and semantic parts, and (2) if a person understands the meaning of those parts 
then that person can understand any thought with those same parts. 
 The third feature of thoughts that Fodor thinks is explained by compositionality is that 
different complex thoughts have identical parts, and those parts contribute the same exact 
meaning to those respective thoughts.138 For instance, the component brown contributes 
exactly the same meaning in the thought David is wearing a brown shirt as it does in the 
thought She has the most beautiful brown eyes. Among other things, this context independence 
explains for example how definite descriptions are able to refer to an object without naming it 
(Fodor 1998, pp. 99-100). Thus one can understand and use the definite description the brown 
purse to refer to a (salient) object without knowing anything else about the object other than it 
has the properties of being brown and being a purse.  
                                                           
138 Does this argument beg the question? If it does, then I assume it is my mistake and not Fodor’s. This is my 
attempt to capture what Fodor (1998) calls “the best argument for compositionality,” which is that “its traces are 
ubiquitous” (p. 99). 
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 I agree with Fodor that (most) thoughts are compositional, and this best explains the 
productivity, systematicity, and other features of thoughts. The issue arises for my theory-
theory view of mental state concepts because (assuming what I argue in Chapter 6 is correct) 
concepts such as KNOW are partly individuated by the overall theories of mind of which they 
are a part. For example, part of the content of the PAR child’s concept KNOW involves 
psychological laws such as knowing directly causes successful behavior and so on—viz. at least 
the 2 PAR rules, and probably other psychological generalizations of the PAR theory as well. 
And the ToM of the PAR child differs from that of the adult. So the concept KNOW does not 
contribute the same meaning to the complex thought Maxi knows where the chocolate is for 
the PAR child and the adult.  
 One important thing to note from the start is that Fodor’s general worry about holism 
(e.g. Fodor & Lepore 1992) doesn’t apply here. This is the concern that since everyone probably 
has different beliefs, then if concepts are dependent upon a person’s entire belief system no 
two individuals would mean the same thing by their concepts.  If this were so, then thoughts 
couldn’t be compositional since in effect the meaning of every concept (constituent of thought) 
would be relative to individuals. However, every child in the PAR stage shares the same ToM—
or at least they share the basic components that determine the content of mental state 
concepts such as SEE and KNOW. The same is true for older children and adults using BR. 
Therefore the only difficulty arises between people using different theories of mind; e.g. when 
a child using PAR communicates with an adult. However, as I note in Chapter 6, it’s an empirical 
question how well adults and PAR children communicate with each other about psychology, 
and my view is that there is a lot more talking past each other than is normally assumed. 
204 
 
 
 
 As it stands, I don’t see how this limited theory-theory is going to have a significant 
impact on the compositionality of thought. After all, even Fodor admits that there are non-
compositional thoughts, such as idiomatic expressions for example. As Fodor (1998) remarks, to 
say that thoughts are normally compositional “means something like: with not more than 
finitely many exceptions. ‘Idiomatic’ expressions are allowed, but they mustn’t be productive (p. 
94; italics in original). Thoughts are productive and systematic in my view; even thoughts 
containing mental state concepts. For instance, whether the thinker is in the PAR or BR stage, if 
she can grasp the thought Joe sees David then she can entertain the thought David sees Joe. It’s 
just that SEE means something different depending upon which stage of ToM development that 
thinker is currently in. In the BR stage SEE is representational but in the PAR stage it is not; so 
the two concepts are not the same. The concepts can be treated in the same way linguists treat 
semantic ambiguities. My view doesn’t conflict with the compositionality of thoughts so far as I 
can see. The meaning of most concepts may still be atomic in the Fodorian sense. 
 Fodor’s major worry about theory-theory views is his charge of inconsistency. He says 
that if concepts are partly constituted by the theories that contain them, then it is not possible 
to learn a new concept in place of the old one (1998; pp.115-119; cf. 1975). The meaning 
holism of theory-theory is incompatible with the view of cognitive development as conceptual 
change, according to Fodor. For instance, since the meaning of KNOW is partly constituted by 
the PAR theory for the 5-year-old, how do they learn the representational concept KNOW 
which replaces the outdated concept as they acquire the BR theory of mental states? The 
problem, according to Fodor (1998), is that “a theory can be used to effect the implicit 
definition of a new term only if at least some of its vocabulary is isolated from meaning changes 
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of the sorts that holists say that concept introduction brings about” (p. 115; italics in the 
original). The first PAR rule, for example, involves a relationship between perception and 
knowledge, but the PAR concepts SEE and KNOW are constituted by the PAR theory itself. So I 
owe an explanation of how the BR child acquires the adult representational concepts SEE and 
KNOW, since the difference between these two stages of development is precisely the 
acquisition of a new ToM, which will in turn individuate new mental state concepts. 
 I agree that I do owe such an explanation, and another future project will be spelling out 
the details of this process, ideally coupled with more empirical research into the transition 
between the three ToM stages. However, I disagree with Fodor’s a priori claim that this cannot 
be done. For instance, the PAR concept SEE will be related to other non-representational 
concepts, such as LOOK, DIRECTION, DISTANCE, OBJECT, ENVIRONMENT, and so on (see 
Chapter 3 above). These concepts are, in Fodor’s terminology, isolated from the vocabulary 
which is dependent upon the PAR theory. Concepts such as these mean the same in all three 
ToM stages and may be involved in the transitions between them. Likewise, the PAR concept 
KNOW will be related to non-representational concepts such as SUCCESS, FAILURE, ACTION and 
so forth (see Chapters 2 and 6 above). It will take some work to cash out the details of this 
story, but I’m not concerned about Fodor’s criticism being a death knell.  
 Granted, the most challenging part of the story of transition from PAR to BR will be 
explaining the acquisition of the concept of MENTAL REPRESENTATION, which is admittedly key 
to the mental state concepts contained in (and partly individuated by) the BR theory. How is 
this completely new conception of the mind acquired? However, here I have a hunch that the 
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way around Fodor’s criticism is to say that the BR theory is not learned. As sketched in Chapter 
6, my hunch is that the BR theory (along with RR, PAR and Rule A) is innate. The reasons for this 
are: (1) these theories are universally found among all human beings regardless of their culture, 
upbringing or education, (2) these theories do not appear to be the result of any learning 
process, and (3) the sole major factor in the acquisition of these theories seems to be the age 
of the subject (e.g. Wellman et al, 2001).  
The details of the argument can be found in Chapter 6 above, where I also note that 
Fodor (1987) already agrees with me that BR (what he would’ve called folk psychology) is 
innate. Fodor makes a case for this which could be added to my argument, including the lack of 
a rival explanation, and the fact that the complexity of the theory would likely make learning it 
too long a process for an individual life span. However, once again the details of this nativist 
theory need to be worked out, and experiments need to be designed to further test this 
hypothesis. (The most pressing challenge, which I shudder to think about, may be to give a 
fuller explanation of what exactly innate means.) 
3.3 Further development of the implications for the HOT theory of consciousness 
The PAR hypothesis presented in this monograph would seem to have drastic 
consequences for the Higher Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness. According to the 
HOT theory of consciousness, in order for a mental state M to be conscious, the subject must 
have a higher order thought (HOT) about that state (Carruthers 2000, Gennaro 2004, Rosenthal 
1986). For example, take Armstrong’s (1981) much discussed example of the long distance 
driver. Often when driving familiar routes or when travelling long distances on the freeway, we 
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have an experience of “zoning out,” where we are thinking about philosophy or listening to 
music or involved in conversation with a passenger. We may suddenly become aware of our 
surroundings (“Oh wow, look, we’re already almost to Watertown,” we think when we see the 
sign on 81 North) and realize we have been driving on automatic pilot but consciously 
concentrating on something else.  
According to Armstrong, when this happens you were perceiving the road (and other 
vehicles, traffic lights, etc.) this entire time, but weren’t consciously aware of this perception 
because you were consciously aware of e.g. thinking about the hard problem of 
consciousness.139 You must have been perceiving the road, or else you would have crashed 
during that large turn 10 miles back. However, you weren’t consciously perceiving the road, 
because you were aware of something else. Now that you have “come to” and are aware of 
driving once again, your perception of the road is conscious. According to HOT theory, what 
distinguishes the current, conscious perception from the former, unconscious perception is that 
there is a higher order thought directed at this perception of the road. 
Details of what this HOT is supposed to be are lacking in the literature. At the very least, 
however, in order to be a HOT at all it must be about the perception of the road. Since concepts 
are the constituents of thoughts, then the HOT that makes the perception of the road a 
conscious perception must have the concept SEE (or the like) as one of its parts. However, 
according to PAR theory, the representational concept SEE is not acquired until the BR stage of 
                                                           
139 Of course, Armstrong uses this example to motivate his own Higher Order Perception theory. However, HOP 
doesn’t have the same obvious difficulty that HOT does, since a child is able to perceive before she is able to 
understand perception. 
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ToM development, or until about 6 years of age. Hence a consequence of the HOT theory 
would be that children under the age of six cannot have conscious mental states. 
This problem with HOT theory, which Van Gulick (2006, p. 13) dubs the “too fancy” 
objection, has been discussed previously (Dretske 1995, Tye 1995). However, now the objection 
can be made more precisely, and there is clear empirical evidence in favor of it. Now we can say 
exactly what it is that is too sophisticated for a young child to possess, viz. an understanding of 
mental representation. Furthermore, the objection is also considerably strengthened. 
Previously, the “too fancy” objection was thought by many to apply only to infants, and not to 
school age children (cf. e.g. Gennaro 2012). Although I find the idea that infants don’t have 
phenomenal experience highly implausible, there have been philosophers who have notoriously 
bitten the bullet on this point (Carruthers 2000, 2005). However, it’s even less plausible to deny 
that 5-year-olds have conscious mental states. HOT theorists such as Gennaro (2012; Chapter 7) 
and Carruthers (2013) were hoping to be saved by the Nativist view (see Chapter 2 above), but 
the implausibility of ToM Nativism makes a strong case against the HOT theory of 
consciousness. To deny consciousness to a 5-year-old is preposterous.140 Therefore, this makes 
a third useful philosophical application of the PAR theory to be written up in more detail in the 
                                                           
140 The state of the art among HOT theorists is to embrace Nativism (Carruthers 2013, Gennaro 2012) , even for 
hardline theorists such as Carruthers who was at one time willing to deny that infants were conscious (2000). So 
the fall of Nativism, and a more protracted development than the Traditional View suggests, is a crushing blow for 
these philosophers. However, it should be noted that other HOT theorists have attempted to get around the “too 
fancy objection” by suggesting that HOTs do not require sophisticated concepts (see e.g. Rosenthal 1993). This 
may be a way around the issue I raise here for HOT theory, but then the HOT theorist owes an account of exactly 
what kind of non-conceptual thought a HOT is supposed to be, and how it is able to do the kind of work that the 
theory requires. 
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future. I also believe the theory can lend insight into what this phenomenal experience of 5-
year-olds must be like; this is the subject of Section 4.  
4. What it’s like to be a 5-Year-Old 
 In terms of my longer term research project exploring major philosophical issues 
through the lens of the PAR hypothesis, I plan to use it next to examine issues of consciousness. 
In particular, I believe the PAR hypothesis, along with an understanding of the child’s 
development of the concept of a self, can bring insight into the phenomenal experience of 
young children. 
4.1 Theories of consciousness 
 There is much work in philosophy attempting to provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions for consciousness. The prospects for this sort of project, however, appear to be 
bleak. For one thing, it’s difficult (perhaps impossible) to come up with a strict definition for 
almost any naturally occurring word (Fodor et al 1980). Also, this sort of program has a long 
history in Western philosophy—going back most famously to Plato but perhaps earlier—with an 
embarrassing track record. Outside of Logic, philosophy has failed to produce a single 
uncontroversial analysis of this sort after almost 3000 years. If we can’t even give necessary and 
sufficient conditions for something as ordinary and unmysterious as a chair or a book, then it 
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appears to be a waste of time attempting to come up with them for something as complicated 
and opaque as knowledge or consciousness.141 
 Just as Fodor (1975) provides a model for the methodology of this monograph (see 
Chapter 1), Fodor (1983) provides a model for how the sort of project I am undertaking here 
might take shape. Fodor (1983) does not attempt to give necessary and sufficient conditions for 
modular psychological mechanisms, but he notes that modular input systems form a natural 
psychological kind, and then goes on to discuss nine features which many of these systems 
share and which seem to demarcate a natural category. He argues “that the functionally 
specified class input system does pick out a ‘natural kind’ for purposes of psychological theory 
construction; that there are, in fact, lots of interesting things to say about the common 
properties of the mechanisms that mediate input analysis” (p. 44).142 The common properties 
which Fodor elaborates on in Part III are neither necessary nor sufficient. He says that “there 
appears to be a cluster of properties that they have in common but which, qua input analyzers, 
they might perfectly well not have shared” (p. 101). Nonetheless, qua modules these properties 
are important for making them the kind of thing that they are. 
 Although not exactly analogous, this project will follow a similar model of theory-
building.143 By consciousness I shall be referring to what Block (1995) calls phenomenal 
                                                           
141 Similar sentiments appear e.g. in Block (1995) and Searle (1992). Other philosophers argue that all (or many) 
concepts have fuzzy boundaries and lack strict necessary and sufficient conditions, most famously Wittgenstein 
(1953) but also Putnam’s “cluster concepts” (Putnam 1962). 
142 Fodor characterizes a natural kind as “a class of phenomena that have many scientifically interesting properties 
in common over and above whatever properties define the class” (p. 46). 
143 Differences between my project and Fodor’s include the fact that Fodor was taking a natural kind (input 
analyzers) and arguing that they share features which make them part of a distinct category, viz. modules. Another 
difference is that Fodor was able to delimit the category “input analyzers” because they form a functional kind, so 
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consciousness—the experiential mental states where there is something it is like (Nagel 1974) 
to have them.144145 I will take it to be obvious that the phenomenal consciousness of psycho-
typical human adults forms a natural kind. As such, it has scientifically and philosophically 
interesting features. Van Gulick (2011), Part 4, outlines seven such features, and notes that the 
list is not exhaustive (p.25). One of these features is that phenomenal experience includes some 
awareness of the self (however minimal), which Van Gulick (2006) calls “reflexive self-
awareness.” Block (1995) for instance notes that “P[henomenal]-Conscious states often seem 
to have a ‘me-ishness’ about them, the phenomenal content often represents the state as a 
state of me” (p. 178). Levine (2001) calls this aspect “the subjectivity of conscious experience.” 
It may even include some awareness of mental states, as for instance Kriegel (2003, 2009) 
argues. I believe this feature of consciousness can provide insight into the phenomenal 
experience of children in the PAR stage of cognitive development. 
4.2 Outline of the project 
If awareness of self and (perhaps) awareness of mental states are indeed important 
aspects of adult phenomenal experience, as I will argue, then the limited understanding of the 
                                                           
that he could give an account of mental architecture modeled on the biological taxonomy of organs. However, the 
function of consciousness is a much disputed matter in philosophy of mind. 
144 Block (1995) says, “P[henomenal]-conscious states are experiential states, that is, a state is P-conscious if it has 
experiential properties. The totality of the experiential properties of a state are ‘what it is like’ to have it… we have 
P-conscious states when we see, hear, smell, taste, and have pains. P-conscious properties include the experiential 
properties of sensations, feelings, and perceptions, but I would also include thoughts, wants, and emotions” 
(p.166). 
145 Kriegel (2009) complains about using the “what it’s like” locution to describe phenomenal consciousness, 
because different philosophers disagree about which states are captured by this phrase (p. 4). However, this latter 
controversy is tangential to the present project. Any states which have this character (recognizing that different 
philosophers will disagree about which states do in some cases) are what I am referring to by ‘consciousness’ in 
this project. Kriegel (2009)’s own rigidified definite description is too vague and uninformative as it stands, and too 
narrow for present purposes whenever precisified.  
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self and mental states which young children exhibit means that either children lack 
phenomenal consciousness, or else their phenomenal experience differs from that of psycho-
typical adults in some interesting ways. Since I take the first option to be obviously false, this 
project will explore what it is like to be a young child, and how the phenomenal experience of 
young children differs from that of adults in some interesting and important ways.146 
 Thus, we begin with the idea that an essential aspect of phenomenal experience is the 
self, or (better) subject of consciousness,147 which is experienced in a few ways. First, all 
conscious experience converges on a single subjective point of view. Second, practical day-to-
day maneuvering through an experienced environment requires understanding ourselves as 
agents. Third, understanding our phenomenal mental states likewise seems to require a sense 
of ownership, that these experiences are my experiences. I am the author of my internal 
monologue. Some support for this is that a breakdown in this sense of ownership may result in 
psychological disorders. Perhaps e.g. a lack of this leads to the intrusive thoughts experienced 
by schizophrenics or persons with OCD (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Finally, the 
narrative self of our episodic memory also ties together memories of my past experiences with 
plans for the future. Without some subject of consciousness who experiences all of these 
                                                           
146 One question to be considered is whether consciousness goes through stages in a fashion similar to ToM 
development (and perhaps even because of it), or whether consciousness should be thought of as a continuum or 
spectrum in which typical adult and child consciousness appear at different points. 
147 My reasons for avoiding talking about the self involve the vagueness of the concept and that it often has an 
interpretation which is much thicker than required, and may push us into a version of what Van Gulick (2006) dubs 
the “too fancy” objection. (This would be the idea that creatures who aren’t sophisticated enough to have a self 
intuitively have phenomenal experience. I’m doubtful whether cats e.g. have a robust sense of self, but I take it as 
obvious that they have consciousness.) Furthermore, I think it’s an open empirical and philosophical question 
whether there is such a thing as a self in the robust sense. The state of the art in psychology suggests that we 
instead have “a loose confederation of sub-selves” (Block 2005; see also Gazzaniga 1998, Kurzban & Aktipis 2007). 
Lastly, philosophical discussions of the self are often concerned with personal identity, which is a metaphysical 
issue and tangential to the current project. 
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mental states, episodic or autobiographical memory wouldn’t be possible.148 Likewise, deficits 
in episodic memory can create a loss of identity (e.g. the case of William in Sacks 1985, Chapter 
12). 
Since they lack a conception of mental representation before the age of six (a central 
thesis of the present monograph), young children are not aware of their mental states as 
mental states. They don’t have the sense of ownership or sense of agency which is so crucial to 
the phenomenal experience of adults. As the studies on Level 1 and Level 2 Perspective-Taking 
demonstrate (see Chapter 3), they are also not aware (at least at an early age) that different 
people experience the world from different subjective points of view. Arguably, then, they may 
not even realize that their phenomenal experiences converge upon a single, subjective point of 
view. Since young children lack a conception of mental states, they also lack a conception of 
themselves as conscious subjects of mental states. Thus, their phenomenal experience is 
fundamentally different from that of psycho-typical adults. So runs the argument of this project 
in broad outline. 
One reason for thinking that these features are important is that deficits of these 
aspects arguably characterize at least some aspects of psychological disorders such as 
schizophrenia and identity disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). There is already 
some precedent for what would be characterized as a psychological disorder in adults to be 
normal during the course of childhood development. For instance, obsessive-compulsive 
                                                           
148 One interesting question is whether episodic memory and autobiographical memory are the same thing. Gopnik 
(2009) makes an interesting suggestion that young children may have the former, because they can remember 
specific events, but lack the latter, because they don’t organize those memories into a coherent timeline (p. 147). 
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behaviors which would be considered pathological for adults are prevalent during the toddler 
years of normally developing children (Evans et al 1997). Although I’m not suggesting that 
identity disorders or the like are a normal stage of cognitive development, it is possible that 
normal development involves some related defecits; e.g. it may be normal to lack a coherent 
stream of consciousness or episodic memory for a time. For instance, it is known that children 
under the age of five don’t tell the type of narratives normally associated with episodic 
memory, and don’t verbally demonstrate any sense of ownership of their memories (Nelson & 
Fivush 2004). They also have difficulty freely recalling their memories without being prompted 
(Ornstein et al 2006). 
4.3 Chapter plan for the project 
 After an introduction and overview of the project in Chapter One, Chapter Two (“Self-
Reflexive Consciousness”) will begin with some intuition pumps that typical adult phenomenal 
experience includes some understanding of the self, and will discuss Van Gulick’s sketch of 
reflexive self-awareness as a starting point for the positive descriptive task of outlining the self-
reflexive aspect of consciousness. Next I will examine Kriegel’s view, which is in its most basic 
form the thesis that a mental state is conscious iff the subject is aware of it, and that our 
awareness is constituted by the self-representation of phenomenal states. I will argue that this 
thesis admits of a de re/de dicto ambiguity. Roughly, Kriegel leaves it open whether subjects are 
aware of mental states in some way or another (de re) or as such (de dicto).149 The same 
                                                           
149 Rosenthal’s HOT view admits of the same ambiguity. Making this distinction allows a sharpening of Dretske 
(1993)’s criticism of Rosenthal, but at any rate the challenges for HOT-theory enumerated in Van Gulick (2006) and 
Kriegel (2009) make the view extremely problematic in my view. 
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ambiguity applies to representation. The de re reading is true but trivial, and the de dicto 
reading is false because children are conscious but lack awareness of mental states as such until 
about six and a half years of age. 
 Chapter Three (“The Subject of Consciousness”) will draw on various sources from 
analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and psychology to present an original and detailed 
analysis of the self-reflexivity of phenomenal consciousness. Part of this project will involve 
distinguishing between various theses which sometimes go under this umbrella. There seem to 
be four important aspects of the self-reflexivity of consciousness (outlined in the previous 
section) which are conceptually distinct but certainly not unrelated. 
 First, all aspects of our phenomenal experience converge upon a single point of view. 
Consider for instance our phenomenal experience as we sit in a tavern. The cold glass of beer in 
front of me, the bartender moving behind my focus, the people getting less and less vivid as 
they are arranged further into the periphery, the smells of pizza and cigarette smoke wafting in 
from different sides of me, the humming noise of various indistinguishable conversations 
coming from different directions in the background as I focus on what my friend is telling me 
directly to my right, the feel of the hard wood on my back which I only become aware of as I 
focus on it, the football game being played on a speaker above me and to the left, the cold wet 
handle of the glass mug and the weightiness of the contents as I hoist it to my mouth, the crisp 
refreshing taste of the beer as I drink, and the proprioceptive awareness of my body in space. 
At any one time, we have an incredibly rich and varied array of experiences which are directed 
at our own unique perspective upon the world. There is a vast sea of experience, what Searle 
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(2005 and elsewhere) calls the “unified conscious field,” which always converges upon a single 
vantage point, with an obvious area of focus and other experiences fading further and further 
into the background from that focus, until—like the feel of the shirt on one’s body and familiar 
background noises—we seem to lose awareness of them altogether at times. Let’s call this the 
subjectivity of consciousness.150 
 It’s difficult to conceive of phenomenal experience which lacked this subjective point of 
view, but it’s hard to tell whether that is of metaphysical import or simply a limit of our 
imagination. Films, for example, convey images coming from various points of view rather than 
a single one (think of how jarring and unsettling it would be if our normal experience was like 
this!), but nonetheless all of the images have some point of view. Supposing God exists, 
perhaps his phenomenal experience would be of the totality of the world from a third-person 
perspective (something like the “God’s-eye point of view” of Gabriel García Márquez’s novels). 
However it seems impossible to conceive of what this would be like. Some philosophers, 
including Searle (2005), Kriegel (2009), and Sartre (1943), contend that consciousness without 
this subjective character is a metaphysical impossibility. 
 Second, there is a sense of agency accompanying our phenomenal experience and our 
practical day to day getting around in the world. We feel ourselves to be the causes of our 
actions, and this seems to be necessary in order to do the kinds of planning and making rational 
sense of human behavior that we do. To begin with, consider the sea of experiences at a tavern 
                                                           
150 Perhaps it should be noted that it’s not at all clear whether this is what Kriegel (2009) means by “the subjective 
character of consciousness.” At any rate, Kriegel’s characterization of the latter as the “for-me-ness” of our 
phenomenal consciousness is much too vague to do any real work in the present context. 
217 
 
 
 
that we used as an example two paragraphs back. Accompanying all of these experiences there 
is also the sense that I have some voluntary control over them. I can change my focus, for 
example. I could stop attending to my friend’s conversation and listen to the ball game, or turn 
my visual attention from the mug of beer to the bartender making drinks. I can also change the 
conscious field by simply turning my head. We can imagine a being who experiences everything 
passively, who is unable to turn her head or move her eyes, and whose focus of attention is 
constantly being pulled from one thing to another without her control, in the way that our 
attention is sometimes “grabbed”—for example in the cocktail party effect when I hear my 
name coming clearly from the babble of background conversations behind me. This kind of 
experience is conceivable, but it would be very different from our own. 
 Beyond this, we could also imagine a being who had no control over her decisions and 
actions, whose consciousness inhabited a sort of robot which was completely under someone 
else’s control. When a button is pushed, she feels the arm of the robot raise. However, our own 
phenomenal experience includes a robust sense of freedom of the will (even if philosophical 
argument convinces us that this is an illusion). Actions don’t just happen, but rather I decide 
and act. If this weren’t the case, then interpreting human behavior in terms of reasons for 
acting and responsibility for certain actions would not make sense. The latter practices would 
also seem to depend upon the subjectivity of consciousness. In order to make sense of the idea 
that my thirst gives me a reason to drink beer, it must be the same subject who sees the beer, 
feels the thirst, makes the conscious decision to drink, and then lifts the glass to the lips and all 
the rest of it. The sense of agency is related to what Van Gulick (2006) calls “the pragmatic 
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aspect of our experiential content”—things are present to us in experience as possibilities for 
practical engagement with the world. 
 Third, there is what I call the sense of ownership we have over our phenomenal states. 
An important aspect of our phenomenal experience is that these are my experiences. I am the 
one smelling the pizza and hearing the football game. I need to understand that I am the one 
seeing the mug and desiring the beer in order to make sense of my decision to lift it and drink 
it. I need to understand that I am the one seeing the truck coming towards me in order to jump 
out of the way. People sometimes lose this sense of ownership over their own body parts, and 
feel for example that their own leg belongs to someone else (Vallar & Ronchi 2009). This 
phenomenon must include a corresponding loss in proprioception. It’s not clear how often 
similar deficits could occur for mental states, but a plausible explanation for the intrusive 
thoughts experienced by schizophrenics is that they lack this sense of ownership for some of 
their internal monologue. 
 Fourth, there is our episodic memory, our autobiographical narrative which connects 
past experiences with future plans. Psychologist Endel Tulving (1985) distinguished semantic 
memories, such as remembering that Albany is the capital of New York, from episodic memory, 
such as remembering your first kiss. Episodic memories include recollection of phenomenal 
experiences, such as remembering the feel of rain on one’s face, the touch of soft lips, the smell 
of perfume, and the sense of embarrassment one felt after realizing that the kiss was being 
watched by a teacher. That phenomenology has the same subjectivity and sense of ownership 
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that occurrent phenomenal experiences exhibit. Episodic memory also allows us to organize 
past events coherently and make plans for the future based upon past events. 
This sort of memory is importantly related to constructing a sense of self which persists 
through time. Persons with dissociative identity disorder have distinct timelines and memories 
for their separate personalities.151  When preschool and kindergarten children are asked to 
recall their day, they don’t tell the same sort of story full of self-references that adults would (“I 
was talking with Santos and the teacher told me to be quiet” etc.) but instead give what 
psychologists and computer programmers call “scripts” (“Well, first the teacher gets everybody 
together in a circle, and then you sing, and then it’s naptime, and after that you paint” etc.) 
[Fivush 2011]. There is some important connection between self-awareness and episodic 
memory. 
 Lastly, although it seems at least conceptually possible that any of these four features 
could exist without the other three, the occurrence of all of them together would appear 
necessary in order to give the sense of unity and coherence which our phenomenal experience 
exhibits. Also, there may be some important dependency relations between them. For instance, 
understanding ourselves as agents may require the subjectivity of consciousness and the 
understanding that these are my perceptions, motivations and decisions (i.e. a sense of 
ownership). Perhaps a sense of agency is required for a sense of ownership. Here I am thinking 
of certain anosognosia patients who are unaware of their inability to move a body limb, and 
                                                           
151 For instance, Baars et al (2003) note that “patients with identity disorders such as fugue (a rapid change in 
personal identity lasting weeks or months) often show amnesia for the eclipsed self. When the patient returns to 
normal, he or she might report time loss—a period of weeks from which no conscious experiences can be recalled. 
It as is if each personality serves to organize and interpret conscious events during its time of dominance” (p.673). 
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report thinking that it belongs to someone else. At any rate features two and three seem tightly 
interconnected. Also, a sense of ownership appears necessary to have a coherent 
autobiographical memory. If I don’t recognize that I was the person receiving the email last 
month, then I have no reason to revise and resubmit the paper by the deadline next Friday. 
 Chapter Four will examine the level of understanding of the self as a subject of 
consciousness and the level of understanding of mental states which is entailed by the analysis 
of the previous chapter. In other words, how much must a subject understand about mental 
states and the self in order to have this sort of phenomenal experience, which is the kind 
psycho-typical adults have? This is a difficult issue because, on the one hand, robust intellectual 
understanding of the self and mental states is obviously not necessary. After all, there is still 
plenty no one knows about mental states and the self. On the other hand, some awareness of 
the self seems to be necessary for psycho-typical adult consciousness. 
 Chapter Five (“Seeing and Believing: Children’s Understanding of Mental States”) will 
summarize the evidence presented in this monograph, demonstrating that children under the 
age of roughly 6.5 years lack a conception of mental representation. This monograph explored 
children’s understanding of belief (Chapter 2), perception (Chapter 3), and mental concepts in 
general (see especially Chapters 5 and 6). If some of the work outlined in Section 2 (exploring 
children’s understanding of desire and other mental states) above is completed by this point, 
this will also be summarized in Chapter 5 of What it’s like to be a 5-year-old. The cognitive 
development of theory of mind sheds light on the consciousness of children in the early stages 
of development, viz. the reality reason (RR) and perceptual access reasoning (PAR) stages. For 
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instance, understanding perception involves understanding that different perspectives yield 
different visual representations. As I explain in Chapter 3, Flavell (1974) distinguishes two kinds 
of perspective understanding. 
Consider Level 1 perspective taking. To understand seeing, one must be able to 
recognize that different people see different things. This is a very rudimentary, basic belief, 
which follows straightforwardly from recognizing that things look differently from different 
perspectives, combined with the recognition that it must also be like this for others. 
Understanding visual representation minimally requires recognizing that different people can 
see different things than what I see. Surely, someone who answers that she sees a dog (when 
the picture is facing her but away from the experimenter), and that the experimenter also sees 
a dog, doesn’t understand what it means to see. Yet, Moll and Tomasello (2006) found that 18-
month-olds gave the correct answer in a version of a Level 1 task less than half of the time (i.e. 
they were performing at less than chance). Thus these young children lack even a rudimentary 
understanding of perceptual states, and their perceptual experience probably does not include 
a sense of themselves as agents, and maybe not even a realization that their perceptual 
experiences converge upon a single, subjective point of view.152 
Mental states such as perceptions are of course representations. Furthermore, as 
philosophers initially suggested to psychologists (Bennett, 1978; Dennett, 1978; Harman, 1978), 
a good way to test whether someone understands mental representation is to test whether 
they are sensitive to misrepresentation. It would be implausible to say that someone can 
                                                           
152 See Chapter 3 above for more on children’s understanding of perception and its development. 
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understand representation without realizing that representations can sometimes misrepresent 
reality. Flavell and colleagues have also explored when children learn that reality can be 
different than it appears (the appearance/reality distinction; Flavell et al, 1983; see Chapter 3 
above). One task they used to test this involved showing children a sponge which looks like a 
rock, and then allowing them to handle it. After the child is familiarized with the fake rock, it is 
placed on the table. Children are then asked, “Is this really a rock or really a sponge?” and 
“When you look at this with your eyes right now, does it look like a rock or look like a sponge?” 
They found that before four years of age children tend to give the same answer for both 
questions (i.e. they say that it really is a sponge, but also that it looks like a sponge), presumably 
because they don’t realize that things can be different than they appear to be.153 Flavell, Green 
& Flavell (1995) also found that 5-year-olds failed to understand thinking about something, 
even after familiarization and education. As explained in Chapter 2 above, probably the most 
startling lack of understanding of mental representation by children as old as four and five is 
evidenced by their failure on the true belief task (Fabricius et al, 2010). 
This finding is significant, because part of what is required to pass this true belief task is 
the understanding that Maxi has a representation (belief) of the location of the chocolate which 
will persist through a brief departure and subsequent return. When combined with other 
findings in theory of mind development, this makes a compelling case that children younger 
than 6 years of age do not understand mental representation, as this monograph argues. 
Furthermore, lacking this sort of understanding would seem to preclude them from 
                                                           
153 In my view, 4-year-olds don’t understand mental representation, so there is no such thing as appearances for 
them; there is only how the world is, and access to that world or lack thereof. See Chapter 3 for details. 
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understanding themselves as owners of such states, and experiencing the world as the sort of 
interplay between agents and things presented to consciousness that Van Gulick (2004, 2006) 
describes. Thus, their conscious experience is importantly different from our own. 
Chapter Six (“Understanding of the Self in Young Children”) will examine the relevant 
empirical literature from developmental psychology, use the analysis in Chapter Three to 
organize the findings, and argue for a view concerning children’s understanding of the self. 
When children acquire a sense of self is an issue of current debate amongst psychologists and 
philosophers, so getting clear about this will be difficult but worthwhile even outside of the 
current project. Some argue that the work of Meltzoff and Moore, which demonstrates that 
newborns are capable of imitating facial expressions of an adult experimenter, is sufficient to 
demonstrate that an awareness of the self is innate (Gallagher & Meltzoff 1996, Wider 2006).  
However, children don’t pass the standard mirror test until about eighteen months to 
two years of age (Brooks-Gunn & Lewis 1984),154 and Daniel Povinelli has found that adding a 
small amount of time (about 5 minutes) to the mirror test will cause 3-year-olds to fail (Povinelli 
et al 1999, Povinelli 2001). He and his colleagues surreptitiously placed a sticker on children’s 
heads while they were being videotaped, and then immediately watched the video alongside 
the young subjects. 5-year-olds reached for the sticker on their own foreheads, but younger 
children did not, even though they recognized that the person in the video was them. Povinelli 
                                                           
154 This is the well-known test where a sticker is placed on the baby’s forehead and then she is shown her own 
image in a mirror. Touching the sticker on one’s head rather than the one in the mirror constitutes passing. 
(Incidentally, I’m not sure how much stock I put in this test. Cats, for instance, are not supposed to pass; but I once 
witnessed my own cat turn from staring at his image in the mirror to swat at a fly which he first saw in the mirror. 
He must have realized that he was looking at himself in the mirror in order to do this. I suppose the mirror test is 
sufficient but not necessary for some understanding of self.) 
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argues that 3-year-olds don’t connect the past self with the current self, because they didn’t 
realize that putting a sticker on them five minutes ago meant that the sticker would still be on 
their forehead. 
What is required for the sort of self-awareness involved in adult phenomenal experience 
requires not only synchronic recognition of the self in the moment, but also an understanding 
of the self through time.155 Hence understanding children’s episodic memory will also be 
important, and there is some evidence that young children don’t have the concept of a 
diachronic self. Even after they are able to remember specific past events (episodic memory), 
young children have difficulty putting those events in order in a timeline. For instance, 3- and 4-
year-olds—who are very accurate at telling which pictures they have seen before and which 
they haven’t—have difficulty telling whether they saw the picture today or yesterday 
(McCormack & Hoerl 2005, 2007). 
 Finally, Chapter Seven (“The Phenomenal Experience of Young Children”) will comprise 
an informed speculation about what the phenomenal experience of children at various stages 
from birth to about six and a half years of age must be like in comparison to that of the psycho-
typical adult, given their limited understanding of the self and of mental states during those 
stages. One obvious constraint will be that the view is compatible with the developmental 
psychology studies of consciousness in children (Flavell et al 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000); 
                                                           
155 There is an interesting parallel with the theory of mind literature here. Many researchers attributed an 
understanding of mental states too early in development because they failed to notice that understanding mental 
representations requires understanding that they are maintained through time in a person’s mind, and are not 
merely synchronic episodes connected to the current situation. 
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however there isn’t much of the latter to go on.156 Finally, I will make a comparison between 
my (eventual) view and that recently put forward by Alison Gopnik (2009, Chapters 4 and 5).157 
  
                                                           
156 Also, this literature might turn out to be irrelevant insofar as it focuses on children’s understanding of 
consciousness rather than their actual phenomenal experience. 
157 I would like to acknowledge the following for useful discussions about some of the ideas presented in this 
chapter: Bill Fabricius (Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4), Bob Van Gulick, Bernie Kobes (Section 3.1), Kevan Edwards 
(Section 3.2), and Ty Boyer (Section 2.2). 
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